FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL

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The Editor

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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IMAGE AND REALITY IN INDOCHINA

By Harrison E. Salisbury

REEXAMINING the 30 and more years since Indochina entered the agenda of world problems one is struck constantly by the curious mirages, the discordance between image and reality which seem to persist not only in American perceptions of Indochina but in the evaluations by other great powers and the Indochinese themselves of the actual nature and goals of U.S. policy.

We are all familiar with the "mirror image" phenomenon in which two rival powers tend to see each other in somewhat similar turns of threat, each mirroring the other's fears and expectations, thus often giving rise to self-fulfilling prophecies. The Indochina phenomenon is different. It lies in a distortion of perception in which one, two or more powers see a different sequence of events as being in progress, each one of these images having little or no resemblance to reality or to the image in the consciousness of the other powers. It strikingly reminds one of the classic Japanese story of Rashomon. An event, a series of events takes place. But exactly what were these events? To each participant it seems that a different thing has happened. We see the tragedy through the eyes of one participant after the other. Each vision is so different, so contradictory, that in the end we can never be certain of what it is that has actually transpired.

So it is with Indochina. I think that it is this diverse interplay of myth and reality, this inability at almost any given moment to find common understanding not only of motivation but of the nature of current evolutions which has placed resolution of the Indochina problem almost beyond the reach of even the most skillful diplomats.

For the United States this process began long, long ago. Even before our entry into World War II, President Roosevelt was

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expressing to Admiral Leahy, our ambassador to Vichy, the essence of what came to be an *idée fixe*—that French colonial policy in Indochina (and to a lesser extent that of the Dutch in the East Indies and the British in Southeast Asia) was "responsible" for the aggressions of the Japanese. Indeed, later, FDR went so far as to blame the whole war in the Pacific on the colonial powers and, specifically, on the French. He advised Leahy on July 29, 1941, that "if Japan wins Japan gets Indochina—if the Allies win *we* would" take it over. It is not likely that he contemplated an actual "U.S. takeover." More probably, he had in mind some kind of international supervision in which the United States would play a leading role.

It was the President's confused view that France and French policy in Indochina were "responsible" for Japan's aggression and that France must therefore be penalized, and specifically, that for this reason Indochina must never go back to the French. The President's position hardened with the years. He advanced it at the wartime meetings with Churchill and Stalin, winning mild, pro forma support from Stalin (who never displayed the slightest interest in this portion of the world) and indignation on the part of Churchill, who was always aroused by Roosevelt's stubborn desire to liquidate colonial empires.

Probably the acme of Rooseveltian schemes for Indochina (of course, by this time under the vicious occupation of the Japanese) was a proposal conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek through Vice President Wallace during his 1944 mission to Chungking in which he offered China a "trusteeship" over Indochina on the grounds that, after all, the Indochinese and the Chinese were "the same kind of people."

If Mr. Roosevelt's thesis that French conduct in Indochina put the Japanese on the road to Pearl Harbor was dubious, his assumption of communality between the peoples of Indochina and those of China displayed an even more profound distortion of reality, both ethnic and historic. Probably the most striking fact about the Indochinese (be they Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians or Montagnards) is their ethnic differentiation from the Han Chinese, the two thousand years of intermittent war and struggle between the Indochinese and the Chinese and the implacable hostility and fear with which most Indochinese regard the Chinese. It is no accident that the first visit of every foreigner coming to Hanoi is to the Museum of the Revolution where

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he is shown the historic record of the endless wars with the Chinese, combat that started at a time when the Vietnamese occupied areas of what is now South China, and is made acquainted with the national and folk heroes of Vietnam, all of them winning their fame in victories over the hated Chinese.

Fortunately, Chiang Kai-shek possessed a keener grasp of reality than FDR. He rejected Roosevelt's offer. There is no record as to what he thought the American motive might be but it would have been natural for him to think that the President was trying to stir up trouble for China in Southeast Asia.

Thus the situation stood at the time of FDR's death in April 1945. Because of his repeated insistence, the French were not permitted to participate in the liberation of Indochina. Under plans made before the President's death the Chinese accepted the Japanese surrender in the north and the British in the south.

This early episode makes plain that major illusions as to the nature of Indochina lay largely on the American side, that is, specifically, in President Roosevelt's mind. But another small yet significant episode involving Indochina and the United States was in the process of taking shape. A close and increasingly warm and friendly liaison had been established in Indochina between special U.S. forces (specifically, OSS teams) and the Vietminh, the nationalist Vietnamese movement, then led by Ho Chi Minh. These relations have sometimes been characterized in recent years in a rather sentimental way, as if they were compounded simply of goodwill and good feeling between the OSS team, on the one hand, and Ho, on the other. That genuine mutual regard existed on both sides there can be no doubt. When Ho in September 1945 proclaimed the new Republic of Vietnam he modelled his declaration on the U.S. Declaration of Independence, actually requesting of the OSS men a copy of the Declaration in order to copy its language in his draft. None of the OSS officers possessed a copy. None the less, the Vietnamese declaration begins: "All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. . . ." At about the same time a delegation of Vietminh ladies called at the OSS Mission in Hanoi, asking to be put in touch with their sister American organization, the Daughters of the American Revolution. There is no record as to what, if anything, resulted from this bizarre effort.

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The Americans saw in these relations a "natural" affinity between themselves and Ho's Vietminh. What did Ho see? Did he and his associates feel a kinship between their movement, their independence, their revolution and that of America? There was some such feeling, and even in his last years when deeply engaged in warfare with the United States Ho occasionally spoke with nostalgia of the Statue of Liberty (which he had seen as a young seaman) and of the principles of the American Constitution. But underlying this was something, of course, far more fundamental, as Ho's policy clearly revealed. In 1945 Ho had three major antagonists: the Japanese, who were being expelled from Indochina and who, presumably, would not soon again endanger the region; the French, who were only too eager to resume their colonial overlordship; and the Chinese, whom geography and history had made Indochina's traditional enemy.

What more natural, then, that Ho hoped to get a distant and presumably disinterested but important power involved as Indochina's chief protector? This would prevent the return of France and would hold the Chinese at bay. This was the classic policy of the weak power. It was the device which Turkey employed during its long years as "the sick man of Europe."

That, in fact, Ho was actually following the policy of the "lesser evil" quickly became apparent. When, after Roosevelt's death, U.S. policy changed, and the way was opened for France's return, Ho did not turn to the Chinese as a "protecting power" (as FDR might have expected). Rather, he sought to make a deal with the French and successfully concluded one which the French promptly violated. Anything, thus, rather than be thrust into the nearby Asian but dangerous arms of the Chinese. Even as the war with the French quickened Ho did not turn to China. The Vietminh fought on their own. Only after the emergence of Mao's communist régime, that is after—considerably after—1949, did Ho approach China and even then on a carefully limited and circumscribed basis.

This ancient history is useful as a benchmark in analyzing later development of great-power policy vis-à-vis Indochina. It shows the United States frequently misjudging the reality in Indochina. It shows Indochina misjudging the United States as well. It also shows marked realism—and antagonism—between Indochina and China and profound lack of interest in the whole region on the part of the Soviet Union.

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Between 1945 and 1950 France was the principal outside power engaged in Indochina. U.S. interest was minimal. So was that of the Soviet Union. China, wracked by the great struggle of nationalists versus communists, had neither time nor inclination for affairs beyond its frontiers.

It was the success of the communist Chinese Revolution and the steadily deteriorating position of the French which finally brought Indochina back into American focus—but a focus which was probably more distorted than it had ever been before or was likely to be in the future.

From 1949 onward the official American perception of Indochina cannot be separated from the U.S. overview of the communist world and, specifically, of the Chinese Revolution. Mao's success was seen initially as a Chinese victory in a Chinese civil war. But this image quickly was to change. The signature of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, February 14, 1950, after a long visit to Moscow by Mao, was widely interpreted in and out of the U.S. government as primary evidence that the Kremlin had "put over" the Chinese Revolution and now dominated Peking.

As Senator McCarthy said on March 30, 1950: "It was not Chinese democracy under Mao that conquered China as Acheson, Lattimore and Jessup contended. Soviet Russia conquered China, and an important ally of this conqueror was the small left-wing element in our Department of State."

Or as Dean Rusk put it a year later, May 18, 1951: "We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping régime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese."

It was not necessary for Dean Acheson and President Truman to share this view in toto (although they may have moved very far in this direction by mid-spring 1950) for them to agree on May 8, 1950, to advance $10,000,000 in credits to France for the support of the Bao Dai régime which was opposing Ho's Vietminh. By this time Acheson had been persuaded that the Kremlin was directing the Vietminh operations in Indochina.

The date of May 8, 1950, is an important one. Ordinarily it is assumed that the U.S. involvement in Vietnam occurred *after* Korea, that is in June 1950. In reality we had already begun to edge into Indochina *before* Korea under the perceived image of a united, powerful communist challenge, directed in Moscow

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and remarkably reinforced by the "puppet" régime in Peking.

What was the reality of China and the communist world at that moment?

II

We now know it was far, far different. Mao Tse-tung arrived in Moscow in early December 1949, having officially proclaimed his régime on October 1, 1949. The treaty with Stalin was signed nearly two months later, February 14, 1950. There was much evidence at that time (and even earlier) suggesting that Sino-Soviet relations were neither so close nor so warm as each party sought to indicate. But it was only after the open breach of the two powers and the polemics beginning in 1961 that Nikita Khrushchev revealed the reality—that China and Russia almost came to a parting of the ways in the very period when the world, and America in particular, concluded they were almost one and the same thing. Mao was so outraged by Stalin's "great power chauvinism," his insistence upon quasi-colonial agreements for the exploitation of China's natural resources, his determination to regain Russia's traditional economic and military posture in North China and Manchuria (and especially, the Dairen and Port Arthur bases) that Mao almost broke off talks. The two powers were held together only by their perception of the overwhelming danger of U.S. aggression.

The inference is clear that had President Truman and Secretary Acheson persisted in the policy which was almost surely their intention in the autumn of 1941, after Mao's October 1 proclamation and before his arrival in Moscow in December—that is, to move toward the recognition of the new Peking régime—this act alone would have been sufficient to derail the alliance of the two communist states and set China on the path of a far different course in world affairs.

Thus, by mid-spring 1950 America perceived a singular unity and direction of a Muscovite communist menace in Asia (which, in fact, did not exist) and the two communist powers perceived a unified aggressive U.S. policy (which, in fact, did not exist). What of the perceptions in Peking of Russia and in Moscow of Peking?

There is substantial evidence to indicate that Stalin, at least, envisaged Mao as much more of an immediate and direct threat than, perhaps, Mao saw Stalin. I support that conclusion with

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what I readily confess is a somewhat unorthodox hypothesis concerning the cause and origin of the Korean War. I believe the war was instigated by Stalin but that his target was not, as is supposed, the United States but actually communist China.

In general terms, we know that Stalin placed very little confidence in any foreign communist leaders, including those he had named himself. The long record of hostile relations between the Chinese Party and Stalin and the emergence of Mao with a program and a strategy almost diametrically opposed to Stalin's (Mao, of course, was repeatedly reprimanded and even expelled from the Central Committee and the party for his deviations) in itself would be strong evidence for Stalinist hostility. The years 1949 and 1950 were those of extreme paranoia on Stalin's part, so far as foreign parties were concerned, touched off by Tito's defiant break. These were the years when Stalin and his secret police put in motion the purges of the East European parties, eliminating the old wheelhorses and replacing them with even more handpicked police nominees. There was nothing in the emergence and success of Mao and his movement calculated to quiet Stalin's nerves. In Moscow he purged at least two suspected Maoists, Mikhail Borodin and Anna Louise Strong.

Moreover, there is compelling evidence that even before Mao proclaimed his régime Stalin had secretly begun to construct an apparatus in China, to be used for his own purposes when the time came. His vehicle was a Chinese party official named Kao Kang who emerged in early 1949 as the leader of the special Northeastern Autonomous region. As early as June and July of 1949 Kao Kang had been to Moscow and had signed special direct economic and other agreements. His relations with Moscow were extremely close, quite independent of Peking, and he was the virtual master of the most important industrial area of China. After Stalin's death convincing evidence came to light that Kao Kang was, in fact, Stalin's agent. He committed suicide and was charged by the Chinese with having been a traitor and with having plotted to turn Manchuria into a separate "kingdom." No public mention of whom he may have plotted with. The only plausible partner, of course, was Stalin, with whom he had so often conferred.

Premier Tsedenbal of Outer Mongolia has told me that one of Mao's first acts on coming to power was a request to Stalin for the return to Chinese suzerainty of Outer Mongolia. Stalin re-

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fused this request and tightened his control of this strategic area with its 1,500-mile frontier on China under his most reliable ally, the then party chief Choibalsan. He also improved Soviet military positions in Manchuria and North China by the terms of the 1950 treaty.

In the reality of the Soviet position vis-à-vis China the Korean venture assumes a radically new light. Acheson on January 12, 1950, speaking to the National Press Club in Washington, had drawn the U.S. defense line in the Pacific from Alaska and the Aleutians to Japan to the Ryukyus (Okinawa) and south to the Philippines. He did not mention Korea in this context. There were other similar statements (including one the year before by MacArthur), but the Acheson declaration was the most important. It was specific, detailed, calculated. There could be no reason for the omission of Korea (although Acheson continues to argue otherwise), except that it was not, in fact, on the U.S. defense perimeter.

The United States and Russia had withdrawn their occupation forces from South and North Korea respectively. I think it is reasonable to assume that Stalin felt he could take Washington's word—that we did not feel obligated to rise to the defense of South Korea.

This, then, unexpectedly presented him with a tempting possibility: if he could overrun all of Korea he would, in fact, (although Mao, ignorant of the secret Stalin-Kao Kang relationship, could not be aware of this) be able to dominate Peking from positions in Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea. He would possess the power to deal with Mao as he once said he would with Tito ("I'll shake my little finger and Tito will fall").

Khrushchev in his new volume of reminiscences depicts Kim Il-sung as coming to Moscow and asking permission to attack the South—permission which Stalin gave. If this hypothesis is correct, Stalin triggered the Korean War on the basis of a mistaken image of the U.S. position. He anticipated noninterference. He got, instead, massive intervention under the auspices of the United Nations.

But if Stalin's image of the U.S. position was distorted, the U.S. image of Korea, Russia and China was equally distorted. Whatever the inner convictions of President Truman and Secretary Acheson may have been regarding the instigator of the conflict they treated it as one, basically, of Chinese aggression. Mos-

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cow was asked to use its good offices in Pyongyang and Peking to persuade Kim Il-sung to withdraw. The U.S. response, outside of Korea, was entirely directed against the image of imminent Chinese aggression. The President not only ordered General MacArthur to take up Korea's defense. He gave Chiang Kai-shek the pledge specifically denied him in October 1949, an immediate defense blanket. He sent the Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Straits to bar an attack by communist China. He rushed military aid to the Philippines and sent (fateful move!) a military mission to aid the beleaguered French in Indochina.

Now, as can quite readily be determined today, there was no Chinese connection whatever with the Korean attack. There is every indication that Peking was as startled as Washington. The North Korean forces were armed and trained by the Russians. The Chinese had no part in that whatever. Kim Il-sung was a chosen Soviet agent for North Korea, trained by and devoted to Moscow. While the Soviet armed forces had left Korea in January 1949, Soviet specialists remained in all branches of the Korean military and government. The Chinese did not even send a diplomatic mission to North Korea until August 1950, two months after the attack occurred.

Of course, the hypothesis may be mistaken. Stalin may have given Mao some warning. But Mao's attention was deeply occupied at that time with the consolidation of his régime. He was busy with the absorption of Tibet and myriad other problems. His principal forward objective was Formosa, not Korea, and the Korean attack effectively put Formosa beyond his reach by the interposition of the U.S. fleet.

It is likely that Mao regarded the Korean move as a reckless Soviet gamble which confronted China with critical problems and serious dangers. If so, his analysis would have been fairly accurate, as the events of September and October 1950, the threat to the Yalu and the massive Chinese intervention, were to show. By this time, Stalin could see that his perception of U.S. policy had been grossly distorted and was probably quite willing to settle for as deep and complex an entanglement between the United States and China as could be produced. If his gambit for getting a stranglehold around Peking had failed, at least he had succeeded in embroiling two of his major antagonists.

However the Chinese may have perceived Soviet motivations in 1950, they have in recent years on several occasions informally

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cited the Korean War as a deliberate Soviet provocation, designed to embroil them with the United States. Certainly by the time that MacArthur approached the Yalu the Chinese had concluded that the American operations in Korea were only a springboard for an assault upon China and a reopening of the U.S. intervention which had come to a close with the departure of Chiang Kai-shek from the mainland.

Here, to be sure, the Chinese deluded themselves. While there clearly was MacArthurian enthusiasm for going into China, President Truman dramatically demonstrated a bit later that he had absolutely no intention of broadening the Korean engagement into a continental war with China.

III

What of events in Indochina?

Here again reality was quite different from the perceptions of most of the participants. Ho had appealed for recognition of his régime on January 14, 1950. The Chinese granted recognition January 18, the Russians not until January 30. But neither of the major communist powers sent any formal missions to North Vietnam until after the 1954 ceasefire. Nor, in the opinion of the late Bernard Fall, did any direct connections exist with the Soviet Union until that time. Indeed, in his opinion Hanoi's principal communist party link up to 1954 was with the French Communist Party, not the Russian, not the Chinese, further evidence of the cautious effort of the Vietnamese to avoid falling under domination of a force which might control them.

In contrast to this reality there is abundant evidence that Secretary of State Dulles fully shared the perception of President Truman and Secretary Acheson (from June 1950 onwards) that Indochina was, in essence, merely the southern sector of a common front against China which extended from North Korea southward in a long curving arc. The truce in Korea did not shake the Dulles concept nor, in fact, did the Geneva agreement of 1954 which was designed to end the Indochina fighting. It is true that by this time, and particularly in the preparations of the Dien Bien Phu trap sprung against the French, Ho and General Giap were receiving a measure of coöperation from the Chinese, particularly in the form of rice to feed the besieging forces and the arms which were transported, broken down into loads carried by men and mules, some 1,500 miles from China.

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But neither then nor later was it true, as Dulles and many U.S. policy-makers supposed, that Ho was a "puppet" of Peking or that Peking was a "puppet" of Moscow. Khrushchev's remembrances cast some, not necessarily clarifying, light on this relationship. He asserts that the Chinese believed that Ho's jig was up at the time of Dien Bien Phu, that the Vietminh had come to the end of the road—an analysis which would indicate that the Chinese were not in close touch with the real situation and the Russians in even less touch. He also recalls telling his colleagues on his return from his first visit with Mao in Peking in November 1954 that "conflict is inevitable" with the Chinese.

Perhaps at no time did distortion and misperception over Indochina rise higher than in the 1965–66 period when U.S. air and ground action was constantly escalating to heights undreamed of earlier. By this time, to be sure, Hanoi had established close relationships with both Moscow and Peking. An estimated one billion dollars in aid had flowed into North Vietnam by the time of the Sino-Soviet break, roughly two-thirds Chinese and one-third Russian. In the subsequent years the totals were carefully balanced and probably the net contribution of the Soviet Union plus that of her East European allies more than equalled that of China. None the less, as anyone in a position to observe Hanoi closely could testify, North Vietnam had in no sense fallen under the domination of either of the great communist powers. In fact, Hanoi's role was one of constant, careful balancing between the two because hostility between Russia and China was so intense that the slightest act of favoritism was magnified and could—indeed, often did—result in reprisals by the affronted power, usually China.

It is not possible to reconstruct a unified American image of Vietnam at that time. Sometimes, Washington seemed to regard Hanoi as an instrument of Chinese policy, sometimes (particularly when trying to get Moscow to intercede in our behalf) as an instrument of Soviet policy, sometimes—ignoring the obvious evidence of Sino-Soviet hostility—as an instrument of the "international communist conspiracy" and even, occasionally, as an intransigent native communist movement seeking to "humiliate" the United States.

The view of the United States held in Hanoi at this time, as I was able to establish in conversations with Hanoi officials in December 1966 and January 1967, was much more in the

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image of the French than of the American reality. It was generally asserted and assumed that the United States simply wished to replace France as the exploiting colonial power in Indochina and that we had mounted the huge war effort for the benefit of capitalists who wished to exploit the enormous natural resources of Vietnam. When I rejoined that there was really nothing in the way of assets or resources in Vietnam which the United States coveted, my comment was regarded as both unfriendly and naïve.

The Chinese image of the United States at that time was entirely different. The Chinese (as they told me) saw the U.S. escalation as the opening move in preparation for an all-out assault on China itself, an operation in which the United States was said to be collaborating closely with Moscow. Indochina was merely needed as a *place d'armes,* a springboard for the U.S. attack. It was expected that we would use nuclear arms, and a frequent justification given for the Red Guard and cultural revolution movement which was launched in mid-1966 was that it was designed to prepare, harden and "blood" the youth of China for the tremendous hardships of war with the United States which lay just ahead.

Peking's fear that Moscow was conniving with the United States in Vietnam was matched by fears expressed in Moscow that the Chinese, in some manner, would turn the Vietnamese war in a direction which would embroil the United States and the Soviet Union. It was fear of such possibilities which spurred Moscow, occasionally, to lend some assistance to the United States in exploring possible ways toward peace in Vietnam.

By 1969, it should be noted, the Chinese had moved away from their image of Vietnam as an American springboard for attack on China and, indeed, gradually were tending to abandon the theory of U.S.-U.S.S.R. collaboration against Peking. By this time both China and the Soviet Union tended to view Vietnam not so much in terms of U.S.-Vietnamese confrontation but as a "front" in their own ever-widening confrontation. Thus, China had opposed negotiations between the United States and Hanoi which finally opened in Paris in January 1969, to a substantial extent because of fear that this might move the United States and the U.S.S.R. closer to détente. Moscow generally favored negotiations because the end of the war in Indochina would be a blow to the Chinese communist propaganda line, directed toward Asian communist movements, of a continuous and constantly

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widening revolutionary movement of backward countries against more advanced ones.

The wide difference between the image of Indochina as viewed by Peking and by Moscow was spectacularly demonstrated in the Cambodian events of 1970. Peking seized upon the coup against Sihanouk to sponsor a summit meeting of Indochinese movements—Sihanouk for Cambodia, Prince Souphanouvong for Laos, Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam and representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. With Chinese sponsorship, all the forces opposed to the United States in Indochina formed a "united front," dedicated to the principle of a common struggle and unified peace negotiation. The Russians, excluded from the China-sponsored meeting, studiously snubbed Sihanouk, maintained relations with the Lon Nol government (and insisted that their satellites do the same) and blamed the Chinese for the U.S. action in Cambodia (and in Vietnam) on the grounds that China had refused to form a "united front" against U.S. aggression.

I think enough instances have been presented (although there are many more which might be noted) to establish the thesis that the image of Indochina not only varies widely from one power to another but also from one period to another. The same is true of the images which the involved powers have of each other's actions and motivations. Rarely at any time do these perceptions coincide; almost equally rarely do they coincide with what, in retrospect, the objective truth is seen to be.

IV

What does this imply for the future? I fear the distortion between image and reality has by no means run its course. We are far advanced in a program of "Vietnamization" which envisages a day when the Saigon government will be able to undertake virtually full military and diplomatic responsibility, supported only by some minimum technical presence of the U.S. forces—air, communications, supplies. This implies a belief in a more or less permanent shift in the balance of force so pervasive, so striking that the North and its southern allies will be dissuaded from an effective military or political challenge to the Saigon régime. On the other hand, by widening the war into Laos, the American-supported South Vietnamese forces may have enlarged the field of battle in a manner which General

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Giap has always claimed would serve the revolutionary interest.

Let us leave to one side the question (which I believe is arguable) as to whether such an image of a competent, secure and confident Saigon government is realistic. Does the concept of a subdued, resigned, low-posture Hanoi and National Liberation Front forces, or Provisional Revolutionary Government as it now calls itself, seem likely to be borne out in real life? It does not fit the pattern of policy and conduct characteristic of the communist side, going all the way back to its Vietminh origins. The pattern, rather, has been one of struggle, struggle, struggle, regardless of odds, of the changing enemy and his tactics. Hanoi has always matched its tactics and strategy to the image it perceives of the enemy, holding back until a moment of opposition weakness, a development which tips the advantage to its side.

Is it not more realistic to assume that Hanoi will deliberately lie low as the American pullout continues, concentrating on recuperation of strength at home and rebuilding the infrastructure in the South? Then, when U.S. force levels are really low and when, perhaps, a moment of internal political crisis arises in Saigon, suddenly striking with utmost force in the belief (which may or may not be realistic) that once American forces are drawn down to a minimum no U.S. government will reëscalate—or indeed have time for such reëscalation unless it is prepared to employ air power on a more massive scale than ever before or even invoke nuclear power. The image which Hanoi may develop of U.S. options may be distorted. The image we may be in the process of drawing for ourselves may also be distorted. But this is in the grand pattern of Indochina, the pattern which has been marked from the very beginning.

If we are to avoid such a critical turn as is here suggested it would seem that an initial requisite must be a persistent and stubborn effort by all concerned parties—and particularly by ourselves—to arrive at some common approximation of both our own role and goal and those of Hanoi—and the great communist powers which back Hanoi. Without such understanding the future is likely to be as illusory as the past. And perhaps one of the greatest of illusions is the American belief that Hanoi, having been, as it feels, cheated both in the French settlement of 1945 and the Geneva settlement of 1954, is likely to put much credence in any end of the war which is not achieved by tilting the military balance in its favor.

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FRANCE'S GLOBAL STRATEGY

By Michel Debré

MOST people in this rapidly evolving world are conscious of sharing a common destiny, but the nature of that destiny is emerging only slowly amid dangers and conflicts. There are still too many differences, too many special interests and contending passions for the concept of defense to have lost its importance. On the contrary: a clearly defined defense policy safeguards the existence of nations and guarantees their evolution. It is also the instrument of their policy, particularly their foreign policy, even—and most especially—if these nations are dedicated to the search for peace.

France intends both to preserve her national identity and to help bring about the peace that she cherishes. She refuses to take refuge in the comfort of a neutrality that is nothing more than an abdication of responsibility in face of the great disputes of our time. At the same time she objects to every form of hegemony, whether detrimental or advantageous to herself; for she does not challenge anyone else's right to the rights she claims for herself. For in her position, with her calling and with her resources, how could she take part in the human adventure and in the construction of peace on earth if she renounced the exercise of political imagination, if she accepted the protection of an outsider and left to others the task of shaping her own history and behavior in the world?

Naturally there are certain higher objectives which supersede the immediate national interest, but a nation must appraise these objectives in complete freedom. While giving full consideration to the facts, and in consultation with others, it must retain mastery over the means which it devotes to pursuing these objectives. France's foreign policy is based on these very simple principles, which reconcile the demands of sovereignty and the need for concerted action with other states to advance world peace. At the same time, she must respect the legitimate aspirations of the disadvantaged peoples, indeed of all mankind.

This freedom of decision, which is the very definition of political individuality and which France claims as much for the common good as for her own, calls for autonomy of action. Clearly the freedom to conceive economic, cultural and political projects

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and the ability to act, even if it means choosing to coöperate with others, imply the freedom and capacity to resolve in accordance with our own interests the tensions and conflicts which ruthless international competition can make very dangerous. Our refusal to accept the state of tutelage generated in Europe by the rivalry of power blocs resulting from the Second World War need not be justified on any other basis.

During the period immediately following that war—a period mainly devoted to domestic recovery but also marked by fear of Soviet expansionism—we undoubtedly relied on the military organization of the Atlantic Alliance to safeguard peace in Europe, that is, on American force and strategy. But the serious differences which turned up over the years in the opposing camps attenuated the Manichean character of East-West antagonism. Moreover, France attained nuclear capability, evidencing both her resurrection and her determination to occupy once again her normal place in the concert of nations.

Little by little, the seriousness of the political simplifications on which the unity of action of the coalition partners had been based, and which had made the coalition possible, came to light. These simplifications confused the interests of Europeans with those of the United States—the dominant power, the guarantor of collective security, and the sole possessor of the ultimate weapon.

What had actually been only a consequence of the temporary weakness of Europeans in assuming responsibility for their own defense appeared a profound negation of their political individuality and their historic mission. Intellectual and economic affinities, the kinship of basic principles by which the concept of society is defined, could only mask the differences.

In these circumstances, how could one continue to accept a military organization which required Europeans, particularly the French, to sacrifice their national vocation? France had to reject the permanent integration of her defense in a collective apparatus that would, even if only occasionally, serve interests other than her own. That would have been incompatible with the autonomy of decision without which no strategy adapted to political purposes is possible.

To go further, defense policy, whatever it may be, is only valid as a function of a nation's patriotism. What happens to patriotism if the men and women of a country feel that the effort

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asked of them—or, if it comes to that, the sacrifice demanded—does not come from their own government but from an outside authority which may not necessarily have the same evaluation of their nation's destiny? Integration, far from assuring the validity of an alliance, may awaken considerable anxiety in the minds of the individuals involved. Patriotism is linked to the feeling that the nation has freedom of choice—if not at a time of clear and present crisis, at any rate in the long run.

Moreover, the revolution introduced into defense by the very existence of weapons of massive destruction warned that caution was necessary. The haunting presence of nuclear risk in the background of all conflicts was a basic and decisive fact for the nuclear powers, and consequently for others as well. Everyone saw how prudently the two superpowers dealt with disputes involving any of their allies, and France certainly approved of strategies designed to prevent escalation to extremes of violence; but she owed it to herself to draw the proper conclusion from this situation.

The lesson was very clear: nuclear risk is not divisible. Indeed, that risk is so enormous that a people would accept it only as a final defense of their supreme self-interest—their existence as an independent and sovereign state assuring both the unity of the whole and the diversity of individuals, both physical survival and personal freedom.

The United States understood this lesson perfectly. In an attempt to resolve the strategic contradiction between the obligations of collective security and those of national security, its leaders invented the policy of "flexible response." But this was only a palliative. The fact is that the risk of nuclear war cannot but limit international solidarity.

The American system of flexible response implies a nuclear battlefield on the soil of Europe. Admittedly this threat has value as a deterrent to the extent that it implies the possibility of all-out war. But the credibility of the threat depends on the strategic nuclear superiority of the United States. And it is possible that the battle in Europe might have only incidental significance in American eyes, whereas for Europeans it would have the decisive significance that it could bring about the ruination of their continent.

Under these circumstances, why not construct a European defense system and a strategy that reconciles both in its ends and

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in its means the different policies of the European states? Let us not delude ourselves with fine words. As regards both Europe and NATO the nature of the nuclear risk has to be considered. Have the promoters of the European idea thoroughly weighed what this means? The decisive question is whether the Europeans are ready—or will be in the foreseeable future—to assume the nuclear risk jointly for the defense of any one of them. At the crucial moment, who would decide in the name of all to use the ultimate weapon? And to protect what? A firm common determination is an absolute prerequisite for any mutual assistance treaty; if that determination existed no treaty would be needed, for it would necessarily express the political unity of Europe. But political unity cannot result from institutions alone: it must arise out of shared feelings about the future of the continent, out of a will to act for a common good clearly recognized as such, out of a rejection of the same impediments and adherence to the same values—in short, out of a patriotism which, taking on a new dimension, is rooted in a collective consciousness.

Without this European patriotism there can be no political unity. And without political unity, no European nuclear strategy is possible.

The European continent is not yet at that point.

As a consequence, since defense can only be on a national basis, and since the nuclear fact constitutes the paramount fact of all defense, the national defense of a middle-sized nation like France has to be nuclear.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century our country's military strength came from our numbers: we could confront any state, and only a great coalition of states could defeat us. At the beginning of the twentieth century, although our demographic situation had worsened, we were able, thanks to our overseas territories, to reëstablish numerical equality or even superiority. Now, near the close of the twentieth century, everything has changed: France is henceforth a middle-sized country in terms of population, and in the atomic age the credibility of military policy is no longer based on numbers. Does possession of nuclear weapons lend France the credibility that numbers would no longer bring her even if she still possessed them? This question is frequently debated, but it can nevertheless be answered without hesitation in the affirmative. For it is clear that to deter a would-be aggressor does not require parity of nuclear armament

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but simply the ability to bring to bear on him a threat proportionate to the importance he attaches to the desired conquest.

In short, France's aspirations to play a fitting international role and the change in defense strategy brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons converge to justify France's present military policy. The foundations of this policy were laid down by General de Gaulle and we shall pursue them tenaciously.

II

Although France rejects notions of hegemony and temptations to neutrality, and is resolved to preserve her freedom of decision, at the same time recognizing the necessity for alliances, she must possess military capabilities commensurate with the interests she has to defend. Her vital interests are mainly located on her own soil and her major interests are in Europe, but she also has responsibilities, although of lesser and varying importance, throughout the world—in the Mediterranean, in the Atlantic, in her overseas departments and territories, in French-speaking Africa, and, more generally, wherever her presence or her intervention either are or would be useful in maintaining or restoring peace.

To defend these interests and carry out these obligations France requires a military apparatus with capabilities that can easily be defined. In the first place, a capacity to carry out nuclear strikes assures France her supreme freedom of decision. The level of corresponding forces is fixed in terms of the rate of casualties and material damage that we estimate as sufficient to deter a possible aggressor from attacking our national territory. The credibility of these forces depends on their level, and also on the internal security forces which must forestall any attempt to disarm us preëmptively. In addition, if the deterrent were neutralized, the operational territorial defense forces would go into action to fight the invader and organize resistance on the home front.

In the second place, we have our air and land and our air and sea forces for both reconnaissance and combat. Their function is to furnish the government with the information and the means to fight which would be necessary in order to make a deliberate decision to resort to nuclear response. They also make France able to contribute, along with her allies, to the settlement of crises in Europe.

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Finally, our forces of intervention have the mission of assuring the defense of our interests, especially in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. They put us in a position to intervene in French-speaking Africa, where we are linked to certain states by aid agreements, and, on occasion, in the rest of the world. The importance of this capacity to intervene outside Europe is not very high, but it has to be maintained. We must be able to assert ourselves, whether in a limited manner and solely on our own initiative in a particular theater of operations, or under other circumstances as part of a joint action.

But to give the government full autonomy of decision, these various military capabilities must be the product of a national effort of scientific research and technological development. This element in our defense policy is of paramount importance in a time when innovations are frequent and often revolutionary. It assures our indispensable freedom of choice in armaments, and it also contributes to the development of technologically advanced industries.

III

The fact that France intends to remain free to choose her own policy, and to act as she sees fit, does not in any way exclude coöperation with other countries. She cannot ignore the fact that her freedom is bounded by the realities of a very complex world. Some of the constraints are rigid, some tense, some confused, and everywhere they are crisscrossed by the many and varied relationships between nations. In short, the will to be oneself cannot operate—or even make any sense—apart from the necessity to live with others.

Coöperation is common sense; it is not only desirable, it is imperative for people who are aware of the dangers that surround them and who understand how closely they are bound to other nations. Often coöperation provides the only means of making progress toward solving the difficult problems of our times and of attempting to regulate, if not avoid, the crises in which the interests of one and another are inextricably bound together. Nations that wish to contribute effectively to building a better future and enlarging the opportunities for peace have a duty to strengthen these bonds.

As far as Europe is concerned, it is very much in this spirit that we attach such great importance to the Franco-German

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treaty and to our membership in the Atlantic Alliance. In the same spirit we pursue the policy of an opening to the East, in particular with regard to the Soviet Union. This policy, like our withdrawal from the military organization of the Atlantic Alliance, marks—though on a different plane—our resolute opposition to the policy of blocs. We feel that such a policy dangerously and artificially limits the development of international links and generates suspicion and tension. There are better things to be done with the development of a language common to all those interested in the security of our old continent.

Coöperation, then, is salutary; but it also must be practicable, reconciling and respecting the interests of each partner. In fact, it is limited to the area, often restricted, in which the interested parties can reach agreements without either ulterior motives or major risks. The lessons of history and the realities of geography teach us the difficulties and limitations of coöperation. Today, in the field of defense, the difficulties have conspicuously increased and the limitations are distinctly marked (as we have seen) by the constraints imposed by nuclear strategy.

Because the nuclear risk is not divisible, any nuclear coöperation which might have a strategic character is simply not possible. The decision to employ nuclear forces can be made only by a single nation, which is to say that any regulations laid down in advance, which set forth the conditions for employment, diminish the deterrent's credibility. The effect, in other words, is the opposite of the one sought in theory.

Limitations also apply to coöperation of our conventional forces in the European theater. Of course, France could not remain aloof from the settlement of the disputes or crises that might endanger the security of the continent. But just because it is hard to imagine an armed conflict occurring in Europe that would not ultimately jeopardize our vital interests, we cannot permit tensions to be transformed into serious conflicts; this would be contrary to our policy of avoiding such conflicts.

Our operational coöperation with our allies thus will express, as circumstances require, our desire to discourage and eventually contain aggression at its source. But we will not use up, by resorting to deterrent manœuvres, the means that would be available to us to halt aggression in its tracks if it actually occurs.

Within the precise limits thus laid down, there are many important methods of operational coöperation. It finds expres-

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sion through particular and precise agreements which enrich the instruction and improve the effectiveness of our conventional forces—to the extent, that is, that such agreements do not limit the use of such forces. The same is true of agreements relating to aerial defense or tactical commmunication systems.

Where vital interests are no longer in jeopardy, possibilities for coöperation are increasing. On the sea the situation is more flexible than on land; there the protection of our national interests, in particular maintenance of our freedom of movement in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, has much to gain from coöperation with countries with interests similar to ours. Our will to take part in keeping the peace in the Mediterranean basin, especially the western part, is based on our coöperation with the coastal states. Finally, we attach a special value to coöperation with the countries of French-speaking Africa; our agreements with them are among their guarantees of independence.

But even if the field for coöperation is very broad, it remains a fact that any armed intervention, even on a limited scale, is a grave matter in itself, to be used only in circumstances when vital interests are clearly jeopardized, not only in the eyes of the coöperating parties but in those of international opinion.

Another area open to military coöperation is technology. In everything having to do with conventional arms, coöperation often provides effectiveness and reduces cost. Once again, it is a different story with nuclear weapons. Coöperation here with the United States or Great Britain comes up against the MacMahon Act, which involves the essential nature of nuclear secrets. Exceptions to the MacMahon Act were granted by the United States to its privileged ally, Great Britain. But France was not at Nassau. As a continental nation, the national character of her nuclear armament, the basis of her independent defense, is at the heart of her political freedom.

Having set forth the principles of French defense policy and defined the kinds of coöperation in defense matters which are based on them, we must examine the validity of that policy for the future in light of the possible evolution of the world political and strategic situation, principally in Europe.

IV

The progressive rise of China is making the bipolar ideological and strategic antagonism of the United States and Soviet

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Russia obsolete, and making them conscious of the strain on their respective economies resulting from their nuclear rivalry. At this time they are engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). These negotiations, aiming to limit the arms race and minimize the risks of a major confrontation between the two superpowers, must have the support in principle of the entire world. They seek to limit their defense budgets and to guarantee their own security, thanks to the balance that has at last been struck because of the risks that would be run by both sides in the eventuality—by now unthinkable—of a direct nuclear confrontation. But in fixing the strategic situation in accordance with their vital interests, might not the two superpowers create new dangers in theaters that for them are secondary? In such cases, might not their confrontation, perhaps by way of intervening states, become actually less improbable, being confined within limits set in advance?

Can Europeans help wondering whether their territory may not become a secondary theater of war for the superpowers?

While the SALT negotiations proceed, some people raise the possibility that the United States may disengage from Europe and reduce its forces there. Such a disengagement would be part, of course, of an attempt to set up an equilibrium that would be less costly for the two superpowers. Does this not risk that if the SALT negotiations succeed, the situation in Europe will tend to be less stable? Moreover, one may question how far the United States can go in this direction. Can it possibly dissociate itself from the North Atlantic and from the Mediterranean, which more than ever is one of the world's sensitive regions, where so many interests of so many nations converge, some of them tied closely to the United States?

The Russians' viewpoint in these matters is quite different. No doubt they seek the same balance of nuclear forces. But can they retreat from those "outer fortifications," the satellites? These are still necessary to protect their own territory, even though 25 years of Soviet military presence there has not stamped out the yearning for national independence, and in spite of the exceedingly brisk competition that has grown up between the Soviet and Chinese interpretations of communism. The answer is no, it cannot. Soviet policy is interested in finding a balance of forces with the United States. But the limits of Soviet disengagement are quickly reached.

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What new strategy, then, could the United States find for participating in the defense of Europe, on the hypothesis that there will be a significant reduction of the military strength at its disposal? Some experts have advanced the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons very soon after the outbreak of hostilities. But is such a strategy practicable without entailing an unacceptable risk of destruction in Europe?

Whether a nuclear war was won or lost it would not fail to have disastrous effects on densely populated European territories. Any strategic policy based on such a radical formula—which leaves little room for temporizing, which does not permit the correction of mistaken appraisals or clumsy executions, and which prematurely seals up every outlet for moderating dialogue—any such strategic policy seems to me very poorly designed for guaranteeing the security of the countries where it would be applied. Even in terms of their own interests alone, can the two superpowers themselves accept the possibility of the destruction of Europe?

Consequently—and taking the Soviet attitude into account—the necessary condition for a significant withdrawal of American forces from Europe may be that the European nations find new formulas to assure the continent's strategic stability. Such formulas should be, first of all, in their own interest, but also, in the long run, in the interest of the superpowers.

Since Europe cannot agree to being both the object and the theater of a nuclear confrontation between the superpowers, certain modalities now envisaged for the defense of Europe seem to me unacceptable. In the nuclear age, the primary objective of a defense system is to safeguard the peace. Not any peace at any price, certainly, but a peace that assures every nation the freedom to pursue its own destiny. For us, it is less a question of preparing for victory one day than of deflecting permanently every threat of conflict, so that it will not be necessary to win.

In other words, the security of Europe can rest only on deterrence and on the strategic nuclear weapon which is its instrument. But as stated, the very nature of the nuclear weapon restricts it to the national arsenal for a long time to come. Moreover, Germany's particular situation excludes her from possessing and employing nuclear weapons. Thus, Europe absolutely cannot count on a European weapon to guarantee her security around the world.

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She cannot count, either, on a political agreement. France is certainly ready to participate in a European security conference. But even if a conference led to the proclamation, by unanimous agreement, of the principles of balance and stability in Europe, that could not settle everything. Plenty of problems would remain, including the Germany problem, which still lies at the heart and center of European security.

The foregoing reflections have an uncertain and hypothetical character, but the potentialities which they point to cannot be categorically rejected at present.

V

All this only highlights the positive character of the French defense system, which undeniably constitutes a determining and stabilizing factor in European security. It would weigh in the balance as heavily in a crisis as it would around a conference table. Indeed, although the French deterrent can and should play a role when the nation's vital interests are threatened, France is not isolated. Western Europe as a whole cannot fail to benefit indirectly from the French strategy, even though decisions—and it cannot be otherwise—belong to France alone, in the person of the President of the Republic.

Because France is not isolated, it is also true, of course, that even though developments abroad cannot change anything fundamentally, they can influence the operation of French defense policy. Clearly, for example, the introduction and activation of our mobile forces are not independent of the moves of allied forces, particularly of the German forces, which in the event of a crisis would be the first ones in action. It is no less clear that, while the employment of our tactical atomic weapons is the responsibility of the French government alone, it will take place in response to a situation recognized generally as grave.

It is a question here of a genuine solidarity quite independent of the system of collective defense conceived of at the time when the nations of Western Europe had no freedom of action other than what the two superpowers granted them. This solidarity is in no sense incompatible with a diplomatic effort directed, through agreement with the U.S.S.R., toward the consolidation of the European situation which is a condition of world peace.

Truly, France's acquisition of a nuclear capability has profoundly modified the situation of the Atlantic Alliance for the

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good of all the allies. It has made relations among members of the Alliance more honest by rejecting the earlier dogma that in all cases the interests of the European nations were identical with those of the United States. Today, those who have advocated methods of integration that in fact led to subordination pure and simple, those who tried to hide the reality of things—even those people have finally realized that in NATO, as in Hans Christian Andersen's story, "the emperor has no clothes."

The existence of an independent French strategic nuclear force, the central element of our whole military apparatus, constitutes a valuable factor in European security. Our national strategy does not pretend to solve all the problems of the defense of Europe. But it constitutes a primary and exemplary rallying-point, at the same time that it enables France to assert an independent policy in Europe in the service of collective security.

So it is that France, assuming her own defense, and ready should the occasion arise to coöperate with her allies and with all countries concerned with peace and freedom, is pursuing a policy of independence which is a fundamental and durable element in the Europe—and in the world—of tomorrow.

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NUCLEAR ENERGY

A Prelude to H. G. Wells' Dream

By Alvin M. Weinberg

In 1914 H. G. Wells predicted that peaceful nuclear energy might profoundly affect the relations between nations. In his remarkable *The World Set Free: A Story of Mankind* Wells foretold the invention of the nuclear bomb and its use in war. After this, said Wells, would come a new age of plenty, based on the availability of cheap and unlimited energy. In this energy-abundant world, adventitious maldistributions of natural resources would no longer be a cause of international strife. The world would become a much more stable place if energy, ubiquitous and cheap, could replace other raw materials: if, say, natural hydrocarbons were replaced by hydrocarbons derived from limestone, water and energy; or if unfertile deserts were rendered fertile by huge desalting complexes driven with the new energy source. Nuclear energy was, to use the current phrase, the ultimate "technological fix": by its exploitation, man could satisfy all of his material wants. And if man's material wants were satisfied, then it seemed to Wells that the world would become a more stable place, especially if the big bomb were there to enforce the peace.

To present-day "realists" all this is merely the dream of a mystic. Yet it is my contention that in the long run H. G. Wells —not the cynical realists—will be proved the better prophet. Despite skepticism with which one now views nuclear energy as an instrument of international understanding, or as a promoter of world stability, the final returns are far from in. The promise is there, and it will eventually be turned into reality.

The Wellsian vision of nuclear utopia was certainly an undercurrent in the original Eisenhower Atoms-for-Peace Plan. President Eisenhower, strongly influenced in this matter by Lewis Strauss, then Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, presented to the United Nations in 1953 a proposal to share the benefits of nuclear energy with the rest of the world, particularly its underdeveloped areas. In his Atoms-for-Peace speech he proposed the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an instrument

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through which the world could coöperate in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has been in existence now for more than 13 years, and during this time has performed many useful functions. Thus, it has established fellowships that enable younger scientists from underdeveloped countries to learn nuclear techniques in the large national centers. It conducts surveys of the role of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques, particularly in underdeveloped countries. It stimulates, through topical meetings and publications, exchange of technical information bearing on nuclear energy. And, perhaps most important, it has established an organization that periodically inspects nuclear plants to ensure that no fissile materials are being clandestinely sequestered or diverted.

The IAEA did not begin operation until 1957, four years after President Eisenhower's original speech. In the meantime the United States inaugurated in 1954 a program of bilateral coöperation between the United States and other countries; and in 1955 the Soviet Union announced a rather similar program of bilateral agreements. By now some 35 countries have availed themselves of the bilateral U.S. assistance; of these, about a dozen would be classified as less developed. From the short-range viewpoint, these bilateral agreements are easy to fault. Aren't there many things, even in science and technology, that Thailand needs much more than a reactor; or, more generally, didn't the availability of U.S. support in nuclear energy encourage a one-sided emphasis on a special technology that not only bore little relation to the real needs of the less developed countries, but possibly helped some few of them along the road to nuclear weaponry?

I shall argue that this is a stylishly facile but poor assessment of the actual potential: that Eisenhower was fundamentally right when he tried to put flesh on H. G. Wells' visionary skeleton, but that he underestimated the time that would be required to actualize the vision. Though it has taken much longer than was expected to bring the technology of peaceful nuclear energy to a point where it, per se, can have a significant effect upon international relations, scientific exchanges in nuclear science have had considerable world impact. I shall therefore interject an account of these programs involving scientific coöperation before returning to the main thread of my contention—that

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cheap, inexhaustible nuclear energy can free nations of their historic dependence on scarce raw materials.

II

One of the first tangible outgrowths of Eisenhower's Atoms-for-Peace proposal was the series of Geneva Conferences on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy—1955, 1958, 1964, and now 1971. Before 1955, there was no exchange between East and West on matters nuclear. Even the relatively arcane behavior of protons at 600 million volts, which had nothing to do with bombs or reactors, was hardly a common subject of discussion between physicists in East and West (though in this case it was a language barrier as much as it was the Soviet penchant for secrecy that prevented the exchange). Imagine the enormous impression that was made at Geneva in 1955 when for the first time East and West came together and compared notes on nuclear physics, nuclear reactors, isotopes, radiation biology. The actual exchange of information was perhaps less significant than was the establishment of technical friendships. Walter Zinn, the foremost U.S. reactor expert, met Dmitrii Blokhintsev, his counterpart in the Soviet Union; Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the USAEC, met Vasily S. Emelyanov, his Soviet counterpart. None who attended that first Geneva Conference 15 years ago will forget the first technical session, held in the main hall of the Palais des Nations. Zinn opened the West's presentation with an account of the first experiments on boiling water reactors, and Blokhintsev responded with an account of the five megawatt power reactor at Obninsk (the first atomic powered station in the world, according to the Soviet view). It was much like a knights' tournament, with each side putting up its champion, neither side quite knowing whether the idea was simply to exchange information or to conduct a scientific Olympics.

The great hit of the first Geneva Conference was the swimming pool reactor set up adjoining the Palais des Nations by the United States. It was the first working reactor ever demonstrated to the public: it attracted more than 60,000 visitors during the two weeks it was on display—and it was eventually bought as a permanent research reactor by the Swiss.

Geneva in 1955 was the pinnacle of international scientific congresses. It followed immediately upon the disaramament negotiations in Geneva between Eisenhower and Bulganin and

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Khrushchev, the same conference at which the American President proposed his open skies policy of mutual inspection. And it was at Geneva that the first informal discussion about nonproliferation took place between the United States and the Soviet Union. This juxtaposition of the scientific and diplomatic conferences added much to the sense of excitement that year at Geneva.

The other two Geneva Conferences, in 1958 and 1964, were more elaborate and larger than the first; but by this time scientific exchange on nuclear matters had become somewhat old-hat, and the political suspense that marked the earlier conference could hardly be sustained. The 1958 Conference focused very heavily on progress in controlled thermonuclear fusion, and the United States put on an extraordinary display of operating fusion experiments that cost several millions of dollars. But now the nuclear business has just become too big for a single, all-encompassing conference: by 1971, all have agreed that the Fourth Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy should be centered only around applications of nuclear energy, with almost no attention being devoted to basic nuclear science.

Coöperation between East and West on nonmilitary nuclear matters has flourished since the Geneva meeting in 1955. In three scientific areas—high energy physics, controlled fusion and power reactors—this coöperation has been particularly notable. In the first two fields a true international community of experts has developed—people who know each other by their first names, who correspond freely, who share technical advances and setbacks openly and immediately. The exchange in power reactors, though also extensive, is rather less open—partly because some of the technology is close to the manufacture of nuclear bombs, partly because the business is beset by commercial rivalry.

High energy physics is one of the most expensive parts of modern science. To probe its boundaries requires huge accelerators. The 200 billion electron volt (BeV) accelerator now being built at Batavia, Illinois, will cost $240 million; the world's largest operating proton synchrotron, capable of achieving 70 BeV is the one at Serpukhov, not far from Moscow. Here is a scientific field where coöperation is clearly advantageous to all. Coöperation is typically regional, as exemplified by the very successful all-European Center for high energy research at CERN and its Soviet bloc counterpart at Dubna. But there is

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much exchange between the centers, with people from Dubna working at CERN or at Berkeley, and Americans and Europeans working on the big machine at Serpukhov. The high energy community even has the equivalent of its Geneva Conference: the "Rochester" Conference on high energy physics, so-called after its origin at the University of Rochester. The conference now is held every other year, alternating between the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union, but always reinforcing the sense of identity felt by all workers in this difficult and expensive field.

The jackpot question in high energy physics now is: what shall come after the 200 BeV Batavia accelerator or the actively discussed 300 BeV European accelerator? What about a 1,000 BeV or even larger machine? Such a device would cost perhaps one billion dollars. Could it be an intercontinental accelerator—jointly supported by the United States, the Soviet Union and Western Europe? And, as was suggested at a Pugwash meeting in 1962, could an intercontinental accelerator be located in Berlin and thus give that city a raison d'être as an international center of science? Sporadic conversations between East and West about coöperation on a 1,000 BeV machine have been held, but to date little has happened.

International coöperation in controlled fusion has followed a parallel course. Here the field is so difficult, and success has been so far from being achieved, that there is no question of commercial or military rivalry: coöperation between East and West has been essentially complete. Many teams from the United States and other Western countries have visited the Soviet Union, and vice versa. During 1969 a British team from the fusion laboratory in Culham conducted full-scale tests on the Russian TOKAMAK. This is an experimental fusion device that has come closer to achieving the extreme conditions necessary for a controlled fusion reaction than has any other device. The Russians' claims for TOKAMAK at first seemed to be so optimistic as to elicit skepticism from the rest of the fusion community. But the British team, using elaborate laser techniques not available in the Soviet Union, confirmed the Russian findings. TOKAMAK is now considered as the nearest thing to a major breakthrough in this difficult search for a way to burn the waters of the sea, and thus give mankind an infinite source of energy.

International coöperation in reactor development has been

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rather less open, not only between East and West, but also among the various partners in the West. Nevertheless, numerous coöperative agreements have been in force for many years. Within the Western bloc the United States has bilateral agreements which involve exchange of information and nuclear material. The most far-reaching is the technical exchange agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, which goes back to the wartime coöperation. Under terms of this agreement, the United States and the United Kingdom coöperate, largely by visits or by exchanges of scientists, in several fields related to nuclear reactors and controlled fusion.

On a different plane are the sister-laboratory arrangements between the United States and several less developed countries, whereby the nuclear center in the less developed country is taken under the wing of a much larger U.S. national laboratory: Taiwan and Mexico are the responsibility of Argonne; Pakistan, of Oak Ridge; and so on. The national nuclear laboratories in less developed countries usually are the largest and most powerful scientific institutions in those countries—yet they are addressed to problems that in the short run may not be crucial to the countries' development. True, every country must sense a need to become sufficiently knowledgeable in nuclear matters to be able to follow the debate on nuclear proliferation, or even to have available some competence to handle an ultimate nuclear catastrophe. But these needs can hardly command the continuing interest of good scientists, and the elaborate installations set up in the less developed countries can hold their scientists only if the scientists can do something worthwhile. In imparting this sense of participation among scientists in the small countries the sister-laboratory arrangements are quite useful.

III

Perhaps the most intense international coöperation in peaceful nuclear matters has developed among the countries of Western Europe. EURATOM, the nuclear arm of the Common Market, was established 13 years ago. The European Nuclear Energy Agency, the nuclear arm of the OECD, has been in existence for a comparable time. And there have been several very successful bilateral and multilateral nuclear projects in Europe: for example, the CERN high energy laboratory; the Franco-German research reactor now being built at Grenoble; the

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OECD Dragon project, a very successful high temperature, gas-cooled reactor built in Winfrith, England; the radiochemical processing plant at Mol, Belgium, built and operated under the same auspices; joint development of methods of waste disposal; and the coöperative European programs to develop the centrifuge method for separation of the isotopes of uranium. Extensive discussions have been held about an all-European diffusion plant for separating ^{235}U, but so far there have been few tangible results.[1]

Technical coöperation in nuclear energy among partners of comparable standing must be limited to projects that satisfy certain obvious conditions. Each partner must perceive benefits from participation, yet no partner can derive large commercial or military advantage at the expense of the other participants. The successful intra-European projects satisfy these conditions: thus all coöperate completely on fusion which is still relatively far away, and to a lesser degree on the fast breeder reactor which is somewhat closer at hand. On the other hand, reactors that are by now articles of commerce, such as the U.K. gas-cooled graphite or the U.S. light water reactors, are no longer proper subjects for close international coöperative development.

EURATOM sponsors Europe's most extensive coöperative development of nuclear energy. The EURATOM idea received great impetus after the first closing of the Suez Canal. Shortly thereafter EURATOM projected the installation of 15 million kilowatts of nuclear power in its member countries. At the time this seemed like a most optimistic projection and indeed, until this past year or so, it was regarded as an optimistic estimate. However, by now 15 million kilowatts of nuclear power in the EURATOM countries does not seem at all excessive. Presently, the EURATOM countries are committed to 31 million kilowatts of nuclear power.

EURATOM has been active in many fields of nuclear research. Its most ambitious undertaking has been the operation of the Ispra laboratory in Italy. This is a large, excellently staffed laboratory that has focused its major effort on the heavy water moderated, organic cooled reactor ORGEL. Unfortunately, ORGEL has been squeezed out by the success of both the gas-cooled and the light water reactors; at the moment Ispra

[1] The symbol ^{235}U denotes the uranium isotope with atomic weight 235. Corresponding symbols are used for isotopes of plutonium (Pu) and thorium (Th). Of these isotopes, the ones with odd atomic weights, namely ^{233}U, ^{235}U, ^{239}Pu are fissile.

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is in process of redeploying around longer range projects, some of which will probably be non-nuclear. Whether or not this presages a broadening of the interest of EURATOM itself to include, for example, environmental questions, remains to be seen.

IV

What I have described thus far has been, to my mind, the lesser, derivative promise of international nuclear energy. It is fine that a coöperative, worldwide attack on common scientific and technological problems associated with nuclear energy has gone forward, on the whole with rather good success. And it is even better that bona fide international production projects, such as the radiochemical plant at Mol, are operating. These efforts promote international exchange and presumably a feeling of friendship among the coöperating parties.

But all this is a small thing compared with Wells' original vision of a world set free by nuclear energy. If the international implications of peaceful nuclear energy amount only to scientific and technological coöperation among different nations, the world will have fallen far short of realizing the full potential of the peaceful atom.

What can we say, 28 years after the Stagg Field chain reaction, about the peaceful atom providing those new options that could indeed change historic politico-economic problems into non-problems? If there are such possibilities, are they so distant that prudent politicians cannot consider them in their present-day planning? To what extent are the Wellsians among the nuclear community, who insist that the promise of the atom is not being overestimated, guilty of trying to solve today's social problems with tomorrow's or even the day-after-tomorrow's technology? To what extent should one take their optimism seriously?

It seems obvious that a new prime source of energy, one that is in principle available to everyone, must have great potential geopolitical implications. How this works is suggested by the Suez crisis of 1956. Here a new technology of transporting energy—namely the big tanker—greatly reduced the political impact of the closing of the Suez Canal.

There is little doubt, despite the cries of some extreme environmentalists, that even by 1980 nuclear power in its present embodiments will provide a sizable part of the world's central station power. The United States is now committed to more

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than 87,000,000 kilowatts of nuclear power from reactors of current design; Western Europe and England to 30,000,000 kilowatts; the Soviet Union to 8,800,000 kilowatts; and so on. The strong likelihood is that, by the turn of the century, the nucleus will be the primary source of central station power.

Stationary central power represents considerably less than half of the world's total energy budget. To what extent can nuclear power provide mobile as opposed to stationary power? Here we move from demonstrated technology to a much more speculative possibility. The key chemical is hydrogen. If hydrogen can be obtained economically from water and nuclear energy by electrolysis or by thermal cracking, then the route to liquid fuel is straightforward. Hydrogen and limestone yield methane and, if one wishes, heavier hydrocarbons. Whether such a circuitous path to an energy economy independent of petroleum sources can ever be taken fully seriously—say in competition with liquid fuel from coal—remains to be seen. Yet it is significant that the Ispra laboratory thinks enough of this approach to put a good-sized team to work on the production of hydrogen from water, using nuclear energy as the primary energy source. The long-range aim here, as stated by the Ispra people, is to provide Europe with an independent source of mobile energy within 50 years.

The route to liquid fuel and, indeed, to many of man's essential commodities such as ammonia fertilizer or basic metals, through nuclear-produced hydrogen must not be taken seriously in the short run—that is, within the next 10 to 15 years—though there are specific spots in the world where electrolytic hydrogen is competitive with hydrogen from coal or oil even now. On the other hand, it hardly stretches one's credulity to imagine that processes for obtaining hydrogen from water and nuclear energy at generally competitive prices will be developed within 50 years. Nor is 50 years an impossibly long time as far as modern heavy technology is concerned. More than 30 years have passed since fission was discovered, and it may be another 10 or 15 years before the ultimate fission energy source, the breeder reactor, is fully developed.

The key to all these long-range possibilities is a nuclear energy source that uses an inexhaustible fuel. Here there are two possibilities: fusion reactors and fission breeders. Though much optimism now reigns within the fusion project, no one can re-

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liably estimate the time needed to achieve success. Fusion, therefore, cannot be regarded as a technology upon whose availability public policy can be based. The breeder, on the other hand, poses no crucial scientific questions; its success depends on working out expensive engineering details, and therefore it is possible to give some estimate of when it will be available.

The fission breeder, in contrast to the present generation of reactors, in effect burns the very abundant ^{238}U or ^{232}Th isotopes rather than the very rare ^{235}U or its man-made counterparts, ^{239}Pu or ^{233}U. (In the breeder, the latter materials are simply catalysts that are regenerated as the more abundant isotopes are burned.) Now ^{238}U and ^{232}Th are ubiquitous; and, because they represent such an enormously concentrated source of energy, it would not be out of the question to burn in breeder reactors even the residual uranium and thorium found in the granitic rocks. The amount of energy thereby made available is truly enormous: enough to last mankind on any reasonable energy budget for many millions of years! Thus the development of the breeder (which "burns the rocks"), no less than of the controlled fusion reactor (which "burns the seas"), would provide man with the basis for Wells' dream of ubiquitous, reasonably cheap energy, essentially forever. It is on this account that the entire nuclear community has turned its collective attention to the development of breeder reactors: and there is coöperation, though it is not fully open, between all the participants—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, Japan, Germany, Italy. With any luck, we should have large commercial breeders operating by the mid-1980s, 45 years after the discovery of fission.

What emerges is the outline of an autarkic world—one in which the primary energy source, based on breeder reactors (or, if we are lucky, on fusion reactors), is available to all countries, not only to countries that possess indigenous fossil fuel, or are rich enough to import such fuel from others. And from the prime energy source can flow, ultimately, secondary energy, fertilizers, metals, water from the sea. Fossilized hydrocarbons would be reserved for use as chemical raw materials.

This, say the "realists," is a figment of Wells' imagination. Yet even in the short run, nuclear energy is now making a difference—for example, in the development of India. Two boiling water reactors at Tarapur have been supplying 400 megawatts

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of power to the Western grid of about 2,500 Mw for more than a year. And in the middle run, say within 15 years, there are at least two projects based on rather well-developed technology that could have important world impact.

The first is the Indo-Gangetic Plain tube well project. The Indo-Gangetic Plain is underlaid with huge rivers of ground-water that are replenished each year by the monsoon rains. Were it possible to pump this ground-water for irrigation, much of the area could be triple-cropped: it could become a vast San Joaquin Valley. If the new high-yielding wheats were planted, and if sufficient ammonia fertilizer were made available, then, according to Professor Perry Stout of the University of California at Davis, this area alone might produce 72 million tons of wheat each year. Professor Stout visualizes 94,000 tube wells covering an area of eight million acres, along with a network of ammonia plants, based on production of electrolytic hydrogen.

The prime missing element in all this is energy: to drive the tube wells, to energize the ammonia plants, to provide the incidental power that ancillary industry in such a complex would need. The full project would ultimately require six million kilowatts; since most of the area possesses no fossil fuel, nuclear reactors of current types would be used.

The Indo-Gangetic tube well project is not a far-off dream; it is an option to be reckoned with seriously. The first element of the scheme, involving 25,000 tube wells, and one million kilowatts produced by two nuclear reactors, has been presented to the Indian government by the Department of Atomic Energy. This part of the project is estimated to cost $1,560,000,000, to produce 8,000,000 additional tons of wheat per year, and to yield a 70 percent return on the initial investment.

The second middle range possibility is nuclear desalting in the Middle East. Here the initial idea again was put forward by President Eisenhower. The scheme envisaged a string of large dual-purpose nuclear power plants that would supply water and power for coastal areas of the Sinai Desert, Israel and the lower Negev. The Eisenhower idea was taken up in 1967 by Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee, and was embodied in Senate Resolution 155. This resolution urged that nuclear desalting be promoted as a means of providing additional arable land in the Middle East.

Not much has been heard about the Eisenhower-Baker plan

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since Senate Resolution 155 was passed. But, for the past two years, technical examination of the general idea has been going on at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory with the coöperation of IAEA and representatives from several of the nations that might profit from the scheme. It would serve no purpose for me at this time to summarize in detail our technical findings. Nevertheless certain realities should be understood before the idea is facilely rejected, as has been the tendency among hard-headed economists:

(1) The incremental cost of water for agriculture in Israel is now 35 cents per 1,000 gallons. This is close to the predicted cost of water from large dual-purpose nuclear plants.

(2) The water table in the Gaza Strip is falling. There will almost surely be a water crisis there within a decade.

(3) New land, which desalting in effect supplies, opens new political options.

I do not contend that the Eisenhower-Baker plan, exactly as the late President put it forward, is itself a realistic option; I do insist, however, that some variants of the basic idea, in which nuclear energy plays a role in supplying new water, deserve serious attention.

The Indo-Gangetic and the Eisenhower-Baker plans fall short of Wells' World Set Free. On the other hand, they are tangible examples of how the new source of energy might make a political difference. That within the first 30 years of the nuclear age we find possible applications of nuclear energy that may help us provide food for India and water and land for the Middle East is to my mind miraculous, especially since these seem to me to be real possibilities, not mere visions. Is it too much to believe that within the next 50 years the other promises of nuclear energy will be realized—cheap and ubiquitous power, mobile fuel via hydrogen, large-scale desalting, and others? The answer is yes, these things can happen, but only if the statesmen of the world continue to give vigorous support to the development of nuclear energy and its associated technologies.

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AFFLUENCE AND THE WORLD TOMORROW

By Leroy S. Wehrle

THE search for affluence is the pursuit of our time. Increasingly, however, we are uncertain where this search will lead, both for the industrial countries and for the developing countries. How may affluence, in concert with other factors, work to reshape the world over the next 30 years, and how will this changed world look from an international point of view? Many factors in addition to increasing wealth will be at work. We cannot be sure what these are and how they are working, much less what role affluence itself will play in the process.

Affluence is the state of society characterized by plenteous commodities and foodstuffs, high use of energy and considerable leisure, all somewhat broadly distributed through the population. But in the world today, countries are confronted by the irony that greater national power and riches are not accompanied by equivalent power to shape their destinies. Increasing wealth is not matched by increasing capacity to achieve national goals, because industrialization and modernization create change faster than countries can choose goals or deal with the results of change. Moreover, the greater the affluence of nations, the greater their dependency on each other.

Affluence acts to destroy traditional cultures, or rather to transform them. Some cultures appear more adaptable than others to the needs of industrial society, for example, the Japanese and the German. Yet in all cases the modified cultures created by emerging affluence increase individual dependency on the economic system and the state and weaken dependencies of individuals on family, clan, temple and community. These new dependencies create new responsibilities for the state and lead to bureaucratic government.

Most Western countries and Japan have given themselves in submission to the pursuit of increasing wealth. Other national objectives such as creating a high culture or helping the poor have taken a back seat to the pursuit of affluence for the middle classes.

Socialist nations, on the other hand, have tended to view submission to the production of goods for everyone as vulgar and

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debilitating to the society. They want production, but prefer to keep a large part of it for meeting national objectives of accelerating economic growth, creating military power, exploring space, etc. Mao Tse-tung speaks forcefully about the evils of family plots and leftover capitalists who work or manage for private gain, warning that material incentives would be the end of discipline, hard work and subservience to the Party and the revolutionary spirit. Yet China too needs the means to produce wealth. How to gain wealth without changing the spirit and motivation of the people haunts China. France in her earlier days was darkly troubled by the fear that capitalism and consumerism would destroy the qualities of warmth and humaneness in her culture. She submitted fully to the Western race for goods only recently and reluctantly.

Few countries in modern times have had the audacity to reject the rest of the world and try things on their own. Burma has perhaps come closest to turning her back on the "materialistic" world around her. Ghandi cautioned India not to submit to the Western machine, but the advice was not taken.

In this country, affluence may be taking the zip out of the search for affluence. The dream of a few years ago that increased economic growth would solve many of America's problems now seems just that, a dream. A quarter-century of unprecedented economic growth has not solved the 350-year tragedy of black people in America. Growing wealth could create a black middle class and alter culture and values enough to create new norms of intermarriage and belief which would overcome this racial legacy. On the other hand, increasing income may only divide America more deeply and demonstrate that its most difficult problem is more intractable than ever. In a different vein, boredom and unemployment and a television view of a ubiquitous affluence may cause the ghetto Black to take heroin to escape his world. Affluence may be, directly and indirectly, causing the suburban White to take LSD to escape his world. In addition, affluence is bringing rapid population growth to countries which do not have cultural rules that tell people how to live in close compaction, as do Asian countries. And finally, minority and poor people in the United States, who previously were coerced into behavior desired by the rich, now find, as fear and coercion are removed by an increasingly aware and concerned public, that they are stranded in their new freedom, without new oppor-

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tunities, rules and values to replace the coercive rules and roles which have been removed.

A minority of youth view today's world as a nightmare of injustice, powerlessness and dehumanization, totally unlike the humanistic, close-to-nature, and compassionate world they believe in. However, a majority of youth today either are not troubled by the world they see, or view science and technology as capable of building a better world where toil, starvation, sickness, prejudice and misery will be overcome. Erik Erikson notes that this contest of identities and meanings for youth is not unique to our time. Nevertheless, the ramifications of these contrasting life beliefs and choices will be considerable should the preponderant choice swing too far in either direction.

Apart from what the youth of today decide to do with their tomorrows, there is the question whether affluence is creating a panoply of problems of population, ecology, compacted living and complex interdependencies that in themselves will create problems more rapidly than Western man can find ways to cope with them. Increasingly, we see evidence that the culture of affluence in the United States could take the vitality out of the economic system, through an erosion of the ethic of work, while simultaneously overloading the economy with economic demands and benefits. Both the attitudes toward work and the increased benefits sought from government represent changed cultural values resulting from increased consciousness within society and prior economic success. There are indications in America of probings for new meaning in sensitivity groups, renewed interest in astrology and in Buddhist and Hindu forms of worship, though none of these seem to come close to grappling with the existential crisis of meaning that exists. If values diverge too markedly and intractably, the long-standing tension and creative balance of world views within the West which have endured since the Renaissance and the Reformation could come undone and create a period of severe unsettlement.

This interaction between economic growth and culture could go several ways. If powerful groups within a country were to believe that the ethical values and norms of a minority were becoming an obstruction to the continued performance of the economic system, they might seek to compel cultural rules of behavior which would protect the workings of the economy and society. An authoritarian response to the cultural attack on capi-

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talism within the Western world is most likely because the complex and interdependent capitalist system can only function under conditions of broadly shared or imposed rules, procedures and goals. Though authoritarianism might protect the economic system it would intensify the basic problem of the meaning of life in the modern world. This would bring the conflict between spirit and efficiency to a critical stage and lead to major but unforeseeable change.

Thus in many ways affluence creates the means to oppose affluence. The argument is not that all of the adverse developments mentioned will transpire and will not be offset by opposing forces, but that some of these developments will come to pass and are themselves sufficient to disrupt the continuity of the political, cultural, economic and social life which has endured in the Western world for roughly the last 300 years.

II

The developing countries today are having a difficult time. Remarkable progress over the last 20 years in increasing economic growth has been offset by rising expectations of progress and by rapid growth of population. Apart from whether economic growth declines in the industrial countries and causes a decrease in aid and trade, the developing countries today face major political, ecological and psychological problems.

First, there are indications that political forms in the developing countries may not evolve sufficiently or rapidly enough to facilitate economic growth past a certain level. Argentina, Costa Rica and Uruguay seem to have run into a political and economic deadlock. In the West, political change in most cases preceded the industrial revolution through the rise of the bourgeoisie. In Japan the political and social climactic of the Meiji dynasty was coincident with economic growth. In the developing countries economic change has come before political change. Moreover, the abruptness of some of the economic changes creates difficult political problems. Consider the dramatic increase in rural income and the altered patterns of land holdings caused by the green revolution in northern India, which have led to strident demands by the hapless Harijans for betterment and a share in the new wealth. The pressures created in just a few years on the Indian social and political fabric are immense even though the threat of famine has temporarily diminished.

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The evidence is abundant in Latin America that a rational and technical approach to growth has not brought hoped-for political and social health—witness Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile. Whatever the causes, excellent economic growth policies and in many cases results (from an economic point of view) have been followed by increased political and social unrest. In Singapore and Malaysia, quite remarkable economic growth has failed to mitigate racial animosities between Chinese and Malays. Perhaps these are problems of turbulence in passing through a sound barrier of social and political change. More likely they represent difficult and enduring problems of expectations and performance.

Second, one form of precariousness has been exchanged for another. The previous Malthusian balance between food, traditional techniques and population has been replaced by a more complex balance between more food, advanced techniques and more population. Industrialization continues to tie the developing countries to a world market they cannot control while the new agricultural techniques tie these countries to new fertilizers and seeds that make the agricultural process more, not less, sensitive to the vicissitudes of nature as well as dependent on technology and inputs from the industrial countries. The new rice strains require precise amounts of water at each growth stage. New strains of seeds must be continually developed to maintain resistance against blight and disease. Food is now winning the race with population, but only through the adoption of advanced techniques which permit increased population growth but concurrently increase the risk of starvation should crops or technique fail or the world economic and environmental systems go off course for a while.

At this point, there is little solid knowledge of the ecological and plant disease risks man is running in squeezing more grain out of the soil of Asia. However, there are indications that nature exacts a price from man for yielding more production and discloses the price only at a later date. The later date has recently arrived for DDT and mercury. Thus far the price exacted for the new agricultural technology has been a race with pests and for water.

The third problem area is psychological. Unlike countries before them in history, the developing countries are forced not only to adapt to and emulate a powerful external cultural force —Westernization—but at the same time watch the powerful

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Western culture groping uncertainly with the consequences of its own success. If motivation is mostly a matter of believing in an end without being able to see its fulfillment, then the will to develop in the poorer countries may come into jeopardy. The developing countries through the magic of cinema, magazine and television are forced to live in two worlds and suffer the torture of seeing themselves both today and tomorrow, aware of the distance in time and effort that separates them from richness while some leaders in the societies become increasingly aware of the disadvantages of becoming rich. The essence of the situation for the developing countries may become this forced consciousness of arduous effort toward an ambiguous end.

Faced with such difficulty and ambiguity, will the developing nations seek alternative goals to high consumption and close ties to the world economy? Will these countries choose not to try to keep up or catch up with the developed nations? Would different national objectives provide these countries with an escape from the frustration of playing a game at which they cannot fully succeed? This is an important set of questions worthy of a much more deliberate consideration than is appropriate here. In my view, unless there are major upsets in the world economic order, the developing countries will be unable in the next decade to shift to new goals. Attitudes supporting economic development have become firmly established in the developing countries. Politicians must deal with these expectations transplanted from abroad or lose power. This is the cardinal point, and only a most unusual leader could buck these popular attitudes. Equally important, Western economics, techniques and cultures come packaged together. Decreased infant mortality brings population growth, while trade, media and tourists bring rock-and-roll music and mini-skirts. Countries must deal with population growth and expectations of economic progress and they have only a limited choice of how to go about this in an interdependent and media-drenched world. Countries can follow a more autarkic development policy, but experience shows they will grow at a slower rate and hence have fewer resources to deal with population growth and public expectations. The developing countries will be able to choose new goals only if the values and objectives of modernization are discredited or a prophetic leader arises and creates a new frame of meaning and a new interpretation of possibilities.

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Let us take an allegory of the tree of life to depict a view of the overall situation. The people in the developing countries are seeking to climb the trunk and lower branches of the tree of life while watching their fellow men farther up in the middle heights of the tree, looking for all the world just like themselves, enjoying a most exotic collection of food, goods and leisure. Thus with the delights of climbing in full view above them, the developing countries redouble their efforts to climb. Yet the task grows more difficult, even as they develop technical climbing skills and prove they are tenacious climbers. It is their misfortune that the hasty climbers far above are dropping on their heads expectations and population and ecological problems that slow their climb. But there is another problem for these climbers. High up in the top branches of the tree curious things are going on—those fabled rich people seem to be pairing off and battling each other, some are acting quixotically and jumping off into the air, while others are trying to climb back down the tree. The climbers on the lower branches begin to question whether the top of the tree is the paradise they had believed.

Could not the arduousness of the climb plus the doubtful benefit of the affluent top of the tree lead to a failure of nerve of those leading the climb for the developing countries? If they look for a different tree to climb, will they not find that population, tastes and skills may be just enough adapted to a tree-climbing economy to foreclose a return down the tree trunk to a traditional balance between culture, technique, population and resources?

III

Anticipating the disruptive effects that our inability to deal with affluence may have in the industrialized nations of the West, we shall assume that the industrial countries will run into increasingly serious domestic problems and consequently try to withdraw from foreign policy involvement with other countries, especially in the developing world. We further assume that economic growth will continue, but at reduced rates. As the powerful countries withdraw from involvement in many parts of the globe, rearrangements of power relationships take place among the developing countries, accompanied by fighting and unsettlement. However, the industrial countries need order in the international system and they continue to promote regional arrangements based largely on the power and self-interest of the regional

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countries. To the extent that these regional arrangements adequately protect the trade and the overseas investments of the industrial countries they will endure, and the developing countries will continue to develop, especially if population growth declines. Two factors, however, could change this outcome.

If trade and financial flows become unpredictable and the overseas investments of the rich nations are jeopardized, the industrial countries will involve themselves again in trying to stabilize regional areas of the world and in securing trade routes. Even if such a reassertion of power by the major nations upsets the regional arrangements and leads to greater uncertainty and to increased warfare, the industrial countries will feel that they have little choice, since their economies are dependent on world trade even if it runs at a reduced tempo.

And if during the next one to two decades internal problems within the industrial countries slow or stop economic growth, the developing countries would have a frightful time keeping ahead of their population growth. Indeed, they are having a tough time already. As noted earlier, even if the industrial countries maintain their economic growth but show signs of ill-temper and despondency, this itself could have a considerable effect on the developing countries. The vintage pioneer spirit which America displayed in providing development aid around the world between 1953 and 1967 represented an optimism and sense of confidence by the United States in the future and in itself; in some cases this gave the developing countries the same buoyant spirit. Various countries such as Taiwan, Pakistan, Turkey and Korea, and many of the Alliance for Progress countries in Central and South America, undertook economic development with zest during those years. In recent travels I have been struck by how this confident spirit has diminished. The competence in Latin America in terms of technical knowledge, economics and planning has grown immensely, but self-assurance in development and trade and political progress has declined.

The risks that leaders in developing countries decide to take obviously depend on their calculation of their chances for success. Most assuredly, decreasing resources from industrial countries will affect the development plans and ambitions of the developing countries. I suspect that the presence of Americans with their enthusiasm and technical skills and confident manner (often misplaced) played as large a role in convincing develop-

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ing countries to adopt ambitious development plans as did U.S. aid. I suspect that the energy and optimism expressed by the United States in placing aid missions around the globe was interpreted by some of the developing countries as follows: "These Americans really can do things. They are cocky and sure of themselves. We had better find out what they have to show us." Today the United States is taking steps to withdraw from such direct involvement in development by institutionalizing aid through international organizations, and essentially saying to the developing countries that we are no longer so sure about the product we were selling so energetically around the world just a few years ago. The United States will carry on a less active and interventionist foreign policy because it is unsure of itself for reasons that go far beyond Vietnam.

I believe we will see faltering leadership in the developing countries deriving both from the severe problems these countries must overcome and their lack of self-assurance that they can succeed, due partly to a shortage of political and economic models that show promise of success. If the United States is not the model to follow today, who is? What models are the developing countries supposed to follow in this age of used-up ideologies? Peru does not know which way to go. Which way will Chile really go? Which way can she go? For every politician in a developing country who urges planning and rationality to solve the country's problems, there is another politician of the people who say "No" to the rational approach, "No" to the industrial countries, and "No" to waiting. Many of these emotional, nationalistic leaders came to power after World War II on the crest of nationalism following the demise of colonialism. Then during the 1950s and 1960s these leaders were frequently replaced by rationalist and technical leaders such as Eduardo Frei, Ayub Khan, Lleras Restrepo, Lee Kuan Yew, Park Chung-hee, Suleyman Demirel and Diaz Ordaz. If the northern countries run into major internal problems, the developing countries themselves might well consider that their brief flirtation with Western values and trade was a disastrous failure; they would likely turn next to charismatic and mystical leaders who would find meaning within the culture and history of their traditional societies.

If industrial countries falter and behave unpredictably, widespread starvation and disorganization of the entire world economy would likely result. This would present the West with a

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supreme moral challenge. Would we let mass starvation occur? Would we have the technical means to prevent it? Would we be forced to close ranks and on an imperialistic basis put the world economy back together to protect our own standard of living? Or could we live apart from the developing countries, yet within sight of their misery?

IV

That Western society is facing a crisis of meaning in various dimensions is, I think, evident. How countries react to the crisis is the interesting question. Though one can rule out a peaceful, almost invisible cultural and social transformation à la Charles Reich, one cannot so easily rule out failure of nerve on a scale that leads either toward collapse and antiquarianism or toward a prophetic reinterpretation of values and meaning while preserving the existing technology and economic system.

Alternatively, there is the possibility that instead of radical political or cultural change as described above, a leadership might emerge and gain support for the conservative position of survival through a policy of equilibrium with our natural environment through zero economic and population growth. We would then no longer use the pejorative term "stagnation," but find a new word that captures the conception of man being in control and stopping growth. This would require an immense wrenching of the spirit. Yet our affluent use of energy and natural resources, of drugs and medicines, our production of things and use of land—all these could so change ourselves and our balance with our environment that there would be a cry for zero growth. It takes little science-fiction imagination to conceive of a virus, mutagenics or mercury poisoning scare that would start people questioning the risks of moving further toward affluence.

Post-industrial society confronts man with difficult problems of management, knowledge, planning and environmental balance. Affluence, as a goal and as a dimension of post-industrial society, presents perhaps the most difficult problem because it changes man and his culture in terms of individual meaning, belonging and identity. Governments may be able to deal with pollution and planning, but changes in culture and meaning seem to be beyond them.

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CHANGES AND CHANCES IN AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

By Hans J. Morgenthau

OUR reactions to Soviet foreign policy have a way of jumping from one extreme to another, both in the long and short run, with more regard for changing superficial appearances than permanent objective factors. During the last year of the Second World War, we tended to idealize the Russians, Stalin became "Uncle Joe" to be charmed by Roosevelt into coöperation, and the United Nations, having done away with "power politics," was supposed to be the vehicle of that coöperation. From 1947 onwards, the Kremlin was perceived as the headquarters of the devil on earth, causing all that was wrong with the world and, more particularly, scheming the destruction of the United States. These extreme swings of the pendulum can also be observed in much shorter time spans.

On August 27, 1970, *The New York Times* reported from San Clemente that "authoritative White House sources have declared that the United States is prepared to join the Soviet Union in a two-nation peace-keeping force to maintain a settlement of the Middle East conflict. . . ." The reader was left with the clear inference that both the President and Mr. Henry Kissinger, his adviser on national security, had something to do with this statement. If Mr. Nixon had made such a statement ten years ago, it would have been judged at best to be utterly eccentric and at worst might have jeopardized the then Vice President's political career, and if Professor Kissinger had made such a statement 20 years ago, the House Un-American Activities Committee might have investigated him as a likely subversive.

Yet less than a month passed, and the atmosphere was drastically transformed. For the Soviet Union had not only violated the ceasefire agreement in the Middle East on a massive scale but seemed to have intended doing so from the outset. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was suspected to be building a submarine base in Cuba. Thus, Secretary of State Rogers, at his news conference of December 23, 1970, discounted as "totally impractical" the idea of such a peacekeeping force as had been adumbrated in August and denied that the United States had ever given any thought to such a possibility.

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Yet beneath these fluctuations of mood and tactics the perennial question about the future of American-Soviet relations persists in demanding an answer: Is it possible to move from sterile confrontation to meaningful negotiations? While 20 years ago such a question was purely rhetorical since the negative answer was a foregone conclusion, it can now be asked seriously, and it deserves a serious answer, derived not from the changing mood of the day but from the objective factors which in the long run determine the relations among nations. What has happened during the last 20 years to account for the possibility of posing that crucial question seriously?

II

Five factors have transformed the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union: the rejection of nuclear war as an instrument of national policy; the ideological decontamination of foreign policy at least with respect to each other; the failure of the competition for the allegiance of the third world; the implicit recognition by the United States of the status quo in Eastern Europe; and the Chinese threat to the Soviet Union.

The fear of mutual destruction through nuclear war has imposed effective restraints upon the foreign policies of the superpowers in two respects: the avoidance of direct military confrontation and, when it inadvertently occurs, its speedy liquidation. The United States has fought in Korea and Vietnam wars for limited objectives, falling short of military victory, because of the fear of such a confrontation. It has kept its hands off a series of East European revolts against Soviet domination. For the same reason, the Soviet Union has not followed up with action its repeated demands—twice in the form of ultimatums with a precise time limit—for a change in the status quo of West Berlin. In the Middle East, Russia has come close to a military confrontation with America, but the latter has not responded in kind, and both powers have joined in an initiative to restore peace. When there was military confrontation during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both sides went as far as they dared without compelling the other side to take steps that might lead to nuclear war, and retraced their steps in partial retreat.

Sharing the conviction of the suicidal irrationality of nuclear war, the United States and the Soviet Union have thus in a sense helped each other to avoid it; they appear to have concluded

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that the sole legitimate purpose of nuclear arms is not to win a nuclear war but to deter it. Nevertheless, they have continued an unlimited nuclear arms race as though there did not exist an optimum of nuclear preparedness sufficient for deterrence, beyond which to go is utterly irrational. They have thus pursued the rational goal of nuclear deterrence with the irrational means of an unlimited nuclear arms race. Recognizing this irrationality, they have joined in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), searching for an agreement which could bring the nuclear arms race under control.

While the United States and the Soviet Union have begun to deal with each other as one great power with another, having certain interests in common and being at loggerheads with regard to others, there was a time, not much more than a decade ago, when we took the communist dogma much more seriously as a guide to policy than did, for instance, Stalin, who with utter cynicism and brutality used communism and communists as a means to further the traditional ends of the Russian state. Yet we saw in Stalin the heir of Trotsky who was out to accomplish the communization of the world, begun in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War, while in truth Stalin was the heir of the Tsars, seeking the traditional goals of Imperial Russia with the new instruments communism put at his disposal. The Russians, in turn, interpreted our insistence upon democratic governments in Eastern Europe and our verbal commitment to "rollback" and "liberation" as evidence of the undying hostility of capitalism which since 1917 had used every opportunity to try to destroy the Soviet Union.

The emancipation of American and Soviet foreign policies from these dogmatic ideological stereotypes—again I must emphasize, limited to their mutual relations—has been the result of the impact the facts of life have made upon the thoughts and actions of the governments concerned. Foremost among these facts has been their failure to win the ideological allegiance of the nations of the third world in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The third world was supposed to be the decisive battleground in the struggle for men's minds, a struggle which would decide the fate of the world. Khrushchev, for instance, used to assure us that the third world would follow the lead of the Soviet Union and thereby seal the doom of the West. Nothing of the kind happened. The new nations of the third world have appar-

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ently preferred to be miserable in their own way to being made happy by the United States or the U.S.S.R.

This failure of ideological competition has led both superpowers to the conclusion that it is not worth the expense and the risk of a direct military confrontation, and they have given it up. The absence of any ideological reference and the explicit disavowal of ideological commitment in President Nixon's message to Congress on the state of the world of March of last year at least provides verbal evidence of this fundamental change in our approach to certain aspects of foreign policy. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has banished, a few exceptions to the contrary notwithstanding, ideological considerations from its policies in the third world. It has very close relations with the United Arab Republic whose communists are in jail, and it supports Latin American dictators against their communist parties, which are in turn supported by Cuba, the ally of the Soviet Union. That is to say, it practices old-fashioned power politics, unencumbered by ideological considerations.

It is part and parcel of this victory of the facts of life over ideological blinders that the United States has for all practical purposes recognized the Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe. True enough, we have contained the Soviet Union at the line of military demarcation of 1945; but now we and the Soviet Union realize that the United States, too, has been contained at that very same line. This realization has removed from the cold war its main issue: the territorial status quo, especially with regard to the two Germanys. The recent treaty between the Soviet Union and West Germany makes explicit what had been implicit in the policies of the two superpowers: the recognition by all concerned of the territorial boundaries established at the end of the Second World War. This normalization of East-West relations in Europe has also deprived the status of West Berlin of much of the leverage which Stalin and Khrushchev used against the West. They threatened the status quo of West Berlin in order to compel the West to recognize the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe. Since that recognition has now been forthcoming, the status of West Berlin as a pawn in the hands of the Soviet Union has markedly decreased, although it still retains its usefulness as an instrument of annoyance.

Finally, even if these two developments had not greatly contributed to stability in Europe, the Soviet Union would have a

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vital interest in such stability. For the Soviet Union must cope at its Chinese frontier with endemic instability which might well escalate into war, and in such a contingency it must be reasonably certain that its western frontiers are secure. It needs that certainty in particular because its élite is obsessed with the fear the Americans will gang up with the Chinese. The Russian leaders suffer from the same "cauchemar des coalitions" which disturbed Bismarck's sleep (only he had better reasons than they). Thus they are not likely to provoke the United States in Europe as long as the insecurity at their eastern frontiers persists.

Considering the beneficial impact these factors have had on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is tempting to conclude that, undisturbed by contrary tendencies, these factors will continue to exert their pacifying and normalizing effect. This conclusion is particularly tempting for those who have conceived of our relations with the Soviet Union primarily, if not exclusively, in ideological, that is, anti-communist terms. Since we do not need to worry any more about the Soviet Union as the spearhead of communism bent upon destroying us, so the argument runs, there is really nothing at all to worry about. This position, simple if not simplistic and superficially attractive since it caters to our wishes, is, however, vulnerable to three arguments: the elimination of ideological considerations from our foreign policy is partial, and tenuous where it exists; the power politics of the Soviet Union contains residues of ideological commitment; the U.S.S.R. is a great power whose interests and the policies serving it, regardless of ideology, may run counter to the interests of the United States and the policies serving it.

Nor does the ideological decontamination of our relations with the Soviet Union signify that our foreign policy has been altogether freed of its ideological ingredients. We still think about foreign policy in demonological terms and allow our actions to be influenced by them. Why are we fighting in Indochina? In order to prevent the communist takeover of South Vietnam is the official answer. Why did we send our troops to the Dominican Republic? Because we cannot have another communist government in the Western Hemisphere, said President Johnson. Thus it appears that the struggle against communism still influences our actions. Only the devil's place of residence has changed. He could at a moment's notice move back to the

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Kremlin, and his reappearance in his old haunts would rekindle the ideological animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union. As William Graham Sumner put it: "The amount of superstition is not much changed, but it now attaches to politics, not religion," and, one can add, it attaches to one locale rather than another as circumstances seem to require.

This propensity for political demonology finds support in the nature of the Soviet state and the foreign policies it pursues. It is true that since Stalin the Soviet Union has used ideological factors as means to the end for the Soviet state and in consequence has been able to switch with great alacrity its ideological preferences and stigmatizations from one country to the other. Thus the German "fascist beasts" became comrades-in-arms against Western imperialism after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939, and the "neo-fascists" and "revanchists" of West Germany transformed themselves into respectable partners, once they were willing to recognize the territorial status quo. China was embraced as a junior partner in the world communist movement as long as it was satisfied with that junior position. It was read out of the Marxist-Leninist camp altogether when it struck out on its own in competition with the Soviet Union.

But it is also true that the Soviet Union regards itself not only as one nation among others but also as the "Fatherland of Socialism," the leader of all "progressive" forces throughout the world. It is this position, now to be maintained against China's competitive claims, that imposes upon Soviet foreign policy certain ideological burdens which the Soviet Union would not need to bear if it conceived of its national interests in strictly traditional terms. What happens in Cuba has no bearing upon the interests of the Russian state traditionally conceived, but it bears heavily upon the position of the Soviet Union as leader of the "progressive" forces of the world. For that reason, the Soviet Union subsidizes Cuba to the tune of approximately $1,000,000 a day even though Castro supports subversion and civil war against the very Latin American governments with which the Soviet Union deals on a pragmatic basis. It is for the same reason that the Soviet Union supports North Vietnam with military aid, carefully limited so as not to provoke the United States to escalate the war, but sufficient to prevent an American military victory.

Thus the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is not dead but only dormant. As long as the

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interests of the two superpowers do not openly clash, the ideological conflict may remain in its present state of suspended animation. But if and when one superpower shall again openly encroach upon the interests of the other, the ideological demons are also likely to be awakened from their slumber. Here is indeed the crux of the future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Can they pursue their respective interests without encroaching upon each other's?

III

Since the downfall of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union has unobtrusively and effectively expanded its political and military influence in the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, South Asia and the Indian Ocean in the best tradition of great-power politics and has enhanced its economic influence throughout the world in the best tradition of a capitalist trading nation. The pattern of that expansion has been constant: Russia has moved into the spaces left by the liquidation of the British and French Empires, thereby bringing close to consummation the Tsarist aspirations which during the better part of the nineteenth century had pitted Russia against Great Britain over the "Eastern Question."

Yet there are less spectacular and potentially as important achievements as well. The following story from the London *Financial Times* of February 14, 1968, points out that Moscow has seen considerable commercial advantage to gain from the blockage of the Suez Canal. Across the Soviet Union lie "straight-line" routes from Western Europe to most of Asia, and the Russians are beginning to exploit this fact.

> Already [the Russians] have developed two alternative water routes of their own to the East—the waterway system linking the Baltic Sea with the Caspian, and the Northern Sea route from Europe through the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific. Distances by these routes are shorter than via Suez (unlike the corresponding Cape journeys) and in the event of a long closure could well capture some of the traffic permanently. Iran's use of the Baltic-Caspian waterway has reached an advanced stage already. This route . . . is cutting 2,700 miles off the Suez route between Germany and Iran.

The *Financial Times* goes on to report that Russia had also announced that she would be "opening her previously tightly guarded Arctic shipping lane across the top of Siberia to foreign ships." Such a new sea route would put Yokohama only 8,500 miles from London whereas the Suez passage totals 12,500 miles.

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Instead of remembering how in the sixteenth century the center of power shifted from the Mediterranean to the nations bordering on the Atlantic in consequence of the opening of new trade routes, we have been hypnotized by the ideological aspects of the Indochina war. While we put our minds to beating the Russian communists to the moon and keeping the Vietnamese communists out of Saigon, the Soviet Union has occupied much of the middle ground between these cosmic and parochial goals. Thus the absence of open conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union or, to put it in positive terms, the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations is in good measure the result not of the settlement of outstanding issues or of the absence of points of conflict, but of American failure to compete with and oppose a Soviet Union steadily expanding its power throughout the world. What looks to the naïve and the wishful thinkers as a new harmonious phase in American-Soviet relations is in truth a by-product of our military involvement in Indochina. We have been too busy with trying to save Indochina from communism to pay much attention to what the U.S.S.R. was doing in the rest of the world and to compete with it or oppose it as our interests require.

As long as our main national energies and human and natural resources remain absorbed by Indochina, we will continue to enjoy "good" relations with the Soviet Union. The "good" quality of these relations will be the result not of the identity or the parallelism of interests derived from the settlement of outstanding issues, but of letting the defense and promotion of our interests go by default. After all, it takes two to quarrel. If one side does not object to what the other is doing, there will be harmony, but it can be harmony at the former's expense. Thus, paradoxically enough, the lack of controversy in American-Soviet relations results in good measure from the pathological inversion of our national priorities caused by our involvement in the Indochina war. Once we terminate that involvement and conduct our foreign policies again on the basis of the rational assessment and ordering of our national interests, we are likely to find ourselves again in competition and conflict with the Soviet Union.

IV

Four issues, if they are not settled, are likely to revive the competition and opposition between America and Russia: the nuclear arms race, the status of Germany, the balance of

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power in the Middle East, and the ferment in the third world.

The restraints which the fear of mutual destruction has imposed upon the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union are predicated upon the certainty of that destruction. That is to say, they depend upon what Churchill called a "balance of terror," in which B, after having suffered unacceptable damage from nuclear attack by A, would still be able with what remained of its retaliatory nuclear force to inflict unacceptable damage upon A, and vice versa. It is this psychological conviction that a nuclear war is a genocidal and suicidal absurdity which has preserved the peace and at least a modicum of order in the relations of the superpowers.

However, the indefinite persistence of this conviction cannot be taken for granted. It is threatened by two assumptions: that one or the other side has acquired a first-strike capability which would destroy the enemy's retaliatory capability or at worst reduce it to tolerable proportions, and that one or the other side or both sides have developed a defensive system which at worst would reduce nuclear damage to tolerable proportions. It is irrelevant for the purpose of this discussion whether or not these assumptions are correct; it is sufficient that they might be held. If they were held, they would be bound to exacerbate drastically the nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union; for then the question before us would no longer be the relatively simple one of maintaining mutual deterrence, but how to assure for oneself, and deny to the enemy, the ability to wage a successful nuclear war. The restraints which, as we have seen, have characterized the foreign policies of the superpowers would then follow mutual deterrence into oblivion; for the avoidance of nuclear war appears no longer as a precondition for physical survival if a nation is convinced that it can win a nuclear war either through irresistible attack or impenetrable defense.

It is this dire possibility that makes the success of the SALT talks, seeking a way to control the nuclear arms race, so crucially important for the future of American-Soviet relations. If they fail, a drastic deterioration of these very relations is likely to result. If they succeed, they will not only have stabilized the nuclear arms race on a level sufficient for mutual deterrence, though not for a first strike or effective defense, but they will also have demonstrated the ability of the two superpowers to translate their common interest in survival into operative policies.

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While this issue, overshadowing all others, is still in the balance, the normalization of the relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union through the former's recognition of the territorial status quo has brought to the fore a conventional issue which touches the vital interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union: the future orientation of West Germany. Almost 20 years ago, West Germany joined the Western alliance in order to contain the Soviet Union and to assure powerful backing for its claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the whole German people, East and West. It succeeded in the first, and failed in the second, objective. That failure was due to the East German government's staying power and the Soviet determination to contain the West at the 1945 demarcation line.

For West Germany, however, the relations with East Germany and West Berlin have remained crucial. Bonn has come to recognize that the only power which can improve and secure these relations is the Soviet Union. By the same token, the Soviet Union knows that the security of its European empire depends upon West Germany's position. A West Germany which is the dissatisfied spearhead of a hostile alliance is a constant threat; a neutralized and friendly West Germany is an invaluable asset. For a Russo-German combination would become the master of the Eurasian land mass, reducing what remains of Western Europe to an insignificant promontory. This has been the long-range aim of Soviet foreign policy at least since Khrushchev. Khrushchev expressed time and again in private conversation his conviction that there would be another Rapallo, that is, another understanding between Germany and the Soviet Union after the model of the Rapallo Treaty of 1922; that it would come not under him and not under his successor but under his successor's successor; that it was inevitable; and that the Soviet Union could wait. The Soviet Union, in the treaty with West Germany recently concluded, has taken the first step in the direction sketched by Khrushchev.

This treaty, on the face of it, performs the function of a peace treaty—a quarter of a century overdue—in which West Germany recognizes explicitly the territorial status quo of 1945. This recognition has been implicit in the policies which West Germany and the United States have pursued for two decades vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe, but the revisionary rhetoric accompanying it, especially in the

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1950s, could not help but create doubts as to whether that implicit recognition could be relied upon if opportunities for a change in the territorial status quo should arise. These doubts have now been laid to rest.

However, it is hardly necessary to point out that the development so confidently predicted by Khrushchev would run counter to the interests of the United States and would nullify the policies Washington has pursued in Europe since the end of the Second World War; for it was the major aim of these policies to prevent all of Germany from being drawn into the Russian orbit. In the course of such a development, the Soviet Union, by replacing the United States as the predominant power in Western Europe, would achieve another of its long-term aims: the expulsion of the United States from Europe.

Here is indeed a potential source of serious conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Whether or not that conflict will materialize depends upon two factors: what other steps may follow after the initial step taken by the Soviet Union and West Germany, and whether the United States, remaining aware of those interests in Europe over which it fought the cold war, is still willing to support those interests with appropriate policies. As concerns the last point, domestic support for the proposal to reduce drastically our military presence in West Germany must give us pause.

At present it is the Middle East which appears the most obvious point at which the interests and policies of the United States and the Soviet Union appear to collide. The Soviet Union seeks to maintain and expand its predominant presence in the region, while the United States tries to contain it. In order to realize its aim the Soviet Union must support the Arab aspirations up to the point where the survival of Israel is in jeopardy; for much of the Soviet leverage in the Arab world depends upon the continuation of the enmity between the Arabs and Israel. Paradoxically enough, the Soviet Union has an interest in the survival of Israel, however precariously placed in the midst of continuing Arab hostility. On the other hand, the United States, too, is interested in the survival of Israel, secured through the acceptance of the Arab states; for such acceptance would reduce the Soviet leverage to a minimum and improve the chances for American influence reasserting itself. Thus American and Soviet interests with regard to Israel are both contradictory and

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run for quite different reasons along parallel lines. They make for conflict as well as coöperation.

The third possible point of friction between the United States and the Soviet Union, the revolutionary ferment in the third world, differs from the others in that it is highly speculative. In theory, both superpowers are committed to incompatible positions on this issue. The Soviet Union has repeatedly come out in favor of "wars of national liberation," while the United States favors stability, which means in concrete terms the defense of the status quo against revolution from the Left. In consequence of these incompatible positions, the United States and the Soviet Union have found themselves on opposite sides of the fence in the Congo, the Middle East, Cuba, Vietnam. But, as pointed out before with regard to Latin America, the Soviet Union has not hesitated to abandon this position in favor of a pragmatic pursuit of its national interests as a great power. And the United States, after the Indochinese experience, is not likely to intervene openly in Africa or Latin America in order to defend the established order against revolutionary change. In view of the abatement of ideological commitment on both sides, this source of friction may appear remote at present, but it might become acute overnight if an unforeseen event, domestic or international, should suddenly awaken the slumbering ideological passions.

The amicable or at least peaceful settlement of the substantive issues outstanding between the United States and the Soviet Union is greatly complicated and under certain conditions may well be jeopardized by a peculiarity of the Soviet approach to negotiated settlements. The Soviet Union has been painstaking in keeping the agreements—both political and commercial—that were in its interests to keep, and this is about all one can expect from any nation; for all nations will disregard—either openly or surreptitiously—those agreements which no longer serve their interests. It is peculiar to the Soviet approach to negotiated settlements to enter sometimes into such settlements with the intention not to honor them. It is one thing to disregard agreements when they no longer serve one's purposes; it is quite another to pledge one's word to an agreement with the intention not to honor it. The former is accepted diplomatic practice, however morally repugnant. The latter is treachery—Gromyko assuring Kennedy of the absence of Russian missiles in Cuba while the President had photographic evidence to the contrary;

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the Soviet Union agreeing to a ceasefire for the Middle East and violating the agreement at the very moment of its coming into operation. The experience and the resulting expectation of such treachery may well make the difference between accord and conflict and, when the chips are down, between peace and war.

Thus the future of American-Soviet relations is shrouded in uncertainty. Neither amity nor enmity is foreordained. Those who proclaim the inevitability of conflict on ideological grounds are as wrong as are those who assert the inevitability of peace, or even friendship, because the United States and the Soviet Union have become more restrained in words and deeds in dealing with each other. The future depends first of all upon how the two governments conceive of their respective interests and how they will go about defending and protecting them. If they conceive of them in compatible terms and pursue them with appropriate concern for each other's sensibilities, the future might well witness the realization of Roosevelt's dream, Stalin's grand design, and Mao's nightmare: the coöperation of the United States and the Soviet Union in establishing and maintaining a modicum of order in the world. Otherwise, the world will continue to hover on the brink of self-destruction.

The outcome, however, will no longer depend exclusively upon the actions of the superpowers vis-à-vis each other, but to an increasing extent upon the actions of secondary power centers—China, Japan, West Germany, either alone or in concert with a politically and militarily united Europe—and the reactions of the two superpowers to them. Thus the issues dividing the two superpowers will remain susceptible to peaceful settlements only in the measure that the superpowers are able to prevent their relations with the secondary power centers from exacerbating their relations with each other. When they deal with each other, they must also, as it were, look over their shoulders to see what other nations are doing and to anticipate what they are likely to do. While the freedom of manœuvre which the secondary power centers are likely to enjoy will introduce a new element of uncertainty and risk into the relations between the superpowers, concern with the interests and policies of the secondary powers may well strengthen the self-restraint with which America and Russia have been dealing with each other because of the fear of nuclear war.

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THE CHILEAN EXPERIMENT

By Claudio Véliz

THERE must be something about Latin America which invites generalization. It could be the common Iberian ancestry—although North America's British roots do not appear to have had the same effect—or the common religion, or simply the legitimate fact of relative ignorance about too many countries which have long remained outside the mainstream of international interest. Even when there is an awareness of diversity, it is often accompanied by impatience at this unhelpful "balkanization," a desire to conceptualize the unwieldy region into an homogeneous, manageable whole. This is a problem peculiar to Latin America; an important political change—say, in Greece—is unlikely to be accepted as a valid indicator of the direction of European affairs generally, let alone as a satisfactory solution for domestic problems in France or Finland. But when a major political change takes place in a Latin American country, the immediate temptation—which few resist—is to see it not only as a portent of things to come elsewhere in Latin America, but also as a possible answer to problems faced by other nations in the region.

This certainly happened after the Cuban revolution when too many foreign observers spent much effort trying to discover which Latin American country was to become the "second Cuba" —an attitude apparently shared by influential minds within the U. S. government which, after all, decided on the invasion of Santo Domingo, presumably to save it from that fate. Equally hasty though perhaps less bizarre was the reaction to the 1964 Christian Democratic electoral victory in Chile; numerous articles, books and learned papers were published after this event, suggesting that Christian Democracy was, after all, the wave of the future for the whole region. More recently, the unorthodox behavior of the Peruvian military régime moved many to fear, or hope, that here at last was a grass-roots "Nasserism" that was going to engulf the continent.

Now it is Chile's turn once more to be cast in the unwanted role of test case, first domino (or second?) in this eclectic Latin American version of the cold-war game. Even excluding the irrationally fearful or enthusiastic, it is striking to note how many

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otherwise prudent foreign observers are already predicting the consequences which the Chilean experience will have for the rest of the continent, either as a threat—as much of the Brazilian and U. S. press are suggesting—or as a hope for political groupings which are endeavoring to move in the same direction. Enough is known now—after a decade—to accept that the likelihood of a second Cuban revolution in the continent was always extremely remote, but it was never as remote as the probability of repeating the Chilean experience elsewhere.[1]

Until the exceptional circumstances of the aftermath of the Second World War, when military factors and decisions on global strategy made it possible for a number of countries to produce communist governments, no modern revolutionary or substantially reformist régime had ever been able to generate in another nation the requisite domestic fervor to reproduce the revolutionary experience. This was possibly because a principal ingredient of such contemporary movements has always been a fairly robust nationalism.

The new *Unidad Popular* government of Chile is not a marginal result of a cold-war situation, nor is it geared to the satisfaction of this or that global strategic demand; it is distinctly a national government come to power because of domestic circumstances unparalleled elsewhere in Latin America. It is addressed to complex problems which it hopes to face with measures which could be described as conventional, but applied with a pragmatism functionally related to a distinctly Chilean definition of those problems.

The *Unidad Popular* coalition was formed expressly to fight the presidential elections of 1970. It consists of three major parties—the Socialist, Communist and Radical—and three smaller movements, the left-wing splinter group from the Christian Democratic Party known as MAPU (*Movimiento de Accion Popular Unitaria*), the tiny Social Democratic Party and the equally small API (*Accion Popular Independiente*). In President Allende's first cabinet, the Socialist Party secured four posts: those of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Housing and the government's Secretary General; the Communists, three posts: Finance, Public Works and Labor; the Radicals, three posts:

[1] However, there is at present a move to reproduce the Chilean electoral coalition scheme in Uruguay, with a view to fighting the November 1971 presidential elections on the basis of a coalition which would include the Christian Democrats, the *Movimiento Battlista,* the *Movimiento Blanco Popular,* and even the *Tupamaros.*

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Education, Defense and Mines, with the key Ministry of Agriculture going to MAPU.

II

It would seem wise, therefore, to begin a consideration of the contemporary situation in the country with an understanding of her insularity with respect to the rest of Latin America, which is as real as that of Japan with respect to the mainland of Asia or that of Britain to the continent of Europe; the high Andes and the great northern desert have been for Chile in the past obstacles as effective as the English Channel has been for Britain. This insularity is not the reflection—as Régis Debray has suggested—of a "superiority complex," but rather of geographical and historical circumstances which, presumably neither good nor bad, stand as a matter of fact.

Isolated from the rest of Latin America, Chile has developed a *sui generis* centralist tradition—otherwise shared in diverse forms with other countries of the region—in an emphatically civilian, legalistic and democratic manner.[2] This has been partly the result of the failure of the military to retain a dominant position during the formative years of the republic. The Chilean armed forces during the first half of the nineteenth century were in fact more attuned to the liberal breezes blowing from Europe than the austere and conservative civil servants who, after the revolution of 1829, dominated national political life for 60 uninterrupted years, impressing on the young nation an early respect for civilian legality, a stern nationalism, and—considering the contemporary circumstances—an observance of the spirit and practice of democratic control, albeit among the members of the ruling élite.

It was only in 1891 that Chile experienced her first de facto change of government after 1829, with the liberal revolt supported by the navy, which ousted President Balmaceda on the excuse that he had assumed unconstitutional powers. The liberal parliamentary régime established after the downfall of Balmaceda proved a failure and in 1925 a new constitution was adopted —the first since 1833—which survives until this day. The constitution of 1925, for all its shortcomings, is very much in the spirit of enlightened, bureaucratic centralism that is associated

[2] For a more detailed consideration of this aspect of the problem, see Claudio Véliz, "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1968.

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with the work of the great civilian decades of the nineteenth century which provides for a strong executive mildly tempered by concessions to the principle of checks and balances.

The Chilean working class movement has origins and traditions which are also unique and influence absolutely contemporary labor attitudes. In Argentina, for instance, socialism was to a very large extent an imported product which took root mainly through the activities of immigrant European workers; in Chile, a full generation before the Soviet revolution and many years before the Mexican revolution, a number of political parties and other groupings with a distinct socialist outlook were already freely functioning. The present Radical Party was founded over a century ago; the Social Democratic Party—another member of the present government coalition—can trace its origins to the Democratic Party founded in 1887, while the Socialist Workers Party, a precursor of the present Socialist Party, was founded in 1898.

These developments were not paralleled elsewhere in the continent; moreover, the economic and social circumstances which surrounded them were also different. Compared with other Latin American countries, Chile has had practically no peasant or Indian problem; her industrialization has been principally capital-intensive and has resulted in the formation of an industrial working class which is relatively well organized, small and well paid in comparison with wage levels outside industry. To this must be added that she has a pre-industrial urban civilization, with a tertiary sector which was already unusually large before the advent of modern industry and which has provided the bulk of her politically active population during this century.

Another distinctly Chilean trait which is relevant in this context has to do with the participation of the upper classes in politics. In Argentina, for instance, the upper class abandoned political activity during the decade of 1930. Why this happened is another question: the fact is that during the past 40 years it has had practically no important role in national politics. This is not the case in Chile, where the aristocracy and the upper-middle class have traditionally shown a remarkable capacity to adapt to changing political circumstances and to continue to play an active role. In this sense, one could describe the traditional attitude of the Chilean upper class as "Wellingtonian" in that they are inclined to avoid fighting great battles and would rather

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stake their survival on flexibility and adaptation and not necessarily on victorious confrontations.[8]

After the parliamentary fiasco which led to the adoption of the 1925 constitution, successive governments—with only incidental exceptions—have tended to accept or reinforce the central power of the state. Even during the presidential election this year, it was interesting to note that all three candidates—Sr. Alessandri for the right wing, Sr. Tomic for the Christian Democrats and Dr. Allende for the left-wing coalition, *Unidad Popular*—obviously for different reasons—coincided in demanding greater power for the central state apparatus, either through constitutional reforms, or through the granting of additional duties and responsibilities to the government. Evidently such an acceptance of the predominant power of the state does not in itself amount to a socialist commitment, yet both Dr. Allende and Sr. Tomic, who together received well over 60 percent of the votes cast, ran on platforms which coincided on many points and which could be generally described as socialistic. After the election, President Allende has further defined his government as one of transition toward socialism.

This is a definition which can only be understood in the context within which it was given; merely to describe something as socialist is not very enlightening. Hungary, Albania, China and Czechoslovakia describe themselves as socialist republics; the British Labour Party also thinks of itself as a socialist group; so does the French Socialist Party; while in Zambia, Tanzania, the United Arab Republic and Ceylon, groups in power pride themselves on their sincere efforts to move toward socialism. Even a superficial examination of all these cases would show a disconcerting diversity of goals and means which becomes more confusing if we add Cuba and Chile to the list.

In the Chilean case, a further extension of the public sector would be well within a secular national trend. In 1968 the state was already responsible for approximately 60 percent of total investment and it could be argued that the "peaks" of the national

[8] There are exceptions to this, of course, the most recent being the alleged participation of significant right-wing figures in the abortive attempt to prevent President Allende from taking office, which resulted in the assassination of General René Schneider, undoubtedly a most dismal chapter in the country's political history and one which has diminished the extreme right wing's moral authority as a viable opposition force. On the other hand, the manner with which the nation responded to this crisis is added evidence of the singularity of the Chilean situation. A similar occurrence in many other Latin American countries would have probably precipitated either direct military intervention or at least an interruption of institutional continuity.

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economy were shared by efficient and dynamic autonomous state corporations, and subsidiaries of foreign private enterprises, with domestic private investment playing a dependent secondary role.[4] No doubt, had this trend continued under a Christian Democratic administration, the emphasis and direction would have differed from the one which the *Unidad Popular* coalition will adopt, but it would be a mistake merely to consider the present policy of nationalizations as a result of an ideologically motivated imposition from above.

The new Chilean government will nationalize the large copper mining concerns of the *Gran Mineria,* but under the Christian Democrats these foreign-owned corporations went through the process of "Chileanization" which resulted in the state securing ownership of 51 percent of the enterprises. To move from this to complete control represents a quantitative change which, moreover, is supported by all the parties represented in the parliament, even the groups on the extreme Right. The complete nationalization of the banking system, which is at present being opposed by the Christian Democratic and the National parties, is also less of a departure than it would seem at first, as one major state bank, the *Banco del Estado,* already controls almost 50 percent of banking activity in the country.

Taken together with other reforms such as the nationalization of key manufacturing firms which enjoy a monopoly position, these decisions amount to a substantial change in the basic structure of the economy, but one in harmony with a trend which has become characteristic and which has proceeded steadily over many decades, through trial and error, without significant recourse to any identifiable body of theory or ideological allegiance.

Yet, with this in mind, if a comparison is made between the performance of the Christian Democratic administration and the avowed intentions of the present régime, a striking difference will immediately become apparent: faced with the inability, unwillingness or just plain incapacity of the domestic private sector to fulfill a dynamic role in the process of economic development, President Frei's government allowed foreign invest-

[4] The detailed examination of this situation has given rise to the concept of dependence, one of the most original and promising contributions to the study of development to come from Latin America in recent years. Most of the work being done on this new concept is as yet unpublished, but the latest version of Osvaldo Sunkel's working hypothesis appears in *Politique Etrangère* (Paris), No. 6, 1970.

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ment capital to fill the gap. The present administration, on the other hand, appears more inclined to rely on the state to perform this task, though quite aware at the same time of the risks involved in a too rapid extension of the public sector over important areas of the economy. The efficiency of the autonomous state corporations is the result of over three decades of experience, during which specific managerial capacity has been trained and placed at the service of these corporations. It is at least arguable whether—notwithstanding the enthusiasm of the new groups in power—a similar performance can be expected if a sizable area of the economy is brought under state control within a relatively brief period of time. This is not impossible, but those concerned are conscious of the fact that it will pose some difficult problems.

III

In addition to its long history of rigorous and efficient internal organization and responsible participation in politics, the Chilean Left is also characterized by a remarkable dearth of theory.[5] There have been many distinguished left-wing leaders, but none that has meaningfully translated experience into theoretical reflection. The Left has also—at least in this sense—been badly served by an intelligentsia which until very recently has been more preoccupied with praising and adopting foreign models than with the infinitely harder task of constructing a viable theoretical framework firmly rooted in an understanding of Chilean conditions. Thus the pattern of cultural dependence that afflicts contemporary Latin America has also had an inhibiting effect on its most articulate detractors. By default, therefore, the political leadership of the Chilean Left has acquired a distinctly pragmatic bent which some may consider a liability but

[5] Of course there have been ideological controversies between different sectors of the Chilean left wing, but these have been largely a reflection of similar encounters elsewhere in the world: thus the controversy between the communist thesis of a "national liberation front" including all groups sharing an anti-imperialistic and nationalist progressive stance and the socialist counter-thesis of a "worker's front," which would only include organized groups of the working class and pointedly exclude bourgeois groups. More recently, the liveliest clash has been between extreme leftist groups—formally outside the *Unidad Popular* coalition—which follow Guevara's and Debray's ideas about the necessity to bring about a direct armed confrontation with the existing power, and the parties and movements of *Unidad Popular,* which maintained (successfully, as it turned out) that it was possible to attain power through the democratic electoral process. The position of *Unidad Popular* generally reflects the "peaceful coexistence" line of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. while—again, very broadly—the extreme leftist groups are closer to the positions upheld by China.

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which is also responsible for a remarkable flexibility and capacity to improvise.

Keynes flattered the intellectuals of his time by suggesting in his "General Theory" that practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, "are usually the slaves of some defunct economist." This is at least partly true of the practical men in the Chilean Left, although it would often appear that Chilean political reformers do their deeds followed at some distance by sociologists, economists and historians trying to understand what they do. Yet in the absence of a satisfactory domestic alternative, the pragmatic Chilean political leaders have almost invariably had recourse to Keynes when it came to the task of running the country's economy. The late economist's ideas most certainly dominated the policies put forward during the early part of President Frei's administration when Sr. Sergio Molina—now with the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Latin America—directed the country's economy from the post of Minister of Finance.

Now once again, Chilean pragmatism dons the Keynesian mantle: to deal with problems of unemployment, severe inflation and under-utilized industrial capacity, the *Unidad Popular* government has proposed a redistributive budget with across-the-board wage and salary increases equal to the rise in the cost of living (35 percent during 1970) with additional increases for lower income levels, sharp rises in family allowances and minimum wage levels. The hope is that this massive release of liquidity at the base of the economy will generate a sufficiently important demand to bring about substantial increases in production and employment.

In the past, after an initial period of relative success these measures proved self-defeating as the rapid rise in costs gave impetus to an inflationary spiral which quickly cancelled out the increase of production and reabsorbed the modest initial redistributive effect. The *Unidad Popular* economists—led by a group of experts many of whom until a few weeks ago were with the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Latin America—have this very much in mind but trust that the special relationship which ought to exist between the new government and the trade unions, and the increased central control of the financial system which would result from an early nationalization of the banks will give them sufficient leverage to prevent inflation from

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getting out of hand during the critical period 1971–1972. Also, the nationalization of copper enterprises and dominant industrial complexes should give the government decisive control over national investment policy as well as important additional financial resources.

Although the measures proposed by the new government are conventional and under normal circumstances should have proved satisfactory, at least in the short run, both the present circumstances and the government's political intent are exceptional and could diminish their effectiveness if loss of confidence leads to a premature and generalized postponement of investment decisions on the part of small and medium-sized firms. There are already some indications that all is not well: unemployment continues to rise; the building industry remains sluggish; the expected investment pause after the change of government is still on. The urgently needed push from the public sector is still to come. However, during this first period, Chile is once again putting the old Keynesian war horse through its paces; it will be orthodoxy on trial, but in hopes of making a smooth transition to a socialist economy.

The political effects of these policies are of some importance. The *Unidad Popular* coalition received a limited mandate from the electorate, which it will want to improve substantially in the general municipal elections scheduled for the first week in April. It is generally thought that the 36.2 percent received by President Allende will be bettered, but the question is by how much. Municipal contests are so bound up with local issues and personalities that normally they are not seriously regarded as an indication of the general political mood of the nation; this time the attitude will be different, and it is already obvious that the municipal elections will constitute a plebiscite on the government's first five months in office. The bumper redistributive budget should certainly contribute to the creation of a feeling of well-being which at any rate should last the summer and early autumn and get people to the polls in an optimistic frame of mind.

But victory in April—unless it is absolutely overwhelming—will not be sufficient; *Unidad Popular* does not control Congress and the next congressional elections are scheduled for 1973. This means that President Allende—an extremely able politician—will have to steer his six-party coalition through three years of

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important decisions during which he will probably need the qualified support of the Christian Democratic Party at critical junctures (unless he is willing to risk a national plebiscite as allowed by a recent constitutional amendment). And of course, the willingness of the government to go to a plebiscite will partly be influenced by the results of the municipal elections next April.

This concern with an electoral mandate is not unimportant in a country so steeped in respect for democratic procedures, and especially in the case of President Allende, who has been a leading figure among those who believe that the transition to socialism can be realized within the rule of law. In this he has not been unanimously supported by the Chilean Left. There are extreme-left groups—notably the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR)—which at all times viewed with great skepticism the likelihood of this transition taking place without a violent revolution. Although their numbers are small, they have support among university students and groups of peasants and slum-dwellers. Undoubtedly they have great nuisance value and their shrill revolutionary declarations have misled many into believing that Chile is about to be engulfed in an apocalyptic upheaval, but their strident postures are not enough to hide their political embarrassment, committed as they are to revolutionary action, but forced by events which they hardly anticipated to accept a popular government whose democratic victory symbolizes their ideological débâcle. They now find themselves in the unenviable position—for a left-wing movement—of having to depend on the failure of the *Unidad Popular* government for their survival, realizing that if the present government succeeds their raison d'être will slowly disappear.

Although the feeling among political observers in Chile is that President Allende has sufficient political skill to make rings around them, there are some disturbing indications that these extremist groups are not going to be easy to manage. During the first weeks after President Allende's inauguration, these groups were involved in a significant number of forcible seizures of land in the southern part of Chile, which the government—using persuasion rather than force—was unable totally to control in the first instance. It is possible that these extra-legal seizures were the result of excessive zeal and impatience rather than of political premeditation, but if they recur they could place the government in a difficult situation.

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IV

The pragmatism which informs the new government's attitude in economic and political matters is also evident in the general direction of its foreign policy. Appreciating that the restoration of fluidity to international affairs which has resulted from the end of the cold war opens up new opportunities and responsibilities for medium-sized and small nations, the Chilean government is endeavoring to increase the viable options for a dynamic, independent foreign policy. This is largely being programmed within the outlines of the national policy designed by the previous administration, but with a significant difference of intent.

In the past, whatever the disagreements between the government of Chile and that of the United States, there was a "special relationship" which would, for instance, have justified consultation in certain critical cases. Today this is unlikely, and if informal consultations are to take place, one would guess that these would be with the Andean Pact countries or with socialist countries which the government feels are nearer to the Chilean position on the international scene. It is known that the decision to reëstablish formal diplomatic relations with Cuba was adopted after friendly consultation with the countries of the Andean Group, and it should not surprise anybody if this initiative is soon followed by other member nations. Thus the fears which were expressed at the time, that the *Unidad Popular* government would not support the Andean Pact with the same enthusiasm of the previous administration, have proved quite groundless. On the contrary, the government regards participation in the pact as most important and has already taken concrete measures in that direction, notably to reach agreement on a common policy with regard to foreign investment in the member countries.

The opening toward countries of the socialist world is also part of this policy. There is in it, undoubtedly, an element of political affinity, but it would be a mistake to leave it at that. The new economic policy—if successful—should result in a significant export drive which, it is hoped, will find a satisfactory echo in socialist countries, with most of which Chile established diplomatic relations under the Christian Democratic government of President Frei.

It would be unwise to ignore the general lack of enthusiasm which the United States generates across the Chilean political

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spectrum; on the other hand, it would be equally mistaken to assume that Chile will conduct her relations with the northern power on such a frivolous foundation. There will indeed be a gradual and very practical redefinition of relations between the two countries, but one suspects that on no account will the *Unidad Popular* government needlessly contribute to making these relations less cordial than they ought to be. Indeed, one would assume that if Chile succeeds in making an efficient, civilized and democratic transition to socialism, the United States could do worse than to present her experience as a suitable model for other Latin American nations to follow. But this, of course, would be a mistake, as the factors at play in the Chilean situation are unique; Chile's mood is most singular, and her cultural and political insularity make her a case apart. Perhaps nowhere is this so evident as in the attitude of her armed forces. Committed to the democratic process, bound to uphold the constitution, they represent not the only guarantee, but an additional and most convincing one that Chile will not easily abandon the path of democratic legality which President Allende has so emphatically declared to be the one his government is determined to follow. Chile, therefore, presents not a threat, but a hope; not a model to be imitated, but an experience to be reflected upon. Perhaps, if *Unidad Popular* succeeds, it would be well to ponder the advantages of a strong dose of domestic pragmatism to qualify the ideological rigidities which all too often inhibit the political arrangements of nations facing such challenging processes of change.

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REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM IN PERU

By Marcel Niedergang

SINCE it seized power in 1968 the Peruvian military régime has constantly and somewhat arrogantly dramatized itself as being nationalist and revolutionary. These two terms are not evidence of any great originality in Latin America. Nationalism—of the Left or of the Right—is a common attribute of most of the 20 Latin American republics, once compared by the Guatemalan writer Juan José Arevalo to sardines trying to escape from the voracious North American shark. Some of the manifestations of a nationalist current now running more strongly than ever south of the Rio Grande are the disastrous armaments race, the persistence of anachronistic border disputes, the justification being made of strictly national values, the stagnation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the deadlock in the Central American Common Market, the refusal of certain countries to include themselves in what is considered to be the most ignominious region of the third world and the justifiable desire for recovery of national resources.

The consequences of this nationalist trend are not all negative—on the contrary. Concern for being, or for appearing to be, revolutionary is evident. Mexico has "institutionalized" a revolutionary party which sprang from a profound upheaval early in this century. Cuba has related the term "revolution" to all evolutions and all possible techniques over the past 11 years. The great majority of minor political groups of both the Left and the Right in the Caribbean area as well as in Central America are also "revolutionary." The Venezuela of Rafael Caldera, as well as the Chile of Eduardo Frei, have pursued a Christian-Democratic experiment in "revolution." In expelling Perón in 1955, the Argentine military junta affirmed its desire to bring about a "liberating revolution;" and the Brazilian military, which in a coup d'état overthrew the weak but constitutional régime of João Goulart, continues to style its own régime revolutionary. Thus the fact of proclaiming one's policies nationalist and revolutionary in 1971 does not *a priori* constitute any reason for great interest. That is no doubt why the Peruvian military *coup de force* was initially received with disapproval and skepticism.

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Nevertheless, two and a half years after the seizure of power by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, spokesman for an army which decided to intervene as such, it must be conceded that declarations have been followed by actions. The first spectacular, though anticipated, decision of the Peruvian military government was taken just one week after the overthrow of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry. It consisted of the troops' occupation of the International Petroleum Company (IPC) plant in the northern part of Peru. To be sure, IPC, which had been extracting oil in Talara since 1924, was in conflict with the Lima government, but an agreement (though not wholly satisfactory to the Peruvians) had in fact been reached with the firm by the Peruvian authorities in August 1968. The occupation of the IPC plant, and the expropriation and subsequent seizure of company property and goods permitted the new Peruvian leaders to present themselves from the outset as serious and formidable spokesmen in an inter-American concert of nations just when more and more voices were clamoring for an "agonizing reappraisal" of relations between Washington and Latin American capitals. Unbeknownst to the general public, the long and trying secret negotiations between Washington and Lima in regard to the takeover of IPC goods placed the Lima military régime in the position of a victim "subjected to intolerable pressures" in the eyes of other Latin American leaders.

Moreover, if we are to believe the ministers of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, these "pressures" at times took on a particularly "disagreeable" character. Whatever the extent and seriousness of these "pressures," the fact remains that the denunciation of them by the Peruvians has given the new régime a certain stamp of legitimacy, based on the theory that an arduous struggle has been endured by a Latin American country which dared to confront the United States. It is not by chance that the "defense" of the Peruvian government was one of the foremost preoccupations of the Latin American Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance when they assembled at the important [European] Economic Committee for Coöperation with Latin America (CECLA) when it met in Viña del Mar, Chile, in May of 1969. Unquestionably—and such is the consensus of the participants at that conference—the conference prompted the United States, which was not officially represented, to adopt a "moderate" tone in the talks going on in Lima at that time.

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Washington may indeed have desired to avoid any categorical stand in favor of Peru by Latin American ministers instructed by their respective governments to define a "common foreign policy" in negotiations on trade and economic relations with the United States.

As of March 1971 this Latin American "solidarity" has in fact permitted the Peruvian régime to gain time, but it has not resolved the fundamental problems involved. The cooling of relations between Washington and Lima, provoked by the IPC affair, continues today, and the consequences of this tension for the Peruvian economy are obvious. The important thing, at this stage, is that the nationalist ambitions of the Peruvian military have been fully justified by the IPC affair, both on the domestic as well as on the international scene. That does not mean that General Velasco Alvarado's government knowingly provoked the crisis in order to obtain nationalist credit. On the contrary, everything indicates that the resentment aroused within the Peruvian army by the details of the agreement reached between the government of Belaúnde Terry and the IPC was the real detonator of the October 1968 coup d'état. In this case, emotional reflex preceded intellectual reflection. In expelling President Belaúnde Terry—guilty in their eyes of having "betrayed the true interests of the nation"—and in attacking the IPC from the very outset, the Peruvian military, nationalistic and virtuous, wanted to express its disapproval of conduct which it judged not sufficiently independent. It was only after the event that the leaders in Lima, schooled at the Center for Advanced Military Studies (CAEM), realized the logic and the risks inherent in the process of recovering their national resources.

II

The Peruvian military brand of nationalism, then, has turned out to be both authentic and resolutely pragmatic. Unlike the Cuban, it does not trouble itself with ideological considerations. The ministers of the Velasco Alvarado government and the men who are to be reckoned with in Lima today have most certainly been influenced during their studies at CAEM by economics and history professors whose vision of the world often approaches that of Marxism. Most of them have retained from that training only an analytic method and some directing ideas which they employ in the service of what they imagine to be the Peruvian

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national interest. It is certainly tempting—as some have shown—to see in General Fernández Maldonado, the dynamic Minister of Mines and Energy, a socialist *éminence grise* within the government. After several conversations with Fernández Maldonado, my impression is that like his colleagues he is working toward an essentially pragmatic policy.

The manner in which he guided the difficult negotiations which resulted in the important settlement with the Southern Peru Corporation is further evidence of this. Many in Lima also believe that personally the Minister of Mines would have preferred even stricter conditions than those which were actually offered to Southern Peru for the extraction of significant copper deposits in the south of the country. The fact that he went along with a compromise agreement, preserving the interests of the nation but sparing the Southern Peru Corporation the stringencies of the new law on exploitation of mines, perfectly illustrates the military régime's concern for pragmatism. The Cuajone accord is important because it provides for the investment of tens of millions of dollars. The leaders in Peru may well have signed the accord because they were aware of the difficulty of finding on the international market foreign companies with available know-how and enough goodwill. But this agreement should, in their minds, result in a certain "thaw" in foreign investment. Several months ago, one Peruvian, the manager of a large foreign finance firm in Lima, expressed the hope that Cuajone would once again encourage foreign industrialists and bankers to place "confidence in the new Peru." In March of 1971 this seems an empty hope.

The fairly cautious constraints and the freeze on credit which have paralyzed economic development in Peru since the spring of 1969 have not disappeared since the signing of the Cuajone agreement; most large foreign concerns, especially North American ones, requested by Lima to furnish "long-range plans of action" seem somewhat reluctant to do so. And it is precisely because they did not make their intentions clear within the stipulated time that several mining companies today find themselves about to lose their rights to mineral concessions. Such is the case, particularly in regard to the deposits at Michiquillay. This decision, taken by the Lima government by applying the new Mining Code, has often been described abroad as a new nationalization. In fact, it is more in the nature of a threat to

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annul claims of mining companies that hesitate—and with good reason from their viewpoint—to get involved in close collaboration with the Peruvian military government. With hindsight it is quite understandable why Fernández Maldonado insisted on announcing the enactment of a new Mining Code just a few hours after the signing of the Cuajone accord with Southern Peru.

But the minister's sense of realism is no less evident in the signing of a contract with the Marcona Mining Corporation last January for the exploitation of iron mines south of Lima. This agreement represents investments in the order of 22 million dollars. It is a modest one. Announced at a time when problems were arising with other companies over an increase in mineral extractions within the more rigorous stipulations of the new Mining Code, the agreement does prove that the Peruvian leaders do not seem to want to use their veto power for political reasons. A desire to salvage what in developing countries are termed "national resources," and to use them in so far as possible for the greatest public good, is undeniable. Obvious enough in the key area of mining, this same desire is no less evident in other sectors of the Peruvian economy which are in their turn affected to some degree by the military government's reforms: banks, the fishing and fish-meal industries, industrial firms. Such a move naturally collides head-on with very great obstacles but the most formidable ones are not necessarily those one would expect.

III

From this point of view, a careful study of the conflict provoked by the seizure of the IPC property is especially revealing. Within a third world which economists and ideologists have made more sensitive to the problems posed by foreign exploitation of a nation's raw materials, an oil dispute would quite naturally assume exceptional importance. The crisis provoked in March 1938 by the nationalization of Mexican oil is still fresh in their memories. The generation in power in Latin America today grew up believing that economic development and political stability in most Latin American nations depended to a great extent on a judicious exploitation of their raw materials: oil in Venezuela, tropical fruits in Central America, coffee in Colombia, tin in Bolivia, copper in Chile, wool and meat in Argentina and Uruguay. After all, the changing nature of the

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Cuban revolution—the first socialist experience on either American continent—first manifested itself in 1960 with a commotion over refined oil.

Such a view of relations between North and South America is not altogether erroneous. A similar view is less true—or more precisely, it is less so on a global scale—in 1971 than in 1960. The struggle against "foreign interests," today seen as a categorical imperative by third-world nationalist governments, cannot be limited to a battle with those companies which *directly* exploit the raw materials of these countries. Modern Latin American economists, usually products of the U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) such as the Brazilian Celso Furtado or the Chilean Oswaldo Sunkel, have skillfully thrust the real problem into the limelight: that of questioning whether there actually exists in Latin America an industrial class with the "maturity and sense of national identity necessary to take the lead in the development of their own countries." It is within this broader and more subtle context that it is realistically proper to study the different nationalist measures adopted by the Peruvian military régime since its accession to political power.

The offensive which they directed against IPC was out in the open, and, objectively, it was a spectacular one. But its true significance and its limitations—as well as those of other analogous reforms decreed in the past two and a half years—cannot be separated from the overall framework of an attempt to reassert national identity.

There is no doubt that the Peruvian military is attempting to create, or to strengthen, a national industrial sector; by this method they hope to ensure that the central decision-making process of economic development will become wholly Peruvian. Apparently they do not question—at least not yet—newer forms of penetration of foreign capital into Latin America. Agrarian reform, enacted in June 1969, is the second most important part of the "revolutionary" program envisaged by the Peruvian military; it clearly demonstrates their concern for promoting the "industrial sector" while discouraging the traditional landed oligarchy.

Certainly one can also detect other motives in the enactment of this agrarian reform which has been defined by the Cuban leaders themselves as "truly revolutionary." There is, for ex-

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ample, a political purpose: that of weakening the agricultural unions of the northern seaboard, which are in most instances under the control of the APRA party (Popular American Revolutionary Alliance) headed by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, number-one adversary of the Peruvian armed forces since the time of the Trujillo revolt in 1932. The fact that agrarian reform has been applied on a priority basis to the large agricultural-industrial sugar complexes in the Trujillo and Chiclayo regions, political fiefs and unions traditionally controlled by APRA, has effectively placed the Peruvian unions in a difficult situation. Unable to criticize openly an agrarian reform which has figured in their programs for some 30 years, APRA union leaders still recognize quite clearly the menace such reform poses to their organizational control of the peasant masses of this region; they have no choice but to try to infiltrate the new organizational structures of the worker coöperatives. From this vantage point, the Peruvian military agrarian reform has pulled the rug out from under the APRA hierarchy and can be considered, at least in this crucial sector of the country's economy, as a political weapon.

In the sierra, where the agrarian situation is far more complicated than it is near the coast, gradual application of reform is likewise aimed at halting, to some degree, peasant agitation which has cropped up with a good deal of bitterness in some Andean valleys in the past 15 years, especially in the Convención valley where from 1960 to 1962 the Trotskyite leader Hugo Blanco had unionized the farm workers. When General Velasco Alvarado cries, "Peon, the landowner will no longer eat the bread of your affliction," at a gathering of farm laborers he cannot fail to elicit favorable echoes in the hearts of the dispossessed peasants of Peru's mountainous regions.

These two secondary considerations cannot conceal the principal element of agrarian reform. In fact, in terms of the law, landowners affected by expropriation are compensated in the form of bonds payable in 20 years at five percent interest. But if they *promise* to invest in industry, landowners may be reimbursed within five years. They thus enjoy the benefits of special advantages and privileges. In some cases landowners or companies, either Peruvian or foreign, owning vast expanses of land, have found it profitable to reinvest in industry, thus avoiding the inconvenience of indemnities offering illusory benefits.

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IV

In his public speeches as well as in private conversations, General Velasco Alvarado, born in Piura of modest background, frequently refers to the need for "breaking the back of the oligarchy." The Peruvian head of state clearly feels little tenderness for the landed oligarchy, which has for a long time (in the words of the military men themselves) considered the armed forces as the "watchdogs of their privileges." But this motive obviously does not fully explain the new régime's strategy of encouraging to the maximum the transfer of land-based capital into industry. The commanders of the Peruvian army have plainly made a very simple discovery: in their own country, as in so many other Latin American nations, the landed, semi-feudal interests constitute a serious obstacle to capitalistic economic development because they prohibit any growth of the domestic market. Up to June 1969, 99 landowners or companies on the coast, and just under 200 landowners in the interior, retained possession respectively of 40 percent and 60 percent of the arable land in the two regions. Owning an average of more than 2,500 hectares [6,175 acres] of land, 1,026 landowners controlled nearly 60 percent of the area, while several million peons had at their disposal only small parcels of land which could not provide a decent living for an average family.

The large and highly profitable capitalistic enterprises of the Peruvian coast contrast, with few exceptions, with the huge but poorly utilized estates and *minifundia* in the high Andean valleys. The agrarian reform decreed by the Belaúnde Terry government, intent on respecting the promises contained in Alliance for Progress programs, in practice spared the great agricultural-industrial operations on the coast. Now, the Peruvian military brand of agrarian reform aims to transform these coastal complexes into workers' coöperatives, with a management in which workers' representatives would participate. It also aims to subdue the two plagues of the highlands: the *latifundia* and the *minifundia.* By offering to those landowners affected by an eventual expropriation the possibility of immediate investment in industry of one-half of the indemnities, agrarian reform becomes organically linked with the industrialization process. Thus, the tempo has been relatively rapid. On the coast, the first coöperatives have been set up; in the sierra, the expropriations continue.

The agrarian reform of June 1969 was unquestionably a radi-

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cal one. But it is not too soon to ask whether it will really contribute to a dismantling of the country's agrarian structure, and also if it will permit changes in personal and social relations. Some of the best economists in Lima are also already asking themselves whether this transfer of the land oligarchy to the industrial sector will in the long run effectively promote the strategy of national development sought by the military and their advisers. In other words, is it still possible for Peru to create a national industrial sector capable of breaking down a system whose decision-making centers lie abroad?

V

It is impossible to achieve all your desires at once. Peru belongs to a region of the world where the chains of dependence are already very heavy. By breaking all ties with the United States, by struggling to transform a Western-oriented capitalistic economy into a communist bloc-oriented socialist economy, Cuban leaders have made a clean sweep of the ambiguities which clearly characterize the Peruvian experiment. But today the Cubans themselves perceive that they have merely replaced dependency with another form of servitude, and they face overwhelming economic problems. According to the new Chilean leaders, Fidel Castro personally recommended to President Allende that he proceed with the greatest caution in order not to provoke a needless crisis with the United States. Fault cannot be found with the Peruvian leaders for being less "revolutionary" than the Cubans and for being concerned with what is realistic and efficacious.

But in the different areas in question—mining, agrarian reform, the law aimed at the creation of joint ownership and profit-sharing in industry, banking reforms—the necessary concessions and unavoidable problems are likely once more to call the military régime's philosophy into question. Moreover, are these concessions and problems not directly tied into a system which Peru already cannot escape from without resorting to the drastic measures which it refuses to adopt?

The adversaries of the military régime, those of the Left as well as of the Right, are in an excellent position to cite: the advantages of the Cuajone agreement; the deficiency of agrarian reform in the north (secondary activities of the agricultural-industrial complexes belonging to the Grace Company, for

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example, are untouched); the indemnification of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, using the much more palatable agrarian reform law of the Belaúnde Terry government as a basis; the repurchase, at an outrageous price, of ITT shares in Lima; the scandal (admitted as such by the authorities) of the repurchase of shares of the Banco Continental which was linked to the Chase Manhattan Bank and the Rockefeller group.

VI

The present Peruvian experiment cannot be judged outside the context of the Andean countries. Peru is in fact linked with Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia in a regional development group at the heart of which are found the contradictions and fundamental problems facing each one of the member nations struggling to improve its resources and its dignity. A major step was achieved last January by member nations of the Andean Group in their agreement to adopt a common policy with regard to foreign investment. It is this ability of the Andean nations, and particularly Peru, to carry out substantive resolutions which will allow them to draw up the first balance sheet of their nationalist experiments.

All of the measures adopted by Peru within the past two and a half years (and the same remark could be made about Bolivia since 1969 and about Chile since 1970) still represent only a fraction of the efforts yet to be undertaken. For, whether they turn to socialism as in Chile, or to the army as in Bolivia and Peru, these revolutionary nationalist régimes realize that the adversaries they intend to overcome—through force or through persuasion—are already reinforcing their own lines of defense.

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BRAZIL—ALL POWER TO THE GENERALS

By Henry J. Steiner and David M. Trubek

IN 1964 the army and the technocrats seized power in Brazil. Forging an alliance with industrial and financial interests, this coalition has revitalized a sagging economy and made sweeping political changes. The authoritarian and efficient régime that has emerged is cheered by business and at least tacitly accepted by the middle classes prizing their greater economic security. A smaller number among the 90,000,000 Brazilians have deplored the destruction of democratic forms and the severe curbs on political and civil rights. But this opposition has hardly affected the evolution toward a new political-economic system.

Through ambitious reforms, the economists have restructured important sectors of business and finance. Their policies stimulated a remarkable recovery. In the early sixties, Brazil's economy had stopped growing. Although industrial production was down, inflation rates reached 70 percent per annum. Moreover, the foreign credit that was crucial to Brazil's development strategy dried up. Today, seven years after the military takeover, the inflation rate is below 20 percent and the problem is under control. The economy grows at a striking nine percent per year, exports show marked gains, foreign exchange reserves stand at over $1 billion, and foreign capital once again flows in. Before 1964 the country had achieved self-sufficiency in most durable consumer goods. In a bold three-year plan issued in late 1970, the economic managers contemplate for the near future the domestic manufacture of most capital goods, development of nuclear power, and a massive absorption of technology.

The military leaders have been active in redesigning other phases of national life. Weary of the "excesses" that developed under the prior democratic forms of government, they doubt that those forms can service Brazil's present needs and ambitions. The military has tried to impose upon political life the more austere standards and discipline of the barracks. In this process, a model for a long-term authoritarian régime—with some totalitarian trappings—is slowly emerging.

Hundreds of politicians have been stripped of rights to hold

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office or driven into exile. Elections have been either cancelled, turned into farces, or shorn of their significance. Congressional elections—the Congress was reconvened, with its powers further curbed, after having been dispatched for over a year—are between approved candidates of the government party (ARENA) and of the officially tolerated opposition party (MDB). Those held last November were preceded in most states by apathetic campaigns. Their results further diminished the status of the "opposition" party.

In 1960, 11,700,000 Brazilians voted in the presidential elections. In 1969, when it became necessary to find a replacement for ailing President (and General) Costa e Silva, an "election" was held where all candidates were generals and only generals could vote. It was feared that junior officers were too radical to be given the franchise. The military selected as President the then relatively unknown General Garrastazú Médici, former head of the SNI, Brazil's powerful political intelligence service.

The press has seen publishers who opposed the government harassed and even imprisoned, whole issues seized, and economic pressures exerted against offenders. It is cautious and subdued. Professors have been fired on political grounds without hearing or explanation. Civil rights have bowed to the imperatives of security and economic progress. The civilian and military police have employed torture against suspected enemies of the state.

No sustained and organized opposition to the rightward drift has emerged, though a relatively small number of Brazilians have publicly and explicitly criticized the régime's policies and tactics. Liberal churchmen such as Dom Helder Câmara, Bishop of Recife, have repeatedly denounced the régime's abusive treatment of its political opponents. At intervals there recurs in the press and elsewhere low-key advocacy for the restoration of democratic processes and civil rights, a theme which the MDB has itself advanced.

Brazil's tiny bands of urban guerrillas—ranging from doctrinaire Marxists to purged army officers and disaffected students—come closest to an organized opposition. Through spectacular kidnappings of foreign diplomats (notably U.S. Ambassador Burke Elbrick) to gain the release of "political prisoners" and through a wave of bank robberies to secure funds for their activities, the guerrillas have gained worldwide attention. But the tactics of violence have yielded few political results, except to

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intensify the repression and perhaps strengthen the support of the upper and middle classes for the régime.

The military have given assurances that the goal is "redemocratization." But one political scientist predicted that the army would rule Brazil for the next 30 years, and said wistfully: "All we can hope for now is a good general." The choices for those who cannot support the régime lie among apathetic acquiescence, discrete attempts to influence the military-political system, emigration or violent subversion.

Very few choose the last path; most simply turn to other pursuits. The growth of what could be called a soccer cult, culminating in the national euphoria following Brazil's World Cup victory, has served as a substitute for politics. Soccer, economic growth and a stock market boom have become the "bread and circuses" of urban Brazil. Rural Brazil, still within a rigid and antiquated social structure, is quiet now that the foci of the agrarian agitation at the start of the sixties have been suppressed.

What occasioned this political cataclysm, and what does it portend? Will the generals soon surrender power to the civilian politicians, charging them to press on with the "economic miracle"? Or have the civilian élites and the military decided that economic boom and authoritarian rule are related, that rapid development requires a political stability which only protracted military rule can ensure? Part of the answer to these questions—to the extent they can be answered—lies in the background to the movement styling itself the "Revolution of March 1964."

II

The political system discarded in 1964 was based on the liberal 1946 constitution: popularly elected president and state governors, bicameral legislature, independent judiciary of substantial powers, and constitutional guarantees of civil rights. That system was put under great stress by rapid growth, inflation, expansion of the electorate, and conflicting claims upon the national purse. And the succession of populist Vice-President João Goulart to the presidency, following the surprise resignation in 1961 of President Quadros, further burdened the system. By 1964, this combination of systemic weaknesses and historical accidents had led to widespread disillusionment with both Goulart and the political system. A broad spectrum of political opinion shared the view that some drastic changes were inevitable.

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During the 1950s, the economy expanded at annual rates of about seven percent. By 1962 Brazilian industry, which had been relatively unimportant 15 years earlier, had assumed a major role in the economy. Industrialization quickened the pace of social change. Cities expanded at annual rates of up to five percent as migrants flocked from a stagnant countryside to search for factory and service jobs. Some improved their position. Hundreds of thousands of others eked out a living while inhabiting the mushrooming shantytowns.

Although many new city-dwellers were only partly integrated into the modern economy, they did begin to participate in the political system. By limiting the vote to the literate, the 1946 constitution disenfranchised most of the rural population. But urbanization brought literacy. The number of voters doubled between 1945 and 1960. New demands could be put to the political leaders. The established prerogatives of the business and urban middle classes were under a corresponding challenge. Parts of the new political programs extended that challenge to the rural oligarchies.

During the Kubitschek government (1955–60), a high rate of inflation took hold. Inept planning and corruption intensified the problems. And despite the increase in the gross national product, disparities in income increased.

Recent studies suggest that the industrial boom was facilitated by holding wages down, so that rising profits could be reinvested by ever more affluent capitalists. The technique for curtailing wage rises ultimately contributed to the political crises. In effect, the annual inflation of about 20 to 30 percent kept ahead of wage increases. None the less, wages gave the illusion of growth because of their nominal rise. But by the 1960s more workers came to realize that they were barely holding their own, indeed taking home decreasing percentages of the expanding national pie.

As the competition for larger pieces of that pie grew keener, a final inflationary spiral was set off. The Goulart government tried to buy off social groups with new programs and dramatic rises in the minimum wage. But the budgetary deficits fueled the inflation. It rose to 70 percent in 1963 and (in the last quarter before the military coup) to an annual rate of about 140 percent. The urban slum-dwellers, who never had much, could not have been seriously threatened by these events. The lot of many among

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the workers may have improved with successive rises in the minimum wage. But the middle classes suffered losses and feared for their standard of living as well as social status. Of course, the confidence of domestic and foreign investors in the business sector wore thin.

When the industrial boom ended in 1962, these crises of Brazilian life began to cumulate. President Goulart sought to secure his support from the working classes not only through wage increases but also by advocating basic social reforms: land expropriation and redistribution, extension of the suffrage to the illiterate, mass education campaigns. The old political balances appeared to be threatened by the changes in economic and social structure that were now talked of. Fears increased of how radical a turn the government's program would take, particularly since several of Goulart's influential advisers had known "leftist" views or associations. Conservative business and military groups saw the specter of a "communist takeover." Rural unrest in the impoverished northeast fostered the sense of crisis. There was some suspicion that Goulart might resort to extreme or even unconstitutional measures to push his programs through.

A series of blunders by Goulart helped to unite important elements of the military against him. With the economy out of control and the legitimacy of Goulart's program and indeed office under increasing civilian challenge, the armed forces brought the president down in a coup of March 1964. That coup met only token resistance. The élites and middle classes acclaimed it, finding ready justification in the pending collapse of the political system and threats to the established order. The U.S. government, which had encouraged groups opposing Goulart, was enthusiastic. So of course was American business with Brazilian interests. Their support of military rule was soon evidenced by heightened bilateral aid and investments.

In the context of Brazilian history, this military intervention was not unexpected. Not for a century has the army been engaged in serious combat with any of Brazil's neighbors. In nineteenth-century society, it assumed the character of a "modern" institution attracted to "development." Many of its officers were drawn to the philosophical camp of positivism with its stress upon efficiency and material progress, discipline and order. The army developed among its officers technocratic skills in advance of most of the civilian world. Through its recruitment

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from different regions, the training given its officers, and its large public works, the army represented one of the significant "national" forces in Brazilian life.

The tradition of military involvement in politics reaches into the nineteenth century, although the interventions have recurred at ever shorter intervals during the last four decades. As a Yale political scientist, Albert Stepan, has documented in a forthcoming study, the interventions generally had the support of the civilian élites. The army did not act when there was substantial risk of a unified civilian opposition. Serving as a de facto constitutional "guardian" and arbiter among conflicting civilian groups in periods of crisis, the military was to assure at least the necessary minimum of political stability.

But while the 1964 coup had numerous resonances in Brazilian history, seven years of military rule are unprecedented. Prior interventions had merely confirmed an existing civilian régime in power or substituted another. Partly for the reason that the military had not directly exercised power, some critical attributes of the liberal state—electoral battles, free political expression in the schools and press, civilian administration of criminal justice—continued to form a vital part of the nation's political character.

Many of those attributes were captured by the phrase *estado de direito* (the law-state). To be sure, this ideal of a government acting within and constrained by a framework of law was never fully realized. Brazilian history carried important derogations from it. And Brazil's poor—the great mass of the population—lay outside the polity. But this tradition helped to limit the severity or duration of dictatorships and military interventions.

Indeed, after the 1964 coup, the military leaders spoke of an early restoration of civilian rule under constitutional principles. Had this occurred, the coup would have served as a temporary preventive intervention, aborting the Goulart government's plans for sweeping socio-economic reforms and returning power to "responsible" middle-class and business interests. But the date of abdication has receded into an ever distant future.

III

The formidable economy is of course the showpiece of the "revolution." A series of technical and administrative reforms have modified the framework for economic growth. Relieved of

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the normal constraints imposed by interest-group politics and bargaining, the economists in the Ministries of Planning and Finance were free to reshape policies and institutions to conform with their "developmental" ideals. The firmer governmental hand encouraged domestic and foreign investment. As one officer put it, "We've closed down politics but opened up the economy."

Fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies have been rationalized, and reforms have created a superior institutional framework for banking and finance. The government has made systematic efforts to secure greater compliance with law in numerous regulatory fields. Publicity about new policies, threats of sanctions and improved administration have persuaded many rich Brazilians to declare more of their taxable income. Government receipts have soared. Planning agencies have been strengthened and modernized. Through such policies as fiscal incentives, the government has nourished a stock market boom and achieved a general expansion of the capital market. Government spokesmen stress the importance of private enterprise in development. But the state continues to be a major actor in the economy, partly through public enterprises. And with the improvement of the regulatory system, private initiative is increasingly channeled in directions set by national planners.

Of course, the rich and the middle class have profited from the boom. Although the government states that its policies include income redistribution, there is little evidence thus far of that policy's implementation. Government figures do indicate that industrial wages rose faster last year than the inflation, though they do not show improvement in labor's relative position.

Among the most effective of the government's efforts to improve the lot of the larger mass of Brazilians is a massive housing program. That program has built several hundred thousand houses for low and middle income groups, and will absorb over a billion dollars this year. The government has recently established a plan for worker participation in industrial earnings, designed in part to give the worker a stake in "development." A limited agrarian reform has been set up, but implementation lags. The rural poor suffer equally under all régimes.

Undoubtedly the military and technocratic leaders have found it easier to execute programs aimed at economic expansion than those whose major purpose is social justice. The army's sturdiest allies are within the industrial and financial sectors, and the

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urban middle classes who panicked during the earlier inflation. Those groups have little enthusiasm for basic social reforms.

The period after the March Revolution has also witnessed an erosion of values and standards that were prominent in the country's political and legal culture. In many fields the régime's policies remain ill-formed, ambiguous and inconsistent; but the trends observable since 1964 suggests that what might first have appeared as "aberrations" in a period of political crisis are becoming permanent features of the new Brazil.

The régime stresses the role of education—still the privilege of the few—in development. President Médici has even seen fit to warn television interests that the government will determine more of program content unless broadcasting improves upon its present banal performance. The media must educate the people to contribute to the developing society. In strengthening education budgets and planning literacy campaigns, the government has sponsored reforms to increase social mobility.

But the government has also made it clear that education must serve the régime. Several hundred academics have been barred from teaching, particularly in the social sciences. Some departments, such as the University of São Paulo's famous sociology faculty, have been decimated. Debate about matters of political sensitivity—criticism of present political authority or of the basic social and economic values that it fosters, discussion of unpleasant facts—takes place within cautious boundaries. There is a widespread belief that government agents are enrolled in classes to spy on suspect teachers. A new law subjects teachers and students to criminal sanctions if they act "against the public order;" military tribunals decide what that may mean.

Outside the classroom the expression of political opinion encounters similar restraints. It is best—and it is standard practice in restaurants—to lower one's voice when criticism goes to the heart of the matter. Legislation of imposing breadth speaks for itself. It prohibits subversive propaganda, a concept that reaches advocacy of change in the existing government even by nonviolent means. It bars dissemination of facts which, even if true, are intended to create ill will against constituted authorities. It requires official approval of a wide range of books and periodicals before publication. Against the background of sporadic official intervention, the press has made careful self-censorship a standard prophylactic practice.

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The government has allowed newspapers and magazines to criticize some aspects of its policies—even matters as basic as economic priorities. Occasionally the press has been permitted to print mildly controversial documents, such as the National Council of Bishops' guarded statement of concern about reports of torture. But discretion lies with the military, and regulation has an accordion-like character. The limits of public debate may expand or contract day by day, according to the local censor's whim or changing executive policies.

Surely it is in "law enforcement" that the régime has done greatest violence to Brazil's liberal traditions. In vital respects, the law-state and related traditions of adherence to basic standards in the government's treatment of individuals no longer prevail. So-called "institutional acts" and national-security legislation have eradicated essential checks upon executive power. The military tribunals now enjoy an exclusive competence to try alleged crimes against national security, a spacious concept. For such matters, the right of habeas corpus has been suspended.

Arrests for political crimes (*i.e.* against national security) have been in the thousands. It has become common practice to detain suspects for long periods and without formal charge, at prisons unknown to their relatives or lawyers. Although a few distinguished lawyers have represented clients before military tribunals, the bar as a whole has been intimidated in its defense of political prisoners. The Brazilian Bar Association recently protested that a lawyer defending an alleged subversive was himself tortured by the police. Other such lawyers have been arrested and held for several days before release. The few incidents that have become known suggest a larger number that have not.

An unpredictable and varying enforcement of these security measures further undermines the rule of law. Without recourse to civilian courts or often to counsel, and with no assurance that law enforcement may not serve as a camouflage for personal vendettas, the individual is kept off balance. It is difficult not to be cynical, as many of the young are, about the present use of "law" in the political sphere. It may assume a venal character, as enforcement shades into unprincipled coercion and arbitrary punishment. It is ironic that such flagrant departures from the spirit of the *estado de direito* coexist with efforts to induce respect for law in regulatory fields such as taxation.

The tragic culmination of such policies lies in the frequent

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resort to torture by state and local police, and by military personnel. Reports over the past 18 months have left a substantial deposit of evidence. They have issued from sources ranging from Marxist-oriented exiles to Brazilians of a conservative stamp and Catholic groups within and without the country. Several groups have published dossiers of the degree and character of torture of men and women: severe beatings, electric shocks applied to the genitals and other parts of the body, the hanging of prisoners upside down on a bar for extended periods.

The principal categories of political prisoners subjected to torture—which newspaper reports indicate in some instances to have been fatal—include students, intellectuals and Catholic clergymen. At one point the torture of priests and nuns in the world's largest Catholic country summoned such attention that the Pope told Bishop Helder Câmara of Recife that "the Church will no longer tolerate the commission of atrocities and tortures in a country that calls itself Christian."

Low-level officials frankly admit the use of torture and other harsh measures against prisoners suspected of "crimes against national security." Their conduct is sometimes justified as appropriate reactions to the guerrilla activities. To these officials, persons suspected of complicity with the guerrillas are prisoners in an undeclared war, from whom information can be extracted that may be vital in a life and death struggle.

It is doubtful that a systematic "torture" policy has been formulated at high levels. In this area as in others, the dictatorial climate has released or intensified forces which the previous forms of government had more effectively contained. "Law enforcement" has become susceptible to a vicious anarchy culminating in the well-known "death squads," bands of off-duty police who murder alleged criminals.

Most of the high officials in government may genuinely be embarrassed by these extreme manifestations of repression. The concession that torture is practiced—for example, a recent public acknowledgment by the Minister of Education—often traces the problem to conduct by local police which the central government apparently finds it difficult to control. But the military police itself has been implicated. And the difficulty is not easy for an outsider to appreciate, within a state which has successfully imposed rigorous restraints upon political and economic life and managed complex economic problems.

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The government has gone so far as to initiate "investigations" following public outcries over a few shocking cases. Perhaps its more determined "repression" of abusive conduct toward political suspects would stem these trends. But perhaps the matter cuts more deeply, to the inner nature and necessary tactics of a régime which controls the expression of ideas through force.

IV

A key element in a prediction of Brazil's political course must be the character of the "military mind." For an important group within the military, the triumphs of the past seven years are not simply economic and political. They have a moral dimension. The higher officers of a stern and puritanical outlook can readily conclude that the "subversives" and the "immoral" have properly been purged and persecuted. "Censorship," a visiting officer advised a Brazilian student here, "is necessary to protect the people against the filth of communist plotters." The people must be saved from the godless, the corrupt, the civilian politicians, themselves. Military tutelage—a paternalism above the corruption and sordid bargaining among selfish interests that characterize civilian politics—will instill those values which have long been at the core of the army's ideals. They are summed up by the motto on the Brazilian flag: "Order and Progress." These were the themes stressed at the military colleges through which most high officers have passed. Politicization of the military, and the militarization of politics were natural companion trends.

The economic gains have tended to confirm many officers in their attraction to the army's grander and more active role. There is a certain swagger. The military really did make something happen. The trains may not yet run on time, but production mounts and inflation recedes. Brazil is on the move, and the world has taken notice.

Such events have heightened the appeal of nationalism, a major political ideology in Brazil since the 1930s. Nationalist themes have come to figure importantly in the articulation of the régime's basic programs. Massive public-works projects have caught the public imagination: plans for a trans-Amazon highway with allied projects to exploit that untapped region, hydroelectric installations. Such programs are presented as paths toward Brazil's realization of its vast potential. Some express the belief that the country will reach great-power status by the year

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2,000, and liken the March Revolution to the Meiji Restoration that started Japan on its march toward industrialization. Both official and public opinion were angered when Herman Kahn's predictions for the year 2,000 placed Brazil among the world's poorer and weaker countries.

This ideology of national development explains the régime's opposition to birth control. The population of 200,000,000 that is anticipated in several decades will support Brazil's claim for recognition as a major economic (and military) power. Birth control is thus said to be no more sensible for the Brazil of 1970 than it was for the United States of a century earlier.

Although such nationalist themes are especially congenial to the military, the technocrats and industry, they have a wider popular currency. The government systematically seeks to exploit these sentiments. After Brazil's victory in the World Cup soccer matches, the President opened his palace to all comers and personally received the team upon its return. A flood of posters and car stickers enjoins the public to "love it or leave it" and proclaims that "No one can catch Brazil," or that "No one will hold back this country." The implication of the last—that someone *might* want to restrain Brazil—touches a responsive chord.

V

In what political directions do such attitudes and forces point? One possibility is "redemocratization," the vaguely defined aspiration of the civilian élites that they may somehow regain power. Many avid supporters of the March Revolution today question whether military rule remains essential after the resumption of economic growth. There is a significant degree of civilian disenchantment with the prospect of extended military rule and all that it implies for the character of the nation's intellectual life and culture.

Moreover, elements in the army stress the dangers of a protracted military involvement in political life. They foresee the emergence of factions, as internal differences on socio-economic policies and political philosophies crystallize. Particularly if the economic boom subsides and problems again start to cumulate, divisive contests for power might follow. There have already been indications of internal dissension. Thus some within the military argue that the army should preserve its unity and influence by retreating to a more traditional and modest role.

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These forces, albeit weak, could work toward a "fading away" of military rule. But discussion about "redemocratization" has a vague and remote character. The reasons are evident. First, the military enjoys the exercise of power and takes pride in what has been accomplished. The officers enjoy the perquisites of power, particularly their higher salaries and status in society. Many in the army doubt whether civilian governments would long preserve these gains in social position. Second, powerful industrial and financial groups continue to support the régime, at least as long as they and the economy prosper. Third, the régime's supervision of political life has both prevented the organization of a genuine opposition and discouraged serious planning for the party or constitutional structure of renewed civilian rule.

Recently the government has stopped paying even lip-service to the idea of a return to some version of pre-1964 political life. Rather, a new and still faintly sketched model of government is emerging. President Médici himself has contributed to the articulation of that model. While paying ritual compliments to "democracy," his speeches reject political "liberalism" as incompatible with the changes that Brazil is now experiencing.

Médici has posited the "revolutionary state" as the next stage in Brazil's political evolution. Such practices as direct popular election of the president, free organization of political parties, or the guarantee of civil rights and freedom of expression have no place in that evolutionary stage. Of course the new model of a political system could—as it now does—accommodate a purged congress of limited powers to permit dialogue among different groups and confer added legitimacy upon the régime.

The victory of Salvador Allende will confirm numerous officers in their belief that a controlled society is a necessary choice. The people can be trusted no more in Brazil than in Chile. The government will continue to limit the expression of ideas through its surveillance of the schools, press and indeed all forms of political life. The few instances since 1964 when such controls were relaxed—such as the relatively open state elections in 1965—left hard lessons. Acrimonious debate and indications of an erosion of popular support for the official government candidates followed. The army may see the alternatives ever more clearly as chaos and corruption under civilian politics, or "order and progress" under military supervision.

It is probable that the government will continue to use the

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system of criminal justice as an instrument of political repression. Vaguely defined crimes leaving a large prosecutorial discretion, unchecked police powers, military tribunals and even resort to torture and other brutality against political opponents may inhere in the nature of the developing political system. Such measures help to contain expression within permitted boundaries and to prevent the formation of an effective opposition. The emerging political model may then mean the end of Brazil's historical commitment to the *estado de direito* and historical aspirations toward a humane administration of the criminal law.

The political structures within which these and other policies will be formulated and administered have yet to be clearly designed. For the while, the military together with its technocratic advisers and civilian ministers exercise power with a minimum of formal institutionalization of political processes. The necessary concessions to the key business groups, and responses to claims of the middle and working classes, have been decided upon through informal and flexible means. But the March Revolution has been sufficiently institutionalized to avoid one-man rule. The popular epigram of post-1964 Brazil as a dictatorship without a dictator remains valid.

President Médici has talked of the need to expand participation in the political system. If the literacy campaigns are seriously undertaken, that may occur. But the manner in which the larger participation will be structured remains uncertain. Perhaps the political system will retain its informal character. Perhaps the government will encourage or permit the formation of additional groups representing basic social and economic interests, to facilitate communication and permit more informed decision-making. Perhaps the government party, ARENA, will grow in significance, secure the participation of different groups, and become the core of an institutionalized one-party system. The term of President Médici expires in 1974. The military leaders may conclude that a higher degree of institutionalization in political life would lend the régime more stability and legitimacy, as well as improve chances for the orderly transmission of power to new leaders.

VI

Some form of military government is likely to continue, then, during most or all of this decade. What socio-economic policies

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can be expected? One possible program would build upon a blend of ardent nationalism with more radical social policies. Such a program has been associated with Alfonso Albuquerque Lima, a three-star general and former Interior Minister who had the support of many junior officers in the 1969 contest for the presidential succession. His proposals have pointed toward a broader distribution of wealth through such measures as serious land and educational reforms. The policies commonly attributed to him include the nationalization of larger portions of Brazilian-owned as well as foreign-dominated industry or finance.

Albuquerque Lima lacked military seniority. But he may also have lost his bid for the presidency because his proposals appeared too radical. Brazil's major manufacturing sector has been built by domestic and foreign capitalists, and this is vital to the economic boom that has strengthened the régime's position. The conservative generals may have feared that Albuquerque Lima would frighten foreign and even domestic capital, and thus risk killing the goose that is laying a very golden egg indeed. Albuquerque Lima himself seemed to sense those fears. In his "campaign" he made a point of giving assurances that he was not hostile to big business, foreign or domestic.

The rejection of his bid, and thus of the views of the more radical junior officers, could be read as a decision that the Brazilian military will not follow the Peruvian army's path. The military's dominant ideology is that of economic growth. Such growth is perceived as a transcendent value, a goal that stands "above" politics. Most important, it is to be achieved basically within the existing social structure.

Such policies do not necessarily imply a rigorous adherence to the status quo. The colonels, majors and captains who espouse the more basic socio-economic changes will continue to influence policy in a populist direction. President Médici himself has several times acknowledged the need for greater social reforms. In a speech which observers felt was as critical of the status quo as any made by recent Brazilian presidents, Médici said that he had come to "the pungent conclusion that the economy may be getting along fine, but the majority of people are still getting along badly." He intended "to see that the national income was more fairly distributed."

But the economy is not likely to be radically restructured, although reform measures will probably be introduced as the

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mood of the country and the control of the military permit. The more egalitarian aspects of the economic program would be imposed at a sufficiently slow pace to avoid jeopardizing the crucial conservative support. That program might eventually benefit the rural as well as the urban poor. To the degree necessary, reliance will be placed upon a stimulated nationalism.

As long as the economic miracle continues, most Brazilians who once had a political voice appear ready to accept such a political-economic system. To the casual eye, today's Brazil offers little evidence of an authoritarian police state. The supervised press adequately satisfies the interests and demands of most people. If the schools give better technical training, most people will not object—perhaps not even be alert—to the debasement of educational values. Only isolated groups—dissenting students and intellectuals, adversary politicians, the outspoken and radical among the clergy, some working-class leaders, the "immoral" and "disloyal"—feel the military fist. As yet, there is little evidence that the urban guerrillas have mobilized popular support among the middle or working classes.

Most among the better-paid workers, the middle classes and the business interests can make the accommodations necessary to live within a politically closed society. The political and moral values that have been surrendered were never vital parts of their lives. Most also remain silent. But the louder voices among such groups that are heard today castigate the domestic or foreign critics of the régime for exaggerating trivial costs while losing sight of grand prospects. Such persons consider the critics to be, at best, uncomprehending, and at worst, to form part of a malicious conspiracy of sentiments against a country which is finally "realizing its destiny."

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BEYOND THE GOMULKA ERA

By Adam Bromke

WLADYSLAW Gomulka's place in Polish history is assured. He was a central, even if highly controversial, figure in Poland's politics in the postwar period. Gomulka ruled the country longer than any other Pole since the eighteenth century—including Jozef Pilsudski, who governed Poland through most of the interwar years.

Gomulka's political program, of course, was that of Pilsudski *à rebours*. Pilsudski epitomized the old Poland of the landed gentry. Even though he flirted with socialism he had little interest in social reform; his main concern was to maintain the country's independence. Pilsudski saw the main danger to Poland coming from the east and he was bitterly anti-Russian. Gomulka personified the new People's Poland. He was preoccupied with social progress, even if this entailed restrictions on the country's external freedom. In Gomulka's eyes the major threat to Poland was posed by Germany and he was a strong proponent of an alliance with the Soviet Union.

Yet, in terms of personal characteristics and political style, paradoxically, Pilsudski and Gomulka had a good deal in common. In private life they were both modest, almost austere, and their honesty was beyond reproach. Their public careers, moreover, showed several striking similarities. Both were men of strong views and considerable courage, who stood up for their convictions against all adversaries—both fought in the underground and knew the insides of many prisons. Pilsudski and Gomulka alike tasted moments of utter humiliation and great triumph; both were defeated and returned to power. And finally, both Polish rulers, as they grew older, became divorced from the people, intolerant of all opposition, and increasingly autocratic.

Gomulka emerged as a top political leader, on the ruins of Pilsudski's Poland, in the communist underground during World War II. From 1943 until 1948 he was Secretary General of the newly founded Polish Workers' Party. In this capacity he played a key role in helping to establish, despite formidable opposition, a communist system in the country. Yet, in contrast to the other Polish communist leaders, who were totally sub-

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servient to Stalin, Gomulka revealed himself fairly independent of Moscow. For this he was removed from power, disgraced and in 1951 imprisoned. He was spared from trial, and, in all likelihood from execution, by the death of Stalin.

His persecution had won Gomulka considerable sympathy among the Poles. The wave of popular unrest which swept the country in 1956 carried him back to power. The Poznan workers' riots in June of that year badly shook the communist régime. In July, Gomulka was readmitted to the Polish United Workers' Party and in October was reëlected its First Secretary. His return to power was a moment of great personal triumph: he was given almost universal support by the people. In 1956 the Poles knew there was no way back to the prewar era. What they wanted to accomplish were reforms within the existing system. They hoped that Gomulka would introduce such changes.

The reforms adopted by Gomulka, however, proved to be half-hearted. The most oppressive Stalinist features were eliminated: the rule of terror was curbed, the persecution of the Catholic Church ended and the collectivization of agriculture was abandoned. At the same time several objectionable aspects of the communist system were maintained: intellectual freedom remained restricted and no major economic reform was carried out. Moreover, after initial attempts to assert a more independent stance in foreign affairs, Warsaw once again fell into step with Moscow.

Gomulka's retrogressive policies soon led to disillusionment among the Polish people. Throughout the 1960s dissatisfaction turned more and more frequently into open defiance. In 1964, and again in 1966, bitter disputes erupted between the communist government and the Catholic Church. Ferment among the intellectuals and the students steadily gathered strength. In 1964 34 writers and scholars came out publicly against the restrictions on freedom of expression; in the same year the first arrests of students were made at the University of Warsaw. In 1966, after Professor Leszek Kolakowski openly criticized the decade of Gomulka's rule, more arrests at the University followed.

In February 1968 came the first explosion. The Warsaw branch of the Writers' Union protested against the banning of the play by the great nineteenth-century Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz, because of its anti-Russian overtones. In March the

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Warsaw students joined in the protest and took to the streets. The youth at other universities throughout Poland followed their lead and the riots and sit-in strikes continued for three weeks. The students' rebellion was suppressed, but the tension in the country persisted.

Gomulka survived the crisis and at the Fifth Party Congress in November 1968 was reëlected First Secretary, but his political influence was clearly waning. He was discredited among the people; dissatisfaction with the deteriorating economic conditions was mounting among the workers. Gomulka tried to stave off defeat by belatedly adopting some new policies. In 1969 he changed Poland's policy vis-à-vis West Germany. Early in December 1970, a Polish-West German treaty normalizing relations between the two countries and sanctioning the Polish western boundary was signed in Warsaw. It was Gomulka's last moment of triumph.

At the same time Gomulka attempted to cope with the catastrophic economic situation by launching substantial reforms. The move to link the cost of production with incomes was generally in the right direction, but by now the Polish economy was so run down that drastic measures were needed. The announcement of increased food prices on the eve of the Christmas holiday led to violent workers' riots in several coastal cities. As in 1956, the unrest in the country resulted in a change in the top party leadership. On December 20, 1970, Gomulka resigned as First Secretary and was replaced in that post by Edward Gierek.

II

The end of the Gomulka era, despite the swiftness with which it came, was not surprising. In a way, as is the fate of many politicians who remain in office too long, his era had ended even before he was ousted. In the last few years his program was growing increasingly obsolete. It was not only that as the years went by Gomulka had become more conservative; even more important was the fact that since he had come to power in 1956 the country had undergone a drastic transformation.

In the 1950s Poland was still badly shattered by World War II. The nation was settling down within its new boundaries and was recovering from its tremendous economic and human losses. The generation that had lived through the cataclysm of the war was wary of pushing the struggle against the communist régime

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too far, lest it explode into a full-scale revolution and expose them to new losses and sufferings. The fate of the 1956 uprising in Hungary—which demonstrated Russia's continued ascendancy in Eastern Europe and the inability of the West to change this situation—only strengthened those sentiments among the Poles. There was also a fear of a revived Germany, especially in view of the open claims to Poland's western provinces advanced by the German Federal Republic. At the climax of the popular upheaval in 1956, Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz, in an address to the nation, emphasized that the alliance with the Soviet Union was necessary to protect Poland's western boundary. But, all in all, in the 1950s, the mood of the Poles tended to be quiescent.

In the 1960s several changes took place in Poland which eradicated the effects of World War II. The western territories were fully populated and integrated with the rest of the country. In the economic sphere not only were the war losses recouped, but very considerable progress was made. The old, predominantly agricultural society was transformed into an industrialized one. The human losses were also made good. The population is now approaching 33 million, but in contrast to the interwar period it is more homogeneous—there are no longer any significant minority groups. Today's Poland is a young country; almost half of its population is composed of people born since the war. Significant strides also have been made in the field of education. While in the entire interwar period 85,000 people received university degrees, in the years 1945–66 over 400,000 pursued higher education.

The changes which took place in the last decade have led to a marked revival of political aspirations, especially among the younger generation. They, of course, have no defeatist memories of the last war. They do not share the pessimism of their fathers and their passive acceptance of restrictions on freedom. It is by no means accidental that the first rebellion against the Gomulka régime was staged by the students. It is also characteristic that during the recent workers' outburst the fiercest fighting was in Szczecin which has the youngest population in the country.

The generation gap is accentuated by differences in education. The young intelligentsia, seeking an outlet for their energies, have grown increasingly impatient with the narrow dogmatism and sheer incompetence of the older managerial cadre which frequently was selected on the basis of political reliability rather

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than professional competence. Although few people had the courage to say it openly, many would have readily agreed with a statement made in 1968 by a well-known writer, Stefan Kisielewski, that the country was run by ignoramuses. The realization that the new technetronic age, which Poland is still ill-prepared to enter, is at hand, made the young technocrats even more restless. In 1970 there was an animated debate in the press criticizing in no uncertain terms the economic stagnation of the country.

The young people also seem to be intensely nationalistic. They show a keen interest in Poland's history. In the 1960s two debates—the first over a collection of historiographic essays and the second over an historical film—stirred up a good deal of emotion in the country. In both, the continuity of national tradition and the need to reassert national pride were strongly emphasized. Even some aspects of the history of the Polish communist movement were rewritten in a more nationalistic vein. All in all, in the last decade a more assertive political climate emerged in Poland; from the point of view of domestic dynamics, the country was increasingly ripe for political changes.

In the 1960s, moreover, some hopeful changes for the Poles took place in the international sphere. The new round of de-Stalinization in the U.S.S.R. in 1961, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and at least a partial détente in East-West relations all contributed to the lessening of Russia's grip over Eastern Europe. The greater independence in foreign policy which has been assumed by Rumania, and the reforms which were undertaken in 1967–68 in Czechoslovakia, made many Poles hope for similar developments in their country. The students' slogans in 1968 called for "a Polish Dubcek." Indeed, had the new trends in Eastern Europe not been abruptly reversed by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Gomulka would have probably been removed from power earlier. The suppression of Czechoslovakia, however, only postponed, but did not eliminate, pressure for changes in Poland.

With the resumption of efforts toward an East-West détente in 1969, and especially with the launching of a new Eastern policy by West Germany, an international climate more favorable to Poland has been largely restored. The conclusion toward the end of 1970 of the Polish-West German treaty, sanctioning Poland's western boundary, was particularly important. It was characteristic that during the recent upheaval, in striking

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contrast to his attitude toward Germany in 1956, Premier Cyrankiewicz singled out the treaty with the German Federal Republic as an achievement of the Polish communist government. Obviously, it would not have been credible to play up the German threat several days after the widely publicized visit of Chancellor Brandt to Warsaw.

In the new circumstances Gomulka was increasingly at a loss. He was totally devoid of new ideas and made little effort to adjust his policies to fit the 1960s. He paid lip service to the younger generation, but the old cadre remained well entrenched in the key positions. Economic reforms were frequently debated, but moved forward at a snail's pace. Gomulka also did his best to dampen the revival of nationalism. He responded to the historical debates with the worn-out communist stereotypes. In foreign policy, the Gomulka government did not exploit the opportunities to win more leeway for Poland from the Soviet Union. Both in East-West relations and in the disputes among the communist countries—including participation in the suppression of Czechoslovakia—Warsaw trailed along after Moscow at every turn.

Seen in retrospect, the turning point in Gomulka's political fortunes probably came in 1961. The second, more thorough de-Stalinization campaign launched in that year by Khrushchev, and the split between Russia and China, created a situation which could well have been used by Polish leaders to carry out substantial reforms in the country. Gomulka, however, failed to exploit this opportunity; he was simply not interested in introducing any more changes in Poland. His stand in 1961 cost him public support. Until then many people still had believed that his course was influenced by pressure from Moscow. With this illusion gone, Gomulka was now seen by the Poles for what he really was—not a Stalinist, but still a communist in the old internationalist tradition. From then on the gap between the Polish people and Gomulka widened steadily. He became increasingly regarded as a spent force—a man who could neither cope with, nor indeed comprehend, the country's needs. Eventually, he had to give way to new people more attuned to contemporary circumstances.

III

The new political forces affected the ruling Polish United

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Workers' Party (PUWP) and gradually eroded the delicate equilibrium underlying Gomulka's position. The struggle in the party, like the tensions in the country at large, stemmed largely from the conflict between generations. In the last decade the PUWP membership more than doubled: in 1959 it was one million and by 1968 more than two million. While growing in size, the party was considerably rejuvenated, but its top leadership remained almost exclusively in the hands of old people. The key positions were occupied by the men who made it to the top with Gomulka in the 1940s: Kliszko, Spychalski, Loga-Sowinski and Strzelecki. In 1968 the average age of the members of the Politburo was 60. Moreover, friction between generations was aggravated by the educational gap. In a party apparatus composed of some 7,000 officials, in 1964 only 1,275—and even by 1968 only around 2,000—had completed their higher education. This situation led to a restlessness among many younger and better educated members which provided fertile ground for factional activity.

In the 1960s the challenge to Gomulka's status quo policy came from two groups within the PUWP: one led by Edward Gierek, and the other from the "partisans" led by Mieczyslaw Moczar. Each faction put forward a different program designed to appeal to different elements in the party and different segments of Polish society. Gierek was an influential figure in the PUWP—since 1956 he had been one of its Secretaries and since 1959 a member of the Politburo. His main power base was the quarter-million-strong Upper Silesian Party organization which he personally had led since 1957. Gierek never revealed any taste for either democracy or nationalism, in fact his attitude toward the Soviet Union did not differ much from that of Gomulka. However, his efficient management of the Silesian region, which was contributing roughly a quarter of Poland's industrial production, had won him considerable prestige among the technocrats and the workers.

General Moczar's power base lay in the security apparatus which he had controlled since 1956, first as Deputy Minister and then as Minister of Internal Affairs, and in the army, where his comrades-in-arms from the wartime communist partisan units occupied many key posts. In addition, since 1964 Moczar had been President of the 300,000-strong organization of the World War II veterans—from the communist as well as non-

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communist formations. The partisans also showed little sympathy for democratization, but played up Polish nationalism. They emphasized the country's proud past, including its military tradition. Whenever expedient, they did not hesitate to revive the less appealing aspects of Polish nationalism, as in the crude anti-Zionist campaign of 1967–68, aimed at compromising Gomulka's Jewish supporters. As to the Soviet Union, the attitude of the partisans was somewhat ambiguous. In their official enunciations, of course, they stressed their devotion to Polish-Soviet friendship and their personal bonds of comradeship with the Russians forged on the battlefields of World War II. Yet, implicit in their program of national self-assertion was the promise of a more independent stand vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. It was this last aspect of the partisans' program which won them popularity among a good many Poles.

The internal conflict in the PUWP was greatly intensified after the riots in March 1968. In the spring the partisans virtually openly challenged Gomulka. In July Moczar was elected to the Secretariat and, although only as an alternate member, to the Politburo; it appeared that he would soon make a try for the top party post. Yet later in the summer, and especially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the partisans lost their momentum. At the Fifth Party Congress in November, with Gierek's full support, Gomulka was reëlected First Secretary.

Despite his formal success at the Congress, it was clear that Gomulka was no longer fully in control of the party. First of all he was dependent on continued support from Gierek. Second, Moczar's advance was arrested, but not reversed—he was not promoted to full membership in the Politburo, but neither was he demoted. Last but not least, Gomulka had to give in to pressure from the younger generation for a share in the top party leadership. Among the newly elected members of the Politburo two full members, Stanislaw Kociolek and Jozef Tejchma, were 35 and 41 respectively. The new men did not produce any coherent political program of their own, but they represented a new style of leadership. They were better educated and although they did not exhibit any liberal sympathies, they were reputed to be more pragmatic than the older generation.

The defeat of Gomulka in 1970 was administered by a coalition of those three groups and the spoils were divided among them. Gierek, as a reward for withdrawing his support from

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Gomulka, was given the post of First Secretary. In the place of the ousted Gomulka's supporters—Kliszko, Spychalski, Strzelecki and the economic expert, Jaszczuk—the partisans and the pragmatists introduced their own men. Moczar was elevated to full membership in the Politburo. Tejchma remained in his post; while two younger men, Jan Szydlak and Stefan Olszowski —who are 45 and 39 respectively—also entered the Politburo as full members. Indeed, to emphasize the broad base of the new leadership, the Army Chief General Wojciech Jaruzelski and Professor Henryk Jablonski, former Secretary General of the Academy of Science, were included in the top party body as alternate members.

The new leadership is truly "collective" and as such, probably rather unstable. Several former followers of Gomulka managed to remain at the top, but their days may be numbered. Trade unions' boss Loga-Sowinski, Foreign Minister Jedrychowski, formerly responsible for economic affairs, and former Premier Cyrankiewicz—all are likely to go. In their places both Gierek and Moczar will try to put their own men, and the rivalry between the two leaders may be revived. Yet, it is unlikely that either one of them will be able to consolidate fully his position. Both Gierek and Moczar are 57, and time is not on their side. The more they quarrel, the sooner they will be replaced by the pragmatists of the younger generation. The future in the PUWP clearly belongs to the Tejchmas and the Olszowskis.

The struggle in the Communist Party will be tied to the pressures in the country at large. In order to win popular support the various competing factions will have to attune themselves more closely to the wishes of the people. In this respect the early policy of the Gierek régime is symptomatic. Not only have the unpopular economic measures been withdrawn, but the workers' rights to participate in the process of political decision-making have been explicitly recognized. The adoption of effective methods of communication and even consultation with the masses has been promised. Gierek has also gone out of his way to assure the intellectuals that their opinions will be taken into account. And the new Premier, Piotr Jaroszewicz, in his inaugural address to the Sejm has called for full normalization of relations between the communist government and the Catholic Church.

Gierek has thus succeeded in temporarily appeasing the

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workers, but his position remains difficult. He has no choice but to continue with economic reforms in one form or another. The drastic overhaul of the economic system in the direction of greater market influence on production is a necessity. Otherwise, Polish products will not meet international competition, foreign trade will not expand, and without it the country's economy will remain stagnant. To undertake such reforms, however, would require that production be linked once again with wages and prices. This, at least in the short run, is going to be painful for the workers. In the economic sphere things will get worse before they get better.

The political situation in the country, moreover, continues to be tense. Despite the fact that the upheaval in 1970 was shorter and not as widespread as that in 1956, its long-term effects may be more profound. The Polish people could not fail to observe that by taking to the streets, for the second time they succeeded in removing from power unpopular communist leaders. Should conditions become unbearable, they may try to do it once again. Moreover, remembering how they were deceived by Gomulka in 1956, they are now unlikely to be satisfied by mere promises. They will judge the new leaders not by words but by deeds. Their expectations were well articulated by the Polish Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, who in response to Premier Jaroszewicz's appeal, called for the adoption of true democracy.

IV

The dynamics of the internal developments also push Poland toward a more assertive nationalism. The revival of aspirations for a more independent stance in foreign affairs was already evident in the last decade; in the 1970s, with the younger generation on the ascendancy, Polish nationalist sentiments are likely to grow. This may well bring them into conflict with Soviet objectives in Central and Eastern Europe, with the resulting delicate interlocking of internal and external pressures.

Contemporary Polish nationalism is not anti-Russian. After the cataclysm of World War II the Poles have no desire to return to the Pilsudski era. They are conscious of their extremely vulnerable position between Russia and Germany. They are certainly mindful of immense Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe. Since the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and with a large Soviet force present in East Germany since the end

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of World War II, Poland is surrounded by Soviet armies on all sides; a small Soviet garrison is also stationed on Polish soil. The Poles are not necessarily adverse to Soviet influence in that part of the world. They remember that the Russian armies freed them from occupation by Nazi Germany, even though this is tempered by recollection of the sufferings inflicted on them by the Russians. They certainly have appreciated constant Soviet support of the Polish western boundary. They are aware, no doubt, that even before its acceptance in the Polish-West German treaty the border had already been sanctioned by the Soviet-West German pact of August 1970. It is not, then, the intention of the Poles to cut their ties with the U.S.S.R. What they strive for is to readjust relations between the two countries to fit the new situation of the 1970s.

Paradoxically, if anti-Russian sentiments were to be revived among the Poles, this could be brought about most easily by the Soviet Union itself. By refusing to adjust Polish-Soviet relations to fit the new aspirations of the Poles, and especially by trying to intervene in their domestic affairs, Moscow might well make Polish nationalism acquire a sharply anti-Russian edge. Such a development might prove tragic. Soviet efforts to suppress changes in Poland could lead to another Czechoslovakia, or even a Hungary—for in line with their tradition the Poles would be prone to resist Russian military intervention with arms. The appointment of General Jaruzelski to the Politburo during the recent crisis may have been intended as a subtle hint to the Russians that, no matter what comes, the Polish Communists can better handle the situation on their own.

Good relations between the two countries, however, are important to the Soviet Union too. Poland is located on the strategically crucial border of the U.S.S.R.; she is also a lynchpin of the present international system in East-Central Europe. Deprived of access through Poland to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet position in those countries would become untenable. This situation greatly restricts Poland's freedom of manœuvre in the international sphere, but it also provides her with a certain leverage vis-à-vis Moscow. Provided the Poles do not go too far, the Russians have every reason not to push them beyond the point of no return.

In the past, the Russians seemed to have appreciated the extreme delicacy of their relations with the Poles. In the late 1950s

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Poland occupied a unique place among the communist states in Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that no similar innovations were tolerated in other countries, the Russians closed their eyes to various internal changes which were adopted in Poland—notably the de-collectivization of agriculture and the special position of the Catholic Church. Had Gomulka tried to widen the scope of domestic reforms in the 1960s, especially by linking them to Khrushchev's second de-Stalinization campaign, he probably would have succceeded in getting away with them. And it was precisely his failure to keep probing the outside perimeter of their freedom which led to the Poles' disillusionment with Gomulka, and ultimately brought about his defeat.

The Soviet leaders were probably sorry to see Gomulka go. Only two years before, while attending the Polish Party Congress, Brezhnev had warmly commended Gomulka's policies. Yet, when the Polish leader had outlived his usefulness in keeping the country quiescent, the Russians did nothing to help him. During the crisis in 1970 they abstained from any overt interference in Polish affairs, and when Gierek visited Moscow in January he was warmly received by Brezhnev. Given the internal dynamics of the country, Gierek seems to have little choice but to revive the probing of the outside perimeter of Polish freedom. He has to win from Moscow a new lease on Poland's domestic reforms. Should he fail to do so, he is likely to be replaced by another communist leader who will identify himself more closely with the aspirations of the Poles. And in the process of readjustment in Polish-Soviet relations, the situation at each step will threaten to get out of hand.

Whether Poland and the Soviet Union will be able to evolve a stable equilibrium, and in so doing avoid an explosion of major proportions, will depend to a large extent on the future course of European diplomacy. For the problems in the relations between the two countries are more susceptible to resolution in a broader political framework than on a strictly bilateral basis. Indeed, in the past few years, and especially since the Budapest appeal of the communist leaders in March 1969, Polish diplomacy has been actively trying to promote such a framework in Europe. Taking its cue from the Soviet call for increased coöperation among all the European states, Poland has considerably expanded its contacts with various countries in the western part of the continent. The marked improvement in relations between

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Warsaw and Paris, and more recently between Warsaw and Bonn, has contributed to the emergence of a more relaxed climate in Europe. Poland has also assumed a major role as the proponent of a European conference. Polish diplomats have been canvassing support for such a meeting in the Western capitals on both sides of the Atlantic.

By applying themselves with such enthusiasm to the task of reducing East-West tensions in Europe, the Poles, it seems, are not only running errands for the U.S.S.R. but have reasons of their own. They see in these various diplomatic initiatives an opportunity to overcome, with Soviet approval, the barriers dividing them from the West. They want to obtain access to Western markets and technology, both of which they badly need in order to get their economy moving once again. They also seem to hope that a progressive deëmphasis on the formal alliance structure, especially if accompanied by troop reductions, and its replacement by growing multilateral coöperation among all the European states, offers them the best way to resolve their political difficulties with the Soviet Union. In this way bilateral Polish-Soviet ties would be gradually transcended by an emerging all-European system. The revival of traditionally strong Polish bonds with Western Europe, side by side with her continued coöperation with Russia, would go a long way to meet the objectives of a more assertive Polish nationalism in the 1970s.

Poland's return to Europe would also be of great importance in resolving East-West conflicts in that part of the world. Precisely because she is a lynchpin of the present system in East-Central Europe, such a development would have far-reaching repercussions throughout the entire continent. Conversely, a major explosion in Poland could be extremely damaging to the prospects for an East-West détente. For there can be no stable European system without Poland's active participation. Whatever the final outcome of the present political crisis in Poland, for better or for worse, one thing seems to be certain—with the end of the Gomulka era, Poland will play an increasingly significant role in the international sphere, as befits this dynamic and proud nation.

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MISSILES IN CUBA, 1970

By George H. Quester

SINCE September of 1970 a renewal of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has been in prospect. Highly placed White House sources reported that the Soviet Union had begun work on a submarine base on the southern coast of Cuba at Cienfuegos, a base which could repair and refuel missile-firing submarines of the Soviet Navy. Warnings were issued that this would be viewed with the "utmost seriousness" by the United States as a violation of the 1962 agreement by which land-based missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. Cited explicitly were President Kennedy's words that peace would be assured only "if all offensive missiles are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future."

Moscow characteristically answered the specific accusation by denying a substantially different charge; it had not been constructing "its own military base" in Cuba. Assuredly the Russians would never stake out a sovereign autonomous base area such as Guantanamo, or the British bases in Cyprus; but a "foreign base" was not at issue in 1962 either. As in other confrontations, a vehement Soviet *denial* of X can be a signal of a *withdrawal* of Y, and Pentagon sources by October 13 professed to have seen signs of a halt on the project. While a submarine tender, a large tug and two barges had been sighted in the harbor at Cienfuegos, the tug and the submarine tender had steamed out of the harbor on October 10, as if to return to the Soviet Union. On October 17, however, the two ships turned back to Mariel, a port on the northwest coast of Cuba; on November 10, they returned to Cienfuegos. A few more inconclusive sorties into the Caribbean followed, in what American officials now describe as a "cat and mouse game." Finally, on January 8, 1971, a Pentagon spokesman cautiously reported that the submarine tender had been tracked into the mid-Atlantic, apparently on its way back to the Soviet Union; however, on February 5, another tender was sailing toward Cuba.

It would seem, therefore, that this is the kind of "crisis" which can recur on short notice. As is also true in the case of the American facilities at Holy Loch in Scotland, much of the supporting structure for missile-firing as well as for other subma-

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rines can normally be kept aboard the seagoing tenders, since this offers mobility and political independence where required. The erection of facilities on dry land might generally offer a greater variety of rest and recreation opportunities for submarine crews; material functions handled from a tender may also be provided more cheaply and cost-effectively by a drydock, or by repair and storage facilities erected permanently on shore. Yet the "permanent facilities" may not be crucial, and the movement of a mother ship out from a harbor does not settle very much; it can always come back.

Some tricky problems of definition are raised, moreover, by ships such as a submarine tender. What if a tender were simply to wait in Cienfuegos harbor, open-endedly playing the "cat and mouse game," with no submarines appearing for the moment? Would this be a violation of the precedent of 1962, or merely a preliminary to a possible violation? What if Russian missile-firing submarines could be replenished on the high seas by the tender, and only the submarine tender sailed into Cienfuegos to be stocked with fuel and food, etc.? Perhaps this could be arranged so that nuclear warheads and missiles were never present in the Cuban harbor itself, but only mechanical spare parts for the submarine that carries them. Does this violate the precedent of 1962, as now reasserted? While the original September warning from the White House seemed to stress the servicing of submarines in Cienfuegos itself, the message on what was expected of the Russians was widened by a White House source in December to preclude servicing "in or from bases in Cuba." President Nixon personally and explicitly affirmed this interpretation in a television interview on January 4: "Now, in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced either in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding."

The Russian statement of October 13 indeed had responded that the 1962 agreement was being fully adhered to, accusing spokesmen in the Pentagon and White House of deliberately generating false tensions. Memories of 1962 unfortunately recall that the Russians then also denied the emplacement of missiles while they were in fact being installed. The Russians in citing adherence to the "1962 agreement" moreover could not fail to recognize its ambiguities for their prerogatives suggested above. Russian surface vessels periodically visit Cuban ports,

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and Moscow is assuredly not ready to forswear that as part of its 1962 agreement, or as part of its lack of interest in "foreign military bases." Do the Russians thus renounce the right to resupply any submarines in Cuba? Do they renounce the right to resupply missile-firing submarines, either directly or by intervening tender? We cannot yet be sure that the Russians are clearly forswearing such activity. If they forswore it, could we, on past experience, be certain they were keeping their word?

There are thus some interesting, unanswered questions on why the Soviet Union would move to establish some sort of base on the Cuban coast just now. Yet one could also challenge the reasoning for the United States' making an issue of it. Why is the 1962 precedent to be interpreted this strictly? Why is the United States so opposed to "offensive weapons in the Hemisphere," and why should it be? Is there indeed a validity to the precedent so gloriously and toughly established by President Kennedy, very possibly with serious risk of World War III at that time?

To be sure, the words of President Kennedy opposing "offensive weapons in the Hemisphere" applied directly to IRBMs and MRBMs which the Soviet Union had transported to launching sites within Cuba. Yet the wording is somewhat expansive. If "the Hemisphere" (literally "half the globe") doesn't include everything that it might imply, in precise terms, it certainly includes waters off New England and Florida, as well as the Pacific Ocean west of California. Is it American policy to forbid or object to Russian missile-submarine deployments in any of the wider areas? With the American stress on assured second-strike deterrents for each side, how could we insist on Russian submarines being kept out of firing range of the United States?

II

A Russian venture might indeed be explained by developments in the deterrent missile technology of the two superpowers. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki and Vienna have accompanied a general discussion of future deterrent retaliatory systems on each side. It is more and more plausible that improved missile accuracies and the advent of MIRV multiple warheads will cast doubt on the reliability of land-based missiles, both in Montana and Siberia, as second-strike forces. Concern for the future stability of the

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strategic balance is usually answered by noting that submarine-based systems will remain invulnerable to preëmptive attack for a long time into the future.

Yet the Soviet Union until recently has been slow to invest in submarine-based missiles, and in the fall of 1970 had only a mixed-bag force of diesel and nuclear-powered vessels, some of which carry rockets and others only "cruise-missiles" which fly as airplanes to their targets. Some 12 to 18 "Y-class" submarines carry batteries of 16 missiles, while some 40 others can fire only three each (the Soviet Union is indeed now launching about eight new "Y-class" submarines a year). In terms of missiles deliverable from underwater, this therefore compares unfavorably with the 41 Polaris submarines with 16 missiles of the U.S. Navy.

The introduction of multiple warheads on submarine-based missiles bends the underwater-deterrent comparison all the more against the Soviet Union. The first Poseidon missiles will be deployed on board U.S. submarines early in 1971, with ten warheads on each launching rocket, thus menacing as many as 160 targets instead of 16. If the world begins looking at underwater arsenals rather than arsenals as a whole, the first census might thus come out vastly in favor of the United States. It may be some years yet before the Soviet Union develops multiple warheads for its submarine-based missiles.

Even prior to the introduction of multiple warheads, other technical complications favored the United States. The crucial factor for submarine-based missiles is not absolute totals per se, but the number on station within firing range of enemy targets at any particular time. One must thus deduct from the available force the time spent in drydock for repairs, and the time spent travelling from port to the firing zone. The United States increases the numbers of Polaris submarines on station by using advanced bases at Holy Loch in Scotland, Rota on the coast of Spain, and Guam in the Pacific. For the moment, the Soviet Navy is presumed to have no bases closer than Murmansk for the refuelling and refitting of its missile submarines. The result is that no more than 30 or 40 percent of the Soviet submarine-based force will normally be on station within firing range of targets in the United States, while the figure for the U.S. force vis-à-vis Russian targets has been estimated as high as 60 percent.

Cienfuegos could thus have an effect similar to that of Holy

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Loch in considerably increasing the normal punch of the Soviet force, by reducing the time spent in travelling to and from firing stations. At a time when the entire world is shifting attention from fixed land-based missiles to mobile and concealable submarine-based missiles, it would not be surprising if the Soviet Navy wished to make its submarines more useful by techniques similar to those used by the U.S. Navy.

The U.S. Navy has for some time sought funds for an ULMS (Undersea Long-range Missile System) which would far exceed the current Polaris system in performance. Perhaps most significantly, the range of missiles would be increased to facilitate the destruction of targets in the Soviet Union from anywhere on the globe. This would not only allow the dispersion of such submarines into a much larger area, making it all the more difficult for an opponent to determine their location, but it would in effect leave all such submarines constantly on station, even when docked at a wharf in their home country. The technology of an ULMS in American and Russian hands would eliminate any need for calculations of comparative times on station, perhaps making a base at Cienfuegos much less necessary for the Russians, in any event reducing any firing-range advantages Cienfuegos would have as compared with Holy Loch. Yet ULMS is still some distance off, and political decisions must be made on the basis of the military technology as it exists for the near future.

It is still plausible, of course, that the Russian submarine-based missile force is fully adequate to deter a World War III launched by the United States; another deterrent is the uncertainty regarding the counterforce effectiveness of American MIRV against Russian land-based missiles. Yet weapons procurements and deployments are often dictated not by the strategic realities surrounding them, but rather by the myths that the public will believe. If the world now becomes convinced that numbers of submarine-based missiles are the only crucial component of the deterrent equation, a secondary strategic-political argument will have emerged for forward deployment of the Russian submarine force.

III

Why, then, has the United States chosen to make an issue of bases as the most important part of the Soviet deterrent? One

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can discover special reasons for the Kennedy objection to the 1962 Cuban deployment. Stationing missiles on Cuban soil reduced one's assurances that the Russians would always keep control over them. If we trusted Khrushchev not to destroy Washington, could we trust Castro to be as rational? One of the earliest assurances conveyed from Khrushchev during the 1962 crisis was indeed that the missiles remained under Soviet control. A similar problem might now pertain to Cienfuegos. The base might be stocked not only with fuel and food and spare parts, plus extra crews, but perhaps also with spare missiles. A submarine riding at anchor in the harbor will be within firing range of a number of American cities. Could Castro's forces in a sudden coup seize some missiles on shore, or aboard a docked submarine, and then irresponsibly exploit this sudden "proliferation" by firing them off? This may be unlikely, but it is at least more plausible than if Russian submarines never entered Cuban territorial waters at all.

Rather than talking in terms of the entire Western Hemisphere, the U.S. government could thus have used this instance to reformulate and shift its objections specifically to missiles on Cuban territory, if quasi-proliferation is what we really fear. As the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is now in effect with Soviet and American backing, the world might have been receptive to the logical drift of such a stand. Yet to base the issue on explicit fear of Castro's finger on the nuclear trigger would have exposed American policy to attack in other locations, since the Russians have long objected to the analogous presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in West Germany. Cannot Russia pretend to distrust Bonn as much as we distrust Havana? With 7,000 or more American warheads in place in the NATO area, the United States still has to challenge a Cuban deployment in terms other than the risk of de facto proliferation, and thus must use the hemispheric focus.

In 1962, there was also a fear that Cuban-based missiles could outflank the radar warning net which gives time for SAC bombers to get off the ground before being destroyed in a missile attack. This seems a less important threat for the 1970s, if only because we now have so many missiles that we rely much less on bombers as our sure deterrent. If submarine-type missiles in Cienfuegos were accurate enough to threaten SAC bases, moreover, these could easily be fired from off the coast of Florida. It

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might yet be that a Cuban base will allow the Russians to concentrate missile-launching submarines more densely to the southeast of the United States, to generate a more effective attack and someday bypass radar to catch most B-52s on the ground. One would have to take this prospect of a general Soviet counterforce attack very seriously, however, to interpret it as the primary explanation of a Cuban base.

IV

A third objection in 1962 was more symbolic than strategic: that allowing the Russians to invade the Caribbean unchallenged with their missiles would signal American irresolution, with unfortunate consequences in Berlin, Southeast Asia and Latin America. With Fidel Castro threatening to induce similarly anti-American régimes all through the Hemisphere, Kennedy's decision to impose the quarantine might have been understandable merely in terms of containing Havana's influence and prestige. Catching Castro and the Russians in the act of bringing nuclear weapons into Latin America indeed diminished Castro's prestige; much of even the neutral world's sympathy was on the American side.

Perhaps there is thus an important correspondence here with the present situation, despite some improvement in Soviet-American relations since 1962. If there is less tension for the moment over West Berlin, American resolve may be in question in the Middle East. Political conflict might spread to Latin America, too, if internal developments suddenly encouraged the Russians to consolidate what seemed to be a momentum in their favor. The election of Salvador Allende in Chile, accompanied by the emergence of a left military régime in Bolivia, resembling one already controlling Peru, might have suggested that Moscow again rattle some missiles in the Caribbean region to demonstrate its power and interest; this conversely induced a tough American response.

Yet Castro's Cuba is no longer the "wave of the future" in Latin America, nor the model for leftist rises to power in Chile, Bolivia or Peru. The connection of any such developments to Russian missile stocks and deployments is not so direct. If Kennedy's hemispheric formulation was at all appropriate in political and symbolic terms in 1962, it may seem much less so now.

The substance of symbolic or political determination, how-

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ever, is a function of momentum and relative comparison, as well as of the absolutes of the situation. President Kennedy in 1962 did more than humiliate Castro and Khrushchev; his "victory" thereafter committed the United States to maintaining these winnings, lest it seem to be weakening in comparison with the past. President Nixon might thus have cause to regret the position so handily captured by Kennedy. Just as the successful retention of West Berlin in 1948 loaded the United States ever afterward with an ambiguous position that could not be surrendered lightly, so the withdrawal of Russian missiles from Cuba and the Hemisphere established a precedent which may be difficult to defend, if only because it is difficult to define.

For example, how would American policy have been applied in the last decade if British or French nuclear weapons had been deployed, for good or bad reasons, in the Hemisphere? Could French missile submarines, to further their dispersal, be tolerated at a base in Martinique? Tahiti, for that matter, where French H-bombs are tested, is in "the Hemisphere." The ban on offensive weapons of course might have been waived for U.S. NATO allies, even those with an "all-azimuth" strategy such as France "adopted" for a time. But it would have been far more difficult to consider such a waiver for the Russians, simply because it would compare unfavorably with the strong-willed posture of 1962.

The Russians might have permanently put aside ideas of reinsuring their deterrent with land-based missiles in Cuba. Yet a sincere shift to submarine-basing would still have led them to search for bases like Holy Loch. Since only Cuba can offer such bases, a real misunderstanding may thus have occurred on whether Kennedy's injunction of 1962 also applied to "missiles in transit" through Cuba, and in and out of Cienfuegos, or just to missiles "emplaced" in Cuba.

Yet it is just as possible that the Russians have not blundered, but were deliberately seizing on the possible ambiguities so as to test American resolve. After missiles had been repeatedly loaded and unloaded from submarines at Cienfuegos, the news might quietly have been allowed to seep out that the United States "no longer objected to nuclear missiles in Cuba," with a follow-up of some token deployment of land-based missiles, with the political inference that the world should now acknowledge that any American superiority in 1962 had definitely been

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reversed. One can understand how an American administration would want to warn the Russians away from such a course, whether or not it privately wished that American prestige had never been coupled to the denuclearization of Cuba.

Moscow can start even further back in trying to erode the precedent. In strategic terms, there is a tremendous difference between ordinary submarines and those which fire missiles aimed at American cities. In terms of the support facilities that might appear on the Cuban coast, however, there might be little or no difference between the requirements of the two kinds of ships. Ordinary submarines can be thought of as "tactical" weapons, not at all banned by the 1962 precedent; perhaps they are "offensive," perhaps they are not. There is also a perennial sloppiness and confusion in the world's press on the term "nuclear submarine;" this obviously can mean a submarine firing nuclear missiles, or a submarine simply powered by a nuclear reactor, perhaps firing only the torpedos of a normal tactical submarine.

While some reports emerging from Washington thus suggested that Cienfuegos would support Russian missile-firing submarines, others merely indicated submarines in general. It might be all too easy for the Russians to establish a tolerated precedent with a base for ordinary fleet-type submarines, and then to introduce submarines carrying ballistic missiles or cruise-missiles. Perhaps this would explain an American decision to interpret any submarine base whatsoever as objectionable.

The Russian statement reaffirming the 1962 agreement was thus itself a concession to the United States at the symbolic level. For some purposes, *e.g.* the impact in Chile, in West Berlin or in the Middle East, it matters less what the Russians actually do, than what they openly assert the prerogative of doing. Kosygin and Brezhnev, by admitting to being bound by Khrushchev's concession, can have eased Washington's suspicions that they were setting the stage for an open termination of the agreement. If the American accusation and challenge were premature in these terms, they were none the less successful and well taken. But the renewed Russian guarantee of nondeployment here can still terminate or be reinterpreted with any change of Soviet administration or Soviet mood. And honest differences of interpretation can still arise between the powers.

The United States might more certainly have been taken off the hook by the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of

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1967 (the Treaty of Tlatelolco). The treaty requires Latin American states not to produce nuclear weapons, accept them from any donor, or to allow such weapons to be stationed on their territory. Holders of possessions in the Latin American area (specifically Britain, France, The Netherlands and the United States) are invited to sign an Additional Protocol I, barring nuclear weapons from their territories. Possessors of nuclear weapons (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, communist China and the United States) are asked to sign an Additional Protocol II, forswearing any deployment or use of nuclear weapons within the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone. Great Britain has signed both Protocols, the United States has signed only Protocol II, and France, the Soviet Union and communist China have signed neither.

Signatories to the treaty are not bound unless every Latin American republic signs and ratifies, and unless all the eligible states adhere to Protocols I and II. Latin American states can waive some of these requirements, and thus bind themselves in any event; Mexico has done so, but Chile, Argentina and Brazil have not. Had the treaty won more general acceptance, the American responsibility for keeping Cuba non-nuclear could have been passed over into less embarrassed hands. While the treaty certainly does not cover the entire Hemisphere, it purports to cover the entire Caribbean, along with a zone of water extending far out into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (including even the waters off the U.S. coasts outside the three-mile limit) north to 35 degrees North Latitude. The United States managed to extract an interpretation that the treaty does not forbid "transit" movements of nuclear weapons on ships through these ocean areas and through the Panama Canal. If "deployment" is thus banned while "transit" is not, the water zones of the treaty would have quite a confusing relevance to Russian missile-submarines. Would it be legal for them to pass through the zone "on the way to their firing station," as long as their "firing station" were outside the zone?

Cuba and the Soviet Union are not accepting the treaty in any event. Moscow has complained about the extension of the treaty's zone far out into international waters. Moscow (along with Washington) also disapproves of the treaty's supposed distinction between "peaceful nuclear explosives" and nuclear weapons. The Johnson administration declined to sign Protocol I because

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it wished to retain deployment options for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which it wanted to have specifically left out of the nuclear-free zone. Averting what would have been an abysmally obvious double standard, the United States at least did not lobby for an exemption also for nuclear weapons rights on Guantanamo Bay, the American base on Cuba's southern coast. The U.S. Senate has not yet ratified Protocol II.

V

Comparative Latin American assessments of superpower strength and resolve may not have been that significant, however. Less reasonable factors can play an important part in explaining the American attitudes here. The logic by which the United States should tolerate or even welcome a Soviet submarine-based force seems simple and obvious; assured second-strike forces on each side eliminate the need for nervousness, or for policies of shooting-on-warning. More than ten years ago Professor Oskar Morgenstern even advocated U.S. assistance for missile-submarine development in the Soviet Union since the secure balance seemed so mutually advantageous. Yet it is far from certain that this logic has really been accepted in the United States.

The image of Soviet submarines cruising off our shores with missiles aimed at our cities raises *gestalt* problems which can lead to very inconsistent policy. Since 1942, or even since 1917, Americans have been psychologically adverse to the activities of foreign submarines off the Atlantic coast. Memories of burning tankers off Florida, and "brown-outs" of coastal cities to make merchant ships less vulnerable by night, may thus have conditioned our people to react against hostile submarines despite a logic which suggests tolerating them with equanimity.

It is even possible that the American public is not really aware of its exposure to nuclear destruction in the "balance of terror." American cities have long been hostages in this balance, hostages held in exchange for the safety of Russian cities. Yet it is somehow still possible for a Congressman as prominent as the late Representative Mendel Rivers to arouse and alarm the public with the news that, due to Russian submarines off our coast, "cities of the Eastern Seaboard become hostages of the Soviet Union." In the 1962 crisis, one could find a similarly uneven perception of strategic reality in the U.S. government. Secretary of Defense McNamara's initial reaction to the Russian missiles

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in Cuba was very calmly that "a missile is a missile," that Americans already vulnerable to ICBMs fired from Russia were not any more vulnerable as a result of the Cuban deployment. McNamara was quickly persuaded by President Kennedy, and by others involved in the decision, that his calmness was inappropriate. Such unexcited reactions seem inconsistent with all of today's strategic "facts of life."

For whatever reason, the American élite and public seem surprisingly averse to recognizing U.S. vulnerability, or at least to having forward deployment remind them of this vulnerability, even some 15 years after Soviet acquisition of the H-bomb. It is still easy for the U.S. Navy to capture attention for its fund requests by pointing to Soviet procurement of missile-firing submarines. It might even be able to win endorsement for policies of chasing or harassing Soviet submarines off our coasts, or "anywhere in the Hemisphere," or at least when docking on the coast of Cuba. The public's sensitivity can thus be exploited by smaller bureaus, or by the national government as a whole. If President Kennedy or President Nixon wished to be politically tough in confronting the Russians, they both knew that American public support would be far more forthcoming on "missiles at our doorstep" than on other issues.

If the Cienfuegos issue does nothing else, it suggests serious problems in relying wholly on underwater deterrent forces. Missiles based on land are increasingly threatened by multiple warheads (MIRV) and improving accuracies of missiles in general. If the Circular Error Probable (CEP) can now be reduced to hundreds of feet, only a small percentage of land-based missiles would survive an opponent's first-strike attack. If each side has multiple warheads, it would be plausible that whoever struck first would come out ahead militarily. A policy of firing off one's land-based missiles on radar-warning, to avoid being caught by such a first strike, is extremely dangerous, if only because of the risks of technical malfunctions in radar.

Many commentators have viewed these developments with relative equanimity, noting that each side will still have increasingly massive submarine-based retaliatory forces which should suffice as a deterrent, no matter what happens in attacks on Siberia or Montana. Yet missiles based on land do not move around under the sea-lanes and off the coasts of the world, generating scare-headlines, inducing speculation about prolifera-

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tion, insubordination, underwater collisions or what-have-you. If underwater deterrents are more secure from a strategic perspective, they may cause more and more political problems as the world's population of missile-firing submarines grows. As the Russian fleet of such ships increases, we may see more tension in the United States than we might have predicted; Cienfuegos may simply be the first example. The addition of British, French and especially Chinese missile-firing submarines on station in various of the seven seas can increase disquiet.

This is hardly an argument for avoiding underwater deterrence systems and the strategic advantages they offer for preserving stability and peace. It is rather a case for anticipating problems to be encountered, and some costs that may have to be paid. Several approaches to alleviating these tensions come to mind.

The Soviet Union has previously proposed agreement on zones from which one side or the other would withhold its missile-submarines. Just as we now resent missiles in Cuba or off Miami, Moscow has long claimed to resent missiles "at its doorstep," in Turkey or just off Murmansk. At earlier times, with an earlier technology, these Soviet proposals seemed intended to weaken the American deterrent. When and if ULMS becomes practical, however, missile submarines can be held far back from opposing coasts, still able to strike at all opposing cities if war should ever come. ULMS might thus be a real blessing, a form of underwater strategic weapons development reducing political tension rather than increasing it, if the oceans of the world are demarcated into deployment zones for the respective powers. Indeed the Soviet response to American charges on Cienfuegos was careful to remind the United States of these earlier proposals for restrictions on Polaris deployments.

Yet it will still be some years before a very long-range submarine-based missile is developed, produced and deployed in the U.S. Navy, and even longer in the Soviet fleet. The United States public will never be persuaded that ULMS technology should be given to the Soviet Union in the interests of hastening an end to the political tensions caused by forward deployments. As a minimum alternative, therefore, it will be important now to try to acquaint the American public with at least some of the real strategic significance of Soviet missile-firing submarines deployed off our coasts, perhaps even with strategic desirability of such deployments from a far-sighted point of view.

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If the American public has never understood how vulnerable it was slated to be in the "balance of terror," a clarification of strategy here may draw a huge wave of disapproval and a vote of no-confidence. If such were the case, the U.S. government would be forced into the most serious reëxamination of its posture, reopening possibilities of drastic disarmament, or drastic investment in ABM missile defenses, with all the uncertainties and instabilities this may suggest. Far short of this, it is simply possible that Americans have never been forced to make the connection between the desirability of "assured destruction" submarine forces and the geography of the oceans into which they must be deployed.

Whether this desirability would have included a tolerance of Cienfuegos remains open to debate because of the other considerations cited. It may still be very difficult to tolerate any missile presence "in Cuba" in 1970, precisely because Kennedy chose not to tolerate it in 1962. Much depends on how the requirements of deterrents and military strategy seep through to the public at large. Kennedy's "finest hour" in 1962, whatever other important impact it had, did not help to educate us on such questions.

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RUSSIA AND CHINA: CONTROLLED CONFLICT

By Richard Lowenthal

IT is now eleven years since an ideological dispute between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties burst into the open on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, and almost eight years since the pattern of world affairs became definitely "triangular" with the open break between the two leading communist powers. Since then, the view of some Western dogmatists that personal rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung for the control of "world communism" was the only cause of the rift was plainly refuted as it continued after Khrushchev's fall; but at the opposite extreme, forecasts about tension between the two communist giants building up steadily toward nuclear war appear hardly more plausible at the present time. What events have tended to show so far is rather the persistence of controlled conflict between Moscow and Peking, with the ups and downs of crisis and relative détente familiar from other great-power conflicts of the nuclear age. A new wave of speculation has been generated in recent months by the efforts at a normalization of Sino-Soviet state relations and the subsequent revival of bitter polemics over the Polish December crisis, by the shifts in the Chinese party leadership since the end of the cultural revolution; and by the approach of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. These may justify one more attempt to analyze the factors underlying this strange relationship and its possible impact on the future.

It is useful to recall at the start that history and geography oppose China and Russia far more to each other than they oppose either to the United States. They are neighbors with the longest common frontier in the world; and among the European powers which took advantage of China's weakness in the nineteenth century, Tsarist Russia was the closest and territorially the most rapacious. It was revolutionary ideology alone that tended to bridge this "natural" conflict of interest after 1917, and the bridge remained imperfect and fragile at best. Soviet Russia's Mongolian and Manchurian policies ensured that Chiang Kai-shek never ceased to distrust the powerful ally—even in his early days as a national revolutionary leader. Mao Tse-tung rose to

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leadership of the Chinese Communists after experiencing, in 1927 and 1934, the disastrous consequences of the party's obedience to Soviet advice; he rose to national power by repeatedly defying that advice; and he had to pay for Soviet support not only by "leaning to one side" in world affairs, but by signing—in February 1950—the last of the unequal treaties in modern China's history. So conscious was Mao of Stalin's tendency to use the Chinese Communists as expendable pawns, and of the potential conflict underneath the ideological solidarity, that from his Yenan days he deliberately trained his cadres to follow their own model of revolutionary strategy, and only his own ultimate authority. Outwardly, he had to tolerate Soviet bases in Manchuria and to fight Russia's war in Korea while Stalin lived; but once the Vozhd was dead, Mao hastened to depose and arrest Kao Kang, long Russia's trusted man in the Chinese leadership, and to negotiate a revision of the unequal treaty. The different ideological emphasis, developed in following an increasingly independent road to power, now became a compass for an increasingly independent national policy.

The death of Stalin had given China equality of status within the alliance; the crisis of de-Stalinization seems to have been viewed by Mao as a chance to win major influence on Soviet policy without conflict. In the fall of 1957, he offered to Khrushchev the support of his intact authority for overcoming the crisis in the bloc and at home—at a price. His demands included substantial new capital aid, delivery of the latest weapons including in due course atomic bombs, and a more forward joint policy in Asia—and at least the first two were apparently promised to him. But the state of Soviet resources and the East European situation prevented major capital aid to China, while the Soviet view of the world relation of forces combined with the vulnerability of the advanced Soviet economy to limit Moscow's willingness to take major risks on Peking's behalf. Furthering atomic proliferation to build up an independent great power bordering Russia must have appeared to the Kremlin as the most foolhardy risk of all. From the end of 1957, the differences in the situations and interests of the two powers thus led to a whole series of Chinese disappointments—over capital aid, over atomic proliferation, over Middle Eastern diplomacy, over military aid in the Quemoy crisis, over Soviet-American and over Chinese-Indian relations. To those disappointments, the Chinese

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reacted in the course of 1958 and 1959 first with implied, then with increasingly explicit, attacks on Soviet ideological positions, in the hope of exerting effective pressure on the Soviet leaders by hitting their vulnerable spot—the weakness of their ideological authority. It was the public appearance of such symptoms of an "ideological dispute" that first indicated the existence of the underlying power conflict to the non-communist world.

II

But once the common ideology is no longer sufficient to bridge the conflicting policies of communist states, conflicting ideological arguments will be advanced to justify those policies—and will make compromise more difficult. As each side seeks to present its own practice as orthodox and its opponent's as heretical, it attacks by implication the legitimacy of the rival leader, and is perceived by him as threatening the stability of his rule. The very first disappointment—Russia's inability to supply the capital needed for China's industrialization—led Mao not only to launch the "People's Communes," but to proclaim them as a shortcut to the "higher stage" of communism—a challenge to the Soviets' birthright as pioneers on that road which they were bound to reject. True, the economic setbacks of the "Commune" experiment led the Chinese to withdraw that challenge in early 1959, and the first muted ideological dispute was thus patched up; but the same setback led one of Mao's domestic critics, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, to seek Khrushchev's support—an approach which the Soviet leader failed to discourage. When Mao learned of this, he must have felt that both his own control and China's independence were threatened by Soviet subversion. His second, less muted ideological attack, which culminated in the Lenin anniversary speeches and articles of April 1960, was thus prompted not only by the growing conflict over foreign policy, military support and international revolutionary strategy, but by a sense that he was fighting for his survival as leader of an independent great power.

On the other hand, the fact that both V. M. Molotov, then Soviet Ambassador to Mongolia, and the Albanian Communists began to argue on Chinese lines soon convinced Khrushchev and his associates that they had to defend the cohesion of their empire against a subversive attack from Peking. The brutality of the total withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in the

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summer of 1960 and the persistence of the Chinese challenge in the face of that blow, disproportionate and irrational in relation to the original policy conflicts, become comprehensible only in the light of the ideological broadening of those conflicts to encompass the domestic and imperial control of both leaders.

By the time of the last joint world conference of communist parties, held in Moscow in November and December 1960, the Chinese leaders were thus convinced that they would have to go their own way without Soviet help, unless and until there were radical changes in Soviet leadership and policy. In the circumstances, the compromise hammered out at this conference could be tactical only, and it proved short-lived because it had a different tactical meaning for each of the two sides. The Soviets had formally renounced their "leading role" in the world movement because they wanted to be rid of ideological debates: relying on their superior material strength to impose their course in foreign affairs, they were willing to stop criticizing what Mao did at home if Mao would stop criticizing what they did in Russia and East Europe. The Chinese, on the contrary, were interested in maintaining formal unity only as a basis for carrying on a long-term ideological struggle throughout the world movement —including Russia and East Europe.

When the difference became obvious in the Chinese support of Albania against Soviet pressure, a third and open phase of the dispute started, in October 1961, with the clashes at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. But now, because of the adoption of a new party program at that congress as well as the increasingly apparent internal struggles in China over methods of industrialization, the basic divergence of the domestic development of the two became involved in the dispute. The need of an advanced industrial (and nuclear) power for continuity of production, hence for domestic stability and internal peace, and its reliance on a highly graded scale of material incentives and privileges seemed directly opposed to the need of an overpopulated, agrarian country with immense problems of modernization for a harsh régime of sacrifice. China needed to keep the masses fired by revolutionary enthusiasm and by the spirit of a besieged fortress. As Mao Tse-tung engaged in a bitter struggle for the distinctively Chinese form of revolution within his own party, he had to hold up the post-revolutionary materialism of Soviet society in the sixties as a warning example of the revisionist degeneracy

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to which any alternative road would lead. The consequences of different national conditions and stages of development were thus raised to the rank of incompatible principles; the objective divergence of the Russian and Chinese roads was magnified by ideology; and the earlier doctrinaire differences about the international struggle against imperialism were absorbed into two complete, mutually exclusive versions of what had once appeared as a common, Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

With the sense of a basic community of goals thus destroyed, the earlier conflicts about the proper contents of a common strategy on the world scene were soon replaced by outright power rivalry between the two nominally still allied states. Even before the rival doctrinaire structures had been fully worked out by their creators, the dual international crisis of the fall of 1962, in the Caribbean and on the Sino-Indian frontier, showed that all sense of solidarity between Moscow and Peking had disappeared: the Chinese delight in embarrassing the Soviets during their retreat from Cuba was matched by the Soviet willingness to aid Indian rearmament. As the Caribbean defeat led to a Soviet decision to seek a détente in relations with the West, regardless of Chinese denunciations, the last official meeting between delegates of the Soviet and Chinese communist parties, held in Moscow in the summer of 1963, was conceived by each side solely as an occasion to "unmask" the other, and its breakdown marked the effective end of the Sino-Soviet alliance: during the year that followed, the public exposition of the two competing ideological systems and the splitting of a number of communist parties along those lines was paralleled by a series of official disclosures about the earlier conflicts in foreign and military policies, and by a growing number of frontier incidents.

Yet compared with the fundamental power rivalry and the divergence of roads of development, the friction at the borders constituted a subsidiary phenomenon. Its first high point was reached when Mao, in an interview granted to Japanese visitors in the summer of 1964, complained about the massing of Soviet forces on the borders of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang, and Moscow failed to deny the charge. But what Mao feared was clearly not a Soviet attempt at territorial conquests, but a preventive strike at China's fledgling nuclear installations. A few months later, the fall of Khrushchev and the first Chinese atomic explosion ended that particular fear.

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III

Khrushchev's successors do not seem to have been under any illusions that the former ideological unity of the communist powers could be restored—not, at any rate, while Mao was in power. But they have made repeated if not consistent efforts to achieve the more modest goal of a "normalization" of Sino-Soviet relations. They aim at a state of affairs in which the two communist great powers would pursue their respective interests independently, now in coöperation, now in conflict with each other, but without fanatical and systematic hostility. Given that the Soviet Union was necessarily opposed to Chinese pressure on India and Chinese influence in Pakistan, could it not at the same time coöperate with China against the Americans in Vietnam? While taking their precautions along the border, seeking to deter Pakistan from relying on China in her conflict with India, and working to forestall a growth of Chinese influence in Japan, the Soviets have therefore not only repeatedly offered a cessation of hostile ideological polemics, and invited the Chinese Communists to join another international conference of communist parties, but have made specific offers for a "united front" in support of North Vietnam, both on the government and party levels.

The Chinese have consistently refused those offers, to the dismay of the independent communist parties of Asia. As many of their earlier sympathizers turned into ideological neutrals while their most promising allies, the Indonesian Communists, suffered disaster in the fall of 1965, the prospect of a powerful bloc of pro-Chinese communist parties vanished. Yet Mao was willing to pay the price of growing international isolation because by then the domestic power struggle had absolute priority in his eyes; and for that he needed the bogey of Soviet revisionism leading to a restoration of capitalism. If Liu Shao-chi had to be branded, in the course of the cultural revolution, as the "Chinese Khrushchev" walking the capitalist road, evidently no united front was conceivable with Soviet leaders whose policy had been unmasked as "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev."

In the course of the cultural revolution, Soviet-Chinese relations thus fell to their lowest point yet; as insults to each other's diplomatic personnel led to the withdrawal of both ambassadors, Chinese propaganda called for the overthrow of the revisionist traitors by the Russian people and Soviet propaganda for the

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overthrow of Mao Tse-tung, the destroyer of the Chinese communist party. The Soviets, at least, may for a time have believed that such an outcome was possible. However, as Mao's domestic victory became evident with the approaching end of the upheaval, the Soviets returned once more to their earlier efforts to work for a pragmatic normalization.

In fact, the end of the cultural revolution has brought a growth of pragmatic influence in the Chinese leadership and a return to a more "normal" conduct in foreign affairs—but at first, Sino-Soviet relations remained an exception. Though evidence on the responsibility for the Ussuri River incident of March 1969 remains conflicting, an analysis of possible political motives strongly suggests a Chinese initiative. The disputed islands themselves are worthless. The prospect of a multiplication of similar incidents along the endless frontier offered to the Soviets no possible gain, but the nightmare of having to tie down large forces for recurring, indecisive battles against an enemy specializing in hit-and-run warfare and disposing of inexhaustible manpower. The Chinese, on the other hand, whose propagandist exploitation of the incidents was far better prepared—with detailed maps—could make excellent use of them for maintaining the "besieged fortress" spirit in general and popular hostility to the "new Tsars" in particular beyond the end of the cultural revolution.

Conversely, it seems plausible that the Soviets were responsible for the subsequent renewal of clashes on the border of Sinkiang, as they were certainly responsible for spreading the rumor, in the summer of 1969, that they might still decide on the preventive strike against China's nuclear installations which Mao had feared five years earlier. However unconvincing the rumor was in view of the probable cost of such an attempt at this stage, it may have helped to bring the Chinese to the negotiating table after Kosygin's meeting with Chou En-lai in September of that year, and to end the frontier fighting for the time being.

The course of the negotiations has so far been inconclusive—apparently not because of any substantial difficulty in agreeing on the demarcation of the existing frontier, but because of the Chinese insistence that the Soviets should formally and publicly admit that this frontier was the result of unjust and unequal treaties imposed on China by the Tsars. In demanding this admission, the Chinese assert that they claim it merely as a matter

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of undeniable historical truth, without any thought of actually changing the frontier to reverse the Tsarist annexations. But the Russians clearly feel that they cannot make such a formal admission without laying themselves open to later substantive Chinese demands. Hence the Chinese appear to have hit on a means for keeping the frontier question open, and thus maintaining popular hostility, without dangerously provoking the Russians by actual fighting. In a similar spirit, Peking finally agreed to resume the exchange of ambassadors with Moscow, and on the occasion of last year's November celebrations for the first time publicly reciprocated the wish for the normalization of state relations which the Soviet government had repeatedly expressed. At the same time the Chinese continue to emphasize their uncompromising ideological struggle against Soviet "revisionism" and "social imperialism."

Yet while that distinction is in principle acceptable to the Soviets and indeed corresponds to the kind of modus vivendi they have long proposed, in practice the Chinese persist in drawing the line between state relations and ideological struggle in a manner which endangers vital interests of the Soviets and cannot be tolerated by them: for the Chinese concept of ideological criticism includes the right to conduct propagandist attacks on the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and even on the unity of the nationalities of the Soviet Union. True, the Chinese attacks on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia took place while the cultural revolution was still in progress and before any talk about normalization of state relations. But in December 1970, Chinese propaganda interpreted the crisis of the Polish régime, in which the Soviets were not visibly involved, in exactly the same spirit as a revolt of the Polish working class against the "revisionist" régime in which the Soviets had allegedly threatened to intervene, and forecast the ultimate victory of the Polish people over "Soviet social imperialism."

To the Soviets, such propaganda naturally appears as incompatible with "normal state relations;" and this applies even more to the continuing Chinese efforts to encourage separatist national movements among the Ukrainians and other constituent nationalities of the Soviet Union. More than a year after the start of negotiations between the governments, Russia and China thus seem back at the point at which the last compromise between the parties broke up a decade ago: at the Chinese re-

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fusal to accept the Soviets' control over their own power sphere as the minimum basis for a modus vivendi.

IV

In trying to evaluate the prospects of the conflict, it may be useful to start by separating its components. The first striking fact is that the basic power rivalry between the two communist giants has survived the disappearance of many of the original policy issues of the late 1950s—issues that were linked to the situation of China's material dependence on a richer and more powerful ally. As a nuclear power with an independent role in world affairs, China is clearly determined never again to rely on Soviet economic or military aid for achieving its policy aims; nor has the Soviet Union any more grounds to fear that it might be drawn against its will into risky adventures by the now defunct alliance. What has remained, however, is the power rivalry itself—the interest of Russia in slowing down the growth of the industrial and military might of its eastern neighbor, and the determination of China to overcome the obstacle.

At present, the rivalry manifests itself above all as a struggle for influence in Asia. That struggle takes the form of political competition in North Korea, which has become independent of both, and in North Vietnam, which both have supported without ever coöperating directly. It takes the form of primarily economic competition with Japan. It appears as a direct clash in the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, where China is trying to undermine Soviet control, and in South Asia, where the Soviets are objectively aligned with the United States for the protection of India and have profited from the collapse of Chinese influence in Indonesia.

The importance of the frontier issue in the wider power conflict remains highly controversial among outside observers. The nature of China's overpopulation is not such as to constitute an urgent compulsion to expand her territory: China remains short of capital rather than land. Nor is there the slightest evidence of a Chinese inclination to engage in dangerous military adventures at the present stage—rather it is the contrast between wild language and cautious behavior that continues to impress the student. Even for the longer run, assuming an absolute and relative growth of China's military power and an eventual exhaustion of the reserves of arable land with a further increase

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of her population, it is by no means "fatalistically inevitable" that she must seek to expand at Russia's expense, at the risk of nuclear war, rather than move south against weaker neighbors or seek peaceful economic solutions. But neither can the possibility of such a development be excluded from the Soviet point of view in the light of the growth of Chinese armaments, of her present hostility, and of her insistence on the illegitimate origin of the present frontier. Seen from Moscow, the rise of China to the full status of a modern world power, which may be slowed down but is unlikely to be prevented, remains a potential long-term threat to Soviet territorial security—by now presumably the only serious threat of that kind.

If we now turn to the ideological aspects of the conflict, the struggle for control of the nonruling communist parties has lost much of its earlier importance because of the comparative failure of Chinese efforts in this field. The dominant fact here has been the collapse of the hopes for a bloc of major Asian communist parties under Chinese leadership since 1965, with the turn of the Korean and Japanese Communists and even the Indian left-Communists toward "neutral" independence and the catastrophe of the Indonesian party. But in Latin America, too, the Chinese have been unable to establish a solid influence among the more or less "Castroist" groups opposing Moscow's "peaceful road" to power, or to prevent the Cuban party itself from attending the Moscow world conference of 1969.

In Europe, the Chinese-oriented splinter groups have nowhere become more than a nuisance for the established communist parties, able at best to delay the evolution of the latter into potential participants in government coalitions useful to Soviet diplomacy. Nor has the Maoist influence among the student "New Left" become more than one unstable element in a general ideological ferment, as it met in the course of time increasing competition from the old-line communists in Western Europe and from the Trotskyites in the United States. The Chinese themselves seem to have come to realize their failure as an international doctrinaire center: there is evidence that for the propagandist struggle against the West and the Soviets, they are relying more and more on supporting militant movements of an outright nationalist character, like the Palestinian guerrillas, rather than left-wing ideological sects.

By contrast, the ideological legitimation of divergent roads

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of domestic development has remained a far more vital element in the conflict; but it is also far more liable to be affected by changes in the leadership and domestic policy of either country. Among the latter, changes in China are likely to have a more far-reaching impact on Sino-Soviet relations. A Soviet turn toward a new effort at modernizing reform could now only produce an intensification of Chinese ideological invectives, while a turn toward a wholesale rehabilitation of Stalin's memory and methods, from which its more primitive advocates are said to expect an ideological reconciliation with the Chinese, would leave the basic differences unaffected and only deprive the Maoists of the tactical pretext that they are defending the Stalinist tradition. In fact, the basic features of Soviet society which form the counterfoil to Mao's vision, such as its reliance on highly differentiated material incentives and its rigid bureaucratic stratification, go back to Stalin's own decisions, as Mao knows perfectly well; and they are unlikely to disappear through any change in the Soviet leadership conceivable at this stage.

On the other hand, a turn on China's part in a more "materialist" and therefore more Soviet-like direction, with more stress on material incentives and continuity of production and less reliance on revolutionary enthusiasm, is conceivable after the disappearance of Mao. Indeed the signs are not lacking that forces favoring such a "pragmatic" turn have increased their influence in the Chinese leadership since the end of the cultural revolution, and that they are the same who have pressed for a normalization of state relations with the Soviet Union (so far, as we have seen, with limited success). In that sense, a decline in bitterness of China's ideological hostility toward the Soviet Union and a move toward a climate of peaceful coexistence between independent communist powers building different types of "socialism" would be a possible development after Mao's demise. But it would not, of course, end the power rivalry between them; it might even, by speeding the success of China's modernization, make her a more formidable rival for Russia at a quicker pace. The power rivalry, then, will continue to be decisive for the substance of the conflict, while ideological factors may influence its more or less acute and intensive forms at particular times. That substance excludes a true "reconciliation" between the two leading communist powers in the sense of a return to a stable alliance based on the primacy

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of common ideological convictions and goals. But given a measure of rationality of the leadership on both sides, the fact of a serious conflict of power interests makes nuclear war between them no more inevitable than between either of them and the United States.

The continuation of limited and controlled conflict between Russia and China thus remains a far more plausible prospect than its end by either reunion or catastrophe. But in an increasingly triangular world, that leaves unanswered a question of decisive practical importance for the West: the question of priorities. In a triangular constellation, different combinations of coöperation and conflict are possible at different periods, with two of the major powers combining on different issues against the third. Yet it is in the nature of such a constellation that the combination that will become effective at any particular time is not predetermined, and therefore not predictable. It will be decided by the choice of the most urgent issues at any given moment, and that depends on the political skill of the leaders of each of the new Big Three—including the United States.

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INTERNATIONAL LABOR IN CRISIS

By N. M.

THE International Labor Organization is in crisis, a crisis in which the United States is deeply involved. The question now is whether the crisis can be used creatively. Conflict may open the possibility of changes which would never have been introduced into an institution pursuing its established routine. Such changes may never have been in the minds of those who initiated the crisis. But a crisis is a collective drama, in the course of which some actors may be able to redefine the issues so as to bring about a significant change in the dénouement.

The crisis was touched off during the summer of 1970 by a seemingly trivial matter, the appointment by a new ILO Director-General of a Russian as an Assistant Director-General. The U.S. Congress reacted to this event by refusing to approve the appropriation for the American contribution to the ILO budget. The character of the response indicates that the precipitating event was but a symbol of deeper concern with increasing Soviet influence in the ILO, a concern not limited to Americans. The action of the Congress has since been criticized on the ground that the United States has a legal obligation to pay its contribution to international organizations it belongs to and on the ground of the impropriety of a rich country using the financial weapon to try to influence the course of an international organization. Both objections are beside the point. The issue is neither legal nor financial. It is political. No one can seriously doubt that the U.S. government will meet its obligations and pay its membership dues. The question is whether it will pay up and leave or pay up and stay.

The issues can be defined in terms either of power or of purpose. Considerations of power lead to short-range tactical measures designed to maintain or strengthen the U.S.—or more broadly the Western—position within the ILO. Considerations of purpose direct attention to a long-range strategy for the use of the ILO. The creative approach will stress purpose.

The question of Soviet influence in the ILO has to be assessed in light of the fact that the Western countries have a proportionately stronger position in the ILO than in any other major

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international organization except the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The ten states of chief industrial importance—eight of them "Western" in the common political use of that term—have automatic representation on the Governing Body which is the controlling organ of ILO programs and policies. The tripartite structure of the ILO, in which trade unions and employers as well as governments are represented, has also favored the West. Trade union and employer members of the Governing Body have been predominantly sympathetic to Western viewpoints. The Soviets, however, with support from the third world, have sought to change ILO structures so as to weaken the Western position; and Western delegates in turn react defensively to the challenge of growing Soviet influence.

The attitude of the delegates of the United States toward the ILO now seems to be dominated by tactical considerations, such as the extent of support given to Soviet-inspired proposals for structural changes and the amount of anti-American propaganda made in public sessions. Such considerations are very short-term indeed. And the Congressional action to block payment of a budget contribution is an unwieldy weapon, which could probably be used credibly only once. If U.S. objectives are defined solely in tactical terms, success may be ephemeral, and the means of achieving it will have been expended. This tactic would lead back to the pre-crisis situation, but with the U.S. position in the ILO—and with it the whole Western position—much weakened.

The U.S. government, both the Administration and Congress, will during the coming months have to define anew its attitude toward the ILO. This is not an altogether novel question. The last time it arose was some 15 years ago, after the Soviet bloc came into the organization. In May 1956, a committee of distinguished individuals, mainly academics, was appointed by the U.S. Departments of State, Commerce and Labor to advise them on the future relations of the United States with the ILO. It was chaired by Joseph E. Johnson, then President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The two salient conclusions of the committee were, first, that the ILO is not of direct importance to American labor but, secondly, that it could be important to the United States in its foreign relations as "an instrument in the ideological contest." This report provided the rationale for continuing American membership in the ILO. In the intervening years nothing has occurred to alter the first conclusion, but

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the validity of the second is now being seriously questioned.

The government will review its commitment to the ILO in terms of the organization's usefulness to American domestic and foreign policy. Also relevant is the organization's usefulness to the international system. Since the United States has the largest single stake in the stability of the international system it will have at least an indirect interest in ensuring that the ILO contribute in some way to the orderly development of this system. The question of the ILO's potential for the future has to be answered in the light of the mutual compatibility of two sets of factors: one, the nature of the real issues with which an international organization in the labor field might usefully deal; the other, the likely political basis of support for the ILO.

II

A first step in rethinking the role of the ILO should then be to assess the evolution of the organization's activities during recent years in relation to the real issues of social policy. Such a review must begin by explaining how the ILO lost its relevance to domestic policy in the Western countries. During the 1920s and 1930s the ILO's elaboration of international labor standards in the form of legal norms corresponded closely with what was then understood as labor policy in Western Europe, *i.e.* protective labor legislation.

Today, however, for advanced Western societies, there is no such thing as labor policy in the old sense. Workers are concerned about employment, but the maintenance of acceptable levels of employment is a matter of general economic policy. It is pursued by manipulating the level of public saving and spending, by fiscal measures, by encouragement of investment in depressed regions, and so forth. Such measures fall outside the scope of labor departments. True, measures for training, retraining and relocation of workers through an active manpower policy can be a significant support to employment policy. But the main point is still valid: employment policy is a central function of government which requires the coördination of many instruments, only some of which are within the jurisdiction of labor departments.

A similar change has taken place in the broader concept of social policy. At the origins of the ILO the "social question" and the "labor question" were identical and their solution was

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seen to be in creating opportunities for the worker to improve his status in society. During the past two decades, the worker seems to have been taking reasonably good care of his own interests. Unions have matured and in maturing have lost the glamor of a cause which drew many intellectuals to their support in the heroic and oppressive days of the 1930s. This must be accounted an achievement of Western society. It has turned our attention to other, more pressing social problems. We are concerned about integrating into the mainstream of social life groups which have been marginal to the material growth and institutional development of modern societies. The current struggle of Blacks in the United States may be a harbinger of conflicts latent in the influx of Mediterranean, Asian and African peoples into northern Europe, to take up jobs the established members of those societies no longer are willing to accept. We are also becoming concerned about the quality of the collective goods available in our societies, with providing an urban environment conducive to healthy personal development, with clean water and clean air.

Workers are very much concerned about all these things, but more as citizens than as workers. As workers, however, they may be able to have a greater influence on action through their trade unions. Labor administration is to some extent involved in action directed to these problems, but is in no case the center of such action. The old-fashioned sectoral approach of government is ill-adapted to the problems at hand. And what is true at the national and local levels is true also at the international. The ILO has lost its relevancy to social policy-making because its structures do not correspond to the ways in which current social problems have to be defined.

Trade unions as well as governments in Western countries have also lost interest in the ILO, probably as a by-product of the maturing process mentioned. Union leaders have become more exclusively concerned with the immediate industrial objectives of their organizations and less with reformist goals of a more general and remote nature. The ILO has become peripheral to the concrete interests of unions—a kind of "good works" requiring perfunctory and increasingly symbolic support. Participation in the ILO then becomes the affair of one or two individuals, and all meaningful connection with the real activities of unions ceases. Where trade union interest in international affairs remained active, as it has in the AFL-CIO, this was gen-

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erally because of a concern with global political and ideological struggles which had little or nothing to do with the real work of unions back home.

Some present tendencies in Western countries, however, suggest a new potential relevancy of the ILO. The unsatisfactory experiments many of these countries have made with incomes policies and in other crucial areas of public policy are evidence of a search for new ways of associating the nongovernmental forces represented in the ILO with government. Clearly government alone does not have the instruments necessary to control cost inflation so as to maintain an acceptable equilibrium between wages and other incomes, prices and employment. Public policy cannot be exclusively governmental and to be effective must carry the commitment of private organizations, notably unions and managements. The difficulty governments in liberal democratic societies have in regulating the economic behavior of these private organizations—and particularly of the less disciplined elements within them—has led to a new public preoccupation with industrial relations. The concept of participation has been advanced and its implications explored at the level of the work group and the plant as well as at the national level. Western societies have become laboratories in which politicians, industrial and trade union leaders and social scientists are searching for new patterns of social relations appropriate for the present. This is an area in which the Western countries might find a use for the ILO.

III

As the ILO became less relevant to the Western industrialized countries, the organization turned increasingly to providing technical assistance to less developed countries. The steady growth of these activities has been the salient feature of ILO program evolution since the 1950s. They have concerned principally manpower and productivity.

This change in the nature of ILO activities can be seen as one reflection of changes in the international system which gave more prominence to North-South relations and made international action for development a primary consideration in the policies followed by industrialized as well as less developed countries in the United Nations. This trend affected most international agencies, but it had a special meaning for the organizational

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politics of ILO. Manpower and productivity became the basis for program consensus in the ILO. Increased membership extending to the Soviet bloc and Africa brought more conflict of purposes into the organization; but all could agree to support manpower and productivity activities, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Other major programs such as setting labor standards and support for trade union freedom of association were divisive. These disputed areas were continued as subsidiary activities, sustained by the bond of common support for politically neutral development-oriented action.

Recently it has become apparent that there may be serious weaknesses even in this consensual bond. Many representatives from developing countries favor an agency like the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which they feel they are able to control through their voting majority, over ILO which they see as controlled by the rich countries. And this raises the question of whether those development activities which had become the central feature of the ILO's work could not as well be carried out by another agency which was purely intergovernmental in composition.

The tenuous nature of the support for these activities on the part of developing country representatives was matched by lukewarmness on the part of the ILO's traditional clients. The ILO has not been able to involve its tripartite structure in a meaningful way in its technical assistance work. Employers prefer that the ILO should busy itself with aid rather than with the elaboration of more standards. Worker representatives regard aid given charitably as a good thing. But neither have any practical role to play in these activities other than to give them their blessing. They do not even approve the budgets or control the allocations.

The second U.N. development decade has opened in an atmosphere of general concern with the efficiency of international aid programs. The study on the capacity of the U.N. system carried out under the direction of Sir Robert Jackson recommended as a remedy greater centralization in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and a lesser role for the specialized agencies as managers of major field projects. Thus, quite independently of the present crisis, the ILO may be faced with a substantial reduction in those activities which now form the largest part of its program and which have been the sole basis of consensus among its heterogeneous composite elements. Erosion of

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this consensus would tend to make conflict on other issues more prominent and to exacerbate the confrontation of opposing conceptions of the ILO.

Through a World Employment Program, the ILO now seeks to give priority to one aspect of development policy—the employment problem. It is not alone in recognizing the importance of this problem. Robert S. McNamara, President of the World Bank, has also drawn attention to the fact that industrialization, though raising production in developing countries, is not creating jobs fast enough to accommodate the increase in the labor force in these countries. Unemployment is growing with development. Seeing unemployment as one of the foremost causes of political instability in developing countries, David A. Morse, the former ILO Director-General, wanted to make employment the primary goal of ILO programs for the future.

The World Employment Program was intended to be more than a conventional technical assistance activity. It began with some intensive studies of the employment problem in particular countries, carried out by large interdisciplinary field missions. The question remains whether the ILO is the most appropriate agency to conduct such a program. Two aspects of policy-making should be distinguished in trying to answer this question. One is fixing the goals of policy. The other is coördinating instruments to attain these goals. The ILO has a natural concern with the first: with pressing policy-makers, both national and international, to accord employment a high priority among the goals of public policy. This is a matter of great concern to workers and employers and the ILO is the international organization in the best position to articulate the concern of these groups.

Governments should be encouraged to avoid a technocratic approach to planning which might seek to maximize growth in production, irrespective of the consequences for employment of the means used; and some capital-intensive means which are most effective in raising production are least effective for creating jobs. Left to themselves, the United Nations and other international experts might be expected to give the highest priority to production. The ILO does a service in pressing upon the United Nations and upon governments the importance of the employment problem. But it may do a disservice to its own cause if it attempts to become the world employment policy-maker because the tendency to separate employment policy from eco-

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nomic development planning at the national as well as the international level may help to perpetuate the secondary status of the employment goal rather than to see it given priority within a more comprehensive development policy.

IV

Another aspect of development policy which would be very relevant to the ILO's tripartite structure but which has been largely unexploited as yet, is the emerging pattern of industrial relations in developing countries.

Industrial relations is a critical aspect of a broader process often called social mobilization, which means the uprooting of people from old social bonds, old loyalties and old structures and their induction into new ones. The choice between liberal or authoritarian modes of society and thus of polity is probably determined during the crucial stages of social mobilization. Industrial relations, according to the pattern of their growth, may incline either toward a diffusion of initiative or toward disciplined submission to the leadership of a national élite. The ability to influence the pattern of industrial relations during its formative stages is the ability to influence long-range political development.

At the outset of present-day bilateral and multilateral aid programs, during the early 1950s, the politicians and officials concerned tended to accept rather uncritically the assumptions that: aid would promote economic growth; economic growth would reduce poverty; reducing poverty in turn would favor and sustain democracy; and democratic polities would be conducive to the organization of world peace. Every link in this line of reasoning has since been contested. More particularly, the imputed connection between economic growth and inclination to democracy seems to be quite unfounded. This illusion has been challenged by the beginning of a political theory of development.

Political considerations have not been absent from the minds of those in industrialized countries who influence aid programs in industrial relations. The trade unionists among them especially tend to see their role as supporting developing country unions and union leaders who profess anti-communism. In addition, some powerful national unions now seek to create unions in developing countries which can be allies in confronting giant multinational corporations. In both of these cases priority is

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being given to short-range considerations of alliance-building.

A longer range view of the implications of industrial relations for political development would consider the possibilities for organizing the unmobilized sectors of society—the peasantry and the large numbers of people in all developing countries who have left the countryside for the cities but still have only a marginal relationship to the urban economy. The future of industrial relations merges with the question of broader popular participation in the economy and in the making of public policy. Since bringing new social groups into effective participation alters the balance of social power, it is likely to be resisted by established groups holding a monopoly of power.

It would have been a bold choice had the ILO made industrial relations the cutting edge of its development effort. Industrial relations would be seen as an institutional underpinning of a participant polity, in which politics is the process whereby the aims and interests of different social groups are reconciled in an orderly way through public policy. This approach therefore would have involved the organization in some of the most controversial issues within emerging nations. To have adopted such an approach, the ILO would have had to be sure of continuing support from a powerful sector of its constituency, prepared to maintain this support in the face of the kind of political obstacles likely to arise. It could not be the policy of a universal organization in which universality was interpreted as the lowest common denominator of agreement among all sectors of the constituency.

In fact, this was a policy advocated by David A. Morse in the mid-1950s after the Soviet bloc had returned to membership in the ILO. While some employer and trade union representatives at that time took the stand that the Soviet system was incompatible with the ILO's tripartite constitution, Morse suggested that all states be accepted as members while the ILO more actively pursued programs and policies to give expression to the tripartite idea. He proposed a program to promote labor-management relations as the central feature of the ILO's growing concern for development. Once created, however, the new instrument of ILO policy never attained the central place envisaged. In retrospect, the failure can in part be explained by the cooling of relations between the AFL-CIO and the ILO during the late 1950s which deprived Morse of a powerful support for the kind of

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program he had proposed. The ILO subsided into a lowest common denominator form of universality.

V

Finally, transnational issues vitally concerning labor now arise from the development of what can be called the world free market economy, *i.e.* the global area open to private international capital movements. Looking to the future, it is possible to discern a changing international division of economic activities, in which manufacturing is increasingly situated in less developed areas of the world while the more advanced societies concentrate on high productivity activities, research and development, information processing and science-based industries. The trend does not imply any lessening of the relative deprivation of the third world, but it will accelerate its economic growth.

Many less developed countries are offering attractive conditions for foreign investment in what are sometimes referred to as "pioneer industries." Cheap labor is foremost among these advantages. The great expansion of multinational corporations has given impetus to the trend. These corporations are able to manufacture components in one country, assemble in another and sell in a third, their production being planned according to the most advantageous economic conditions.

Export of jobs from the richer countries is seen as a threat by organized labor in those manufacturing sectors affected. Their natural recourse is protectionism. In a few of the richer countries which have state-supported retraining and relocation schemes this protectionist tendency is less evident. The issue of protectionism in the rich countries will be determined to some extent—and perhaps in the main—by the way in which the labor aspect is handled. Less developed countries have, for their part, to face the issue of their dependence upon foreign employers who wish to make use of cheap local labor. As a strategy for development, this method contains the seeds of its own destruction. When carried out by tough local oligarchies, it will almost certainly, as social mobilization proceeds, lead to a nationalistic revolutionary response.

Despite the essentially transnational nature of these issues, the ILO has not yet come to grips with them. The explanation is in large part temerity before issues on which powerful forces are in conflict.

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VI

The conclusions from this review of ILO programs are not encouraging. They may be held to counsel that the ILO has come to the end of its usefulness. The evolution of ILO activities has led to a situation where tripartism—the ILO's characteristic feature—is unnecessary and unrelated to most of what the organization is now doing. A concept of universality based upon consensus has emptied the program of activities which might have given expression to tripartism, in favor of neutral technical services. The contradiction between universality and tripartism, whether or not it is one of principle as was debated within the ILO in the 1950s, has become one of practice.

The purposes of the ILO as expressed in its programs are now in conflict with the political base of the organization, which remains today in the Western countries. Within these countries, it lies with the trade unions. Employers participate because the ILO exists, because they have to defend their interests. Western governments, though they have long since lost interest in ILO work, support the organization because of their trade unions. In Western Europe, union loyalty to the ILO has been steadier, in the United States more volatile. The present crisis arises because the AFL-CIO has questioned its commitment to the ILO. If the AFL-CIO were to conclude that it was no longer interested in participating in the ILO, no other significant force within the American political system could persuade the Administration and Congress to continue in membership. But in general the Western nations agree that if the ILO is to exist, it must be tripartite.

Tripartism is not nearly so important a consideration for many third-world countries. The services their governments expect of the ILO might as well be provided by a purely intergovernmental organization. For a few of these countries such as India, where trade unions had an early growth and remain influential, the appeal of tripartism is nevertheless significant. The Soviet position is a peculiar one. The legitimacy of its régime's participation as a full-fledged member of ILO has been challenged by the adherents of tripartism; but at the same time the opportunities which the ILO's tripartite structure gives the Soviet delegates for contacts with trade union leaders of different ideological persuasions and from different countries (particularly develop-

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ing countries) is probably what makes membership interesting to the Soviet Union.

If the present crisis is to be used creatively to redefine the purposes and thus the programs of the ILO, this can only come about through a Western initiative to make a more active use of tripartism. No other political basis for a reconstruction of the ILO makes sense. But serious questions first have to be answered as to the feasibility of such an initiative and its desirability from the standpoint of Western governments.

The first and most basic question is whether Western governments want to take this initiative. At present, they still control the ILO, but have left the initiative to the Director-General and the Office; and the pressures these feel come mainly from the Soviet bloc and less developed countries. This situation is not unique to ILO. There has been a general withdrawal of Western initiative in the worldwide international organizations during the past decade. The West has come to accept the view that the main function of these organizations is to give expression to the demands of the third world or to take the temperature of East-West relations. Western countries have created their own parallel organizations such as OECD to deal with their own problems, showing no particular desire that these problems be discussed in a global forum. The very idea of Western initiative in a universal organization may thus conflict with an acquired habit which may almost have the status of a policy. Nevertheless, recently there have been some signs of irritation among Western delegates at the way this abdication of initiative has weakened their position. It has taken the form of resistance to rising budgets, a rather negative exercise of influence. But would Western countries be ready to attempt to exert a positive influence? There are risks as well as benefits. As a first step, the United States could take the lead in exploring the readiness of other Western countries to join with it.

The elements of a program which would respond to real issues have been sketched above. Within the sphere of industrial relations the ILO would deal with problems of advanced countries concerning the role of trade unions and management in regard to public policy, notably in the control of cost inflation and in managing technological change. Related issues concern the reform of structures, from the enterprise to the national level, so as to increase participation in decision-making. Developing

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country problems would include the promotion of participation by as yet unorganized social groups in the life of the nation and of patterns of industrial relations which in the long run would support democratic polities. Finally, there are the labor problems inherent in the growth of the world market economy, particularly those associated with the expansion of multinational corporations.

The ILO is at present doing virtually nothing about any of these problems because they are controversial. An organization open to universal membership could deal with them only if it were assured of consistent Western support. It is questionable whether Western governments really want a tripartite international organization to become active with respect to these issues, or whether they would prefer that tripartism remain merely formal.

To pursue its programs, the ILO would have to use methods appropriate to assisting the process of national policy-making. It should be able to mobilize the best talent and experience to help national policy-makers. Whereas now, the dominant pressures within the staff are toward avoiding controversial thoughts and producing anodyne publications, the ILO's staff ought to be of the highest competency and enjoy freedom for inquiry and independence in the expression of its ideas. Setting new labor standards might continue to have some place but probably a minor one; the administration of large field projects of technical assistance would no longer be such an important feature of the organization's programs, since they may be managed more effectively through a centralized U.N. aid program in which the ILO would have an advisory role.

Would a reinvigorated tripartism be compatible with universality? Non-Western countries would have to answer this question. Some less developed countries may not welcome international programs dealing with delicate internal issues, such as promoting peasant organization. ILO action would be regarded as subversive. Soviet delegates have already expressed disapproval of ILO action in the industrial relations field. Would the Soviet Union quit an ILO which had made industrial relations its central theme?

Finally, what kind of an international organization would the ILO become, were the Western countries to take this initiative? Two distinct patterns of international organization can be dis-

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tinguished for comparison. In one, the initiative lies with a permanent international staff, national delegates acting as a control over its work. In the other, the initiative lies with national representatives, who define the work of the organization in relation to their current policy preoccupations. This work is shared among independent specialists, government experts and an international staff of rotating composition. The advantage of this pattern is involvement of policy-makers in activities that matter to them and fuller interpenetration of national and international staff work. The historical growth of the ILO has followed the first pattern, stressing organizational autonomy. It has paid the price in that the makers of social policy now find little of interest in the ILO. Representation has become formal, often the concern of a handful of ILO professionals, some of them having little or no connection with labor affairs at home. The organization is highly institutionalized, with rich tradition; but participation in it lacks depth. To redirect the organization on the lines sketched above implies a change in the character of the organization, in the direction of the second pattern. In short, the ILO needs less autonomy and more involvement.

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LAOS: ANATOMY OF AN AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

By Roland A. Paul

WHEN President Kennedy came to office in 1961, he was startled to learn that almost 700 American soldiers, more than half of whom were members of the Special Forces, were in Laos, while about 500 Soviet troops were there providing logistics support to the local communist forces, the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies.

Fearing the possible consequences of such a confrontation and considering American interests in Laos to be small, President Kennedy sought to disengage. Negotiations ensued at Vienna, at Geneva, in Laos and elsewhere. The result was the ambiguous compromise set forth in rather unambiguous language in the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and the Protocol to that Declaration, signed by 13 communist and non-communist countries in July 1962, commonly known as the Geneva Accords of 1962.

Under the mantle of this agreement, the Laotians themselves established a tripartite government composed of right-wing royalist elements under General Phoumi Nosavan, neutralist elements under Prince Souvanna Phouma and communist elements whose nominal leader was Prince Souphanouvong (Souvanna Phouma's half brother). The balance of power in the government was given to the neutralists, and their leader Souvanna Phouma became Prime Minister, a post he holds today.

The Geneva Accords themselves required Laos to disassociate herself from all military alliances, including SEATO, prohibited the introduction of foreign military personnel and civilians performing quasi-military functions (except for a small French training mission), precluded the establishment of any foreign military installations in Laos and forbade the use of Laotian territory to interfere with the internal affairs of another country. Pursuant to this agreement the Americans and Soviets withdrew their military personnel. The North Vietnamese, however, failed to withdraw most of their 6,000-man force that was then in Laos.

Nevertheless, a relative peace settled over this somnolent "Land of the Million Elephants" for about one year, to be shattered in 1963 by an exchange of assassinations. The non-communist officer Colonel Ketsana was murdered and shortly thereafter the pro-Chinese Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsema was killed. These sparked a renewal of the fighting in Laos, which has raged ever since.

To understand the nature of the hostilities in Laos, one must bear three points in mind. First is the fact that the Laotians are a very peaceful, in some cases indolent, people. Accordingly, they generally make poor soldiers. This is true whether they march, or walk, under the red flag of communism or the white elephant and parasol emblem of the neutralist government. They are no match for the well-trained soldiers of North Vietnam. Until recently, this was evidenced all too frequently by the flight of government forces upon rumor that they were facing an opposing force composed of North Vietnamese.

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There is one exception to this behavior, however. The 250–300,000 Meo tribesmen (no one knows precisely how many there are) and the other smaller Montagnard tribes come from different stock and have been hardened



by centuries of nomadic life, slash-and-burn farming, principally opium poppies, and oppression at the hands of their neighbors, historically the Chinese. Sustained and supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,

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these warriors, under the leadership of Meo General Vang Pao, constitute the bulk of the central government's paramilitary forces and by far its most effective fighters. Thus, one of the countless ironies of the war in Laos, at least in contrast to the conflict in Vietnam, is that the main force of guerrillas in Laos is on the non-communist side. In passing, it may be interesting to note that because of their long association with the American agency, the hill tribes have shifted their agricultural emphasis from opium to rice.

The second major point for one who would hope to understand the bizarre war going on in the jungles and grasslands of Laos is the seasonal pattern of the conflict. During the dry season that lasts from October to early June, the communists invariably make their greatest advances. In the ensuing rainy season each year, with the communist supply lines clogged, the forces of the central government have been able to recoup most of their losses of the preceding dry season, often with very little opposition. This pattern has been so regular that in most years Souvanna Phouma has been able to count on taking his annual vacation in France in the month of June.

Third, and perhaps most important in any analysis of American policy toward Laos, is the fact that it is not a single war, but two distinct conflicts being fought there for quite different purposes and to some extent by different forces. The contest being waged by the government forces of Laos supported by their American and Thai allies against the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies for political control of the kingdom is carried on in northern and central Laos and, to some extent, in the Mekong River Valley in the western half of the Laotian panhandle.

The other war involves the efforts of the North Vietnamese to use the network of roads, waterways and trails in the eastern part of the Laotian panhandle as a corridor for the transportation and provisioning of their forces fighting in South Vietnam, and more recently in Cambodia, and the efforts by the Americans and South Vietnamese to interdict such traffic. Regular Laotian forces hardly participate here. This is the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the northern entrance of which is generally considered to be the Mu Gia Pass less than 100 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam. The contest on and over the Ho Chi Minh Trail is actually only an adjunct of the struggle for power in South Vietnam. Until the recent invasion by South Vietnamese troops, supported by U.S. air power, the American involvement was mainly in northern and central Laos.

While Laotians, Vietnamese, Americans and Thais contest for power in Laos, there are more than 10,000 Chinese soldiers in the northernmost provinces of Laos who serve as construction crews and security troops in connection with the extension of one of several roads originally laid out by the Chinese in years past. Another one of the ironies in Laos is that the Chinese were first invited to do road construction there in 1962 by Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister and the right-wing leader Phoumi Nosavan as his Defense Minister.

The road now being worked on somewhat intermittently extends into Laos 80 miles south, with a branch 40 miles in a northeasterly direction toward Dien Bien Phu. American policy-makers view this roadbuilding effort with obvious concern, particularly to the extent it indicates Chinese movement

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toward the Thai border in the bulge west of Luang Prabang. The non-communists avoid this Chinese presence as if it were a jungle ogre that must not be disturbed. Even the Aeroflot flights from Moscow to Hanoi detour to avoid overflying the region.

II

Let us now turn back to the autumn of 1962, three months after the signing of the Geneva Accords. The United States by this time had come to realize that the North Vietnamese were not going to withdraw their forces from Laos. It therefore agreed to provide Souvanna Phouma with certain limited amounts of military equipment. This was permitted by the Geneva Accords. In order to administer the program we set up a small office in our AID mission at Vientiane under the nondescript title of the "Requirements Office" and staffed it with retired American military officers, though this was of dubious legality under the Geneva Accords. This was the beginning of the American military assistance program to the present régime in Laos.

Still another one of the ironies of the war in Laos is that the government of Laos under Souvanna Phouma which we now support was the faction in 1961 which we were actively opposing and which the communists were supporting. Our champion in those days was General Phoumi Nosavan.

With the outbreak of serious hostilities in 1963, the United States began to train Laotian pilots and ground crews in Thailand. By the spring of 1964 the war was going badly for the government forces. The communists were able to overrun the remaining government positions on the Plaine des Jarres, the famous and picturesque plateau situated in the center of Laos. In the face of this threat American tactical fighter-bombers began striking targets in northern Laos under what was publicly described as "armed reconnaissance." This was not a large American effort. There were only 20 such sorties in the whole year of 1964, a sortie being a single mission by a single aircraft.

We also began to provide greater amounts of war matériel and other assistance. To transport Laotian supplies and military personnel, the services of the semi-commercial American companies Air America and Continental Air Services were made available, both their airplanes and their helicopters.

The communist drive in 1964 was stopped on the western reaches of the Plaine des Jarres at the town of Muong Soui. Invariably journalistic references to the Plaine des Jarres describe it in terms such as "strategic" or "key." Inasmuch as this plain has remained in communist hands from 1964 to the time of this writing, except for a few months in 1969, and as the Souvanna Phouma government has continued to survive and control about 80 percent of the population, the implications of such terms do not seem apt.

The government forces launched an offensive in another part of Laos in the summer of 1964, the rainy season. No American air strikes were provided, but a few American airmen went along with the Laotian forces on the ground to guide Laotian planes to their targets, and eight American soldiers accompanied the Laotian regiments as military advisers.

In the autumn of the same year, at American request, Laotian fighter-bombers began to hit North Vietnamese supply routes along the panhandle of Laos. In 1965, as the war in South Vietnam intensified, American aircraft took over this mission.

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The war in Laos has seesawed back and forth ever since. The government forces made impressive gains in 1967, advancing to within 20 miles of the North Vietnamese border and reaching the outskirts of Sam Neua, the principal town in the communist-held portion of Laos. With substantially increased Soviet assistance in matériel, the communists launched offensives in 1968 and 1969 (the planning for the first of which coincided with the planning for the Tet offensive in South Vietnam). These communist drives in Laos wiped out the gains made by the government forces in the previous year and brought the communists beyond their previously held positions. In June 1969 Muong Soui fell to them and they encircled the royal capital of Luang Prabang from three sides.[1] That they did not push on and seize this city is one of the curiosities of the war that may be of more than passing significance.

As the war intensified in these years, so did American involvement. In 1966 about 50 U.S. Air Force officers and enlisted men, technically assigned to the Air Attaché's office, were stationed at the Laotian Air Force bases as advisers. In 1967 about the same number of U.S. Army personnel were deployed to the regional headquarters of the Laotian Army for similar duty. The Americans who had briefly served with the Laotian forces to guide tactical aircraft to their targets were replaced by Laotians, who by now had been trained to do such work. And about 20 U.S. Air Force pilots stationed in Laos and others stationed in Thailand began to serve as airborne forward air controllers in single-engine slow-moving airplanes for the same purpose.

As the American air war over North Vietnam intensified, several navigational aid facilities were installed in Laos to guide American F-4s, F-105s and other aircraft to their targets. Some of them were manned by U.S. Air Force personnel; others were unmanned. One of the manned facilities was set up at Muong Phalane in the panhandle. It was overrun by communist forces on Christmas Day 1967 with the loss of two American lives. In October 1967 another such facility was placed on a 5,000-foot cliff in northern Laos just 13 miles from the North Vietnamese border at a place called Phou Pha Thi, then in the hands of friendly Meo tribesmen. This facility functioned for five months and then was overrun by communist forces on March 11, 1968, with the loss of all but a few of the Americans who were there.

By far the largest American contribution to the war in northern Laos has been the air strikes by American Air Force planes against communist interdiction and close-in targets. By 1969 the level of such strikes had reached more than 100 sorties a day—not including any near the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos. The increased American involvement in the war in northern Laos can be shown graphically by the ever-increasing sortie rate over that area, ranging from 20 per year in 1964 to 52 per day in December 1968 and more than 100 per day in 1969.

The large increase in 1969 was a result of the increased intensity of enemy action in northern Laos well into the rainy season, the availability of American aircraft following the cessation of bombing over North Vietnam, and the reduced number of targets on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the rainy season.

[1] The king of Laos resides at Luang Prabang. The administrative offices of Souvanna Phouma's government are at Vientiane.

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There is a significant distinction between American air operations over northern Laos and those formerly over North Vietnam that may explain the greater success our air power has achieved in Laos. In North Vietnam our air strikes were exclusively against interdiction targets. The enemy controlled all of the ground there. By contrast, our operations in northern Laos involve close air support for friendly forces in addition to strikes at interdiction targets. Furthermore, the friendly forces are indigenous guerrillas and the enemy is composed of roadbound conventional forces. Thus, we have advantages in terms of target acquisition, as well as fairly minimal anti-aircraft opposition.

The next most important assistance which we have provided to the Laotians has been the aid we have been giving to General Vang Pao's Montagnard forces. With CIA and U.S. Army advisers and substantial American logistics support, these forces have borne the brunt of the battle for the Vientiane government. According to Henry Kamm in the October 26, 1969 *New York Times*, Vang Pao's troops are "armed, equipped, fed, paid, guided strategically and tactically, and often transported into and out of action by the United States."

The U.S. Air Force advisers with the Laotian Air Force exercise great influence over their protégés; but the American Army advisers, except those with General Vang Pao's forces, have much less influence with the Laotian Army. The air force advisers in effect, if not in name, run the air force of Laos. That force is small, composed of relatively intelligent officers and men motivated by an esprit and sense of professionalism lacking in most of the other Royal Laotian units. Working with men of this caliber, the American airmen have little difficulty in guiding operations along the lines of their own experience and training. Not so with many of the Laotian Army units. The lot of the American Army majors and captains assigned to them as advisers is often a frustrating one. Besides the natural Laotian disinclination toward fighting, the Royal Laotian Army and its adjunct, the Neutral Laotian Army, known respectively by their French names *force armée royale* and *force armée neutrale,* are plagued by extreme class distinctions between officers and enlisted men, widespread corruption, an absence of political or ideological motivation, and an awareness from long experience that a live-and-let-live policy is often the wisest. Under these circumstances, an American adviser's ability to influence events is often measured more by his personality and his control over American logistics support than by his military knowledge.

The cumulative cost of U.S. military support for Laos since 1962 runs into the billions of dollars, but the exact amount remains secret. Our support for the regular Laotian forces has grown to more than $90 million annually, as compared with the Laotians' own contribution of only $17 million a year. Our contribution does not include the amount we provide to the paramilitary forces nor does it include the cost for the American air operations in the war.

To maintain a color of compliance with the Geneva Accords, the large American logistics support for the Laotian forces is not administered by a typical military assistance group as in most other countries. Instead, such a group of Americans was assembled in neighboring Thailand under the

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command of a colonel carrying the deceptive title of "Deputy Chief of the Joint Military Advisory Group for Thailand." This group of supply and training experts do their work for Laos through the small Requirements Office in the AID mission in Laos referred to earlier and through frequent visits of their own to Laos. Thus there are no more than several hundred Americans in Laos who are directly involved in the war. The main American support is furnished by Americans who are stationed elsewhere, mainly Thailand.

American casualties in the Laotian war have not been high. Among Americans stationed in Laos, as the President has announced, there have been only about 50 men lost to hostile action. The number of American pilots stationed in Thailand or on the carriers, who have been lost over northern Laos, has never been publicly released. We know, however, that American aircraft lost over northern Laos up to January 1971 numbered less than 90.

The Laotians themselves, on the other hand, have suffered enormously from this war. They have had more than 600,000 refugees since 1962. They have lost, by official reports, from 15,000 to 35,000 killed, and continue to lose men at the rate of 120–140 a month. According to former American Ambassador William Sullivan:

> It is pertinent to point out that the Lao themselves, a nation of less than 3 million, have suffered enormous casualties by their standards, . . . a loss that, proportional to the population of Laos, would be considered, I think, larger than the losses sustained by any other country on the face of this earth in that same period.

Perhaps even more vivid was the account of Edgar "Pop" Buell, the AID Director for the northeastern region of Laos in the May 1968 issue of *The New Yorker* Magazine:

> A few days ago, I was with V.P.'s [Vang Pao's] officers when they rounded up three hundred fresh Meo recruits. Thirty per cent of the kids were fourteen years old or less, and about a dozen were only ten years old. Another thirty per cent were fifteen or sixteen. The rest were thirty-five or over. Where were the ones in between? I'll tell you—they're all dead.

In the winter of 1970, the North Vietnamese poured considerably more men into northern Laos, reaching a reported strength of 33,000 men, and seemed on the verge of new and ominous gains. They retook the Plaine des Jarres, seized Vang Pao's base at Sam Thong and threatened his headquarters at Long Chien. To stop them the Laotian government forces and their American allies redoubled their efforts, including a single raid by B-52 bombers over the Plaine des Jarres. Thereupon the American press raised what seemed at the time to be a great hue and cry for fear such steps would lead to the introduction of American ground troops into Laos, claiming to perceive a parallel with our earlier involvement in Vietnam. In comparison to the later outcry at the use of American forces to raid the communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, these assertions in the press over Laos now seem little more than polite admonitions.

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III

Regardless of the purported parallels with Vietnam, it seems very unlikely that the United States will send ground combat troops to defend the Vientiane government. To do so would be contrary to the Nixon doctrine announced on Guam. More important, perhaps, it would definitely go against the prevailing mood of the American people growing out of the frustrations of Vietnam, heightened by the dissension over the incursion into Cambodia. It would also be in violation of present legislation, Section 843 of the 1971 Defense Appropriations Act, which precludes the use of any funds so appropriated "to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into either Laos or Thailand"—legislation which was publicly endorsed by the White House. (The legal effect of this legislation, however, will expire at the end of the period for which the appropriations in the act are provided.)

Further, our direct interests in Laos are small, and we are no longer using American ground troops in outright support of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia, which bears a rather similar relationship to the United States.

The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, of which Senator Stuart Symington is the chairman, explored at length the possibility of the United States becoming so involved in the fighting in Laos that we would be compelled to send ground troops if our other efforts should fail. The events in Laos are well worth studying in order to distinguish between the sorts of involvement, or "commitment," which lead on to more costly operations and those that do not.

For the sake of analysis, the pertinent relationships with another country may be categorized as follows: (1) a mutual defense treaty or other form of defense agreement, (2) unilateral declarations of support for the other country's security, (3) a significant presence of American troops there, (4) a moral obligation to defend it, and (5) some more general identification with its governing system, institutions or society.

The United States has no defense treaty or other written defense commitment with Laos. Until 1962 Laos was a protocol country coming under the protection of the SEATO Treaty, but in accordance with the Geneva Accords of that year she disassociated herself from that treaty.

Under the Geneva Accords we are legally obligated to respect the neutrality of Laos, but we are under no legal responsibility to come to the defense of Laos in the event that her neutrality is violated by another. However, just to consider the legal rights and obligations of the parties does not answer the real question as to the significance of the agreement for determining the course of future American action. A lawyer's analysis of the clauses and provisos of the Geneva Accords serves little to reveal the true dynamics embodied in the document. Important international agreements such as mutual defense treaties and multilateral neutrality guarantees do not exist within self-contained legal systems, as do ordinary commercial contracts. In the international field there is no disinterested judge to decide the various rights and obligations of the parties, and there is no effective law-enforcement agency standing behind him to see that all concerned comply with his decision.

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Instead, the only means for "enforcing" international agreements are the sense of comity and fair play that exists, to some extent, among nations and the concern each country has for the interpretation placed upon its words and actions by other powerful countries. This means that the overtones of an international agreement are often more important than the actual words in determining the conduct of nations. It also means that sometimes the opinion of a country not a party to the agreement is by far more significant in determining what one party may consider to be its responsibility than is the judgment of the other party. It means further that when the language of the accord is ambiguous, and it very often is, each party will act under that interpretation of the language which is most consistent with its own interests.

To illustrate, the language of the SEATO Treaty probably did not require American intervention in South Vietnam in 1965, the communist forces at that time being mainly indigenous South Vietnamese. Nevertheless, the treaty was one expression of the importance which the United States attached to South Vietnam in the eyes of the world. So among the variety of reasons that led the United States to take the fateful step it did in 1965 was a belief that failure to aid this treaty ally in its hour of desperation could well be interpreted to America's serious disadvantage by several more powerful nations, particularly communist China and Japan.

Coming back to the 1962 Geneva Accords, however, we see that they have never taken on a similar sanctity and meaning. They have always been considered an unhappy compromise. They were the best bargain that could be struck in a very awkward situation. Furthermore, their multilateral nature has tended to diffuse responsibility. No American leader would sound a call to the barricades to preserve the Geneva Accords.

Another aspect of our relationship with Laos which might have led to very unfortunate consequences was embraced in the high-sounding declarations on Laotian security by several American officials. One of the most egregious was that made in a news conference on March 15, 1961, by President Kennedy: "The security of all Southeast Asia would be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence. Its own safety runs with the safety of us all. . . ."

In June 1964, President Johnson, in a speech in Minneapolis, warned that the United States was prepared "to risk war" to preserve the peace in Southeast Asia. And on October 13, 1966, President Johnson informed the press that he had told Souvanna Phouma that "the world must know that aggression will not succeed in Indochina." The obvious mistake in all of these well-intended statements is that they commit American prestige to the fulfillment of the spokesman's word. When the President speaks, he inevitably speaks for the entire country to the ears of the world.

Fortunately in the case of Laos an occasion never arose during the vitality of these declarations that would have required the United States to fulfill the noble sentiments expressed. Unlike radioactivity, the dangerous effects of such emissions are measured in fairly short half-lives. That is why foreign statesmen frequently insist upon a repetition of such expressions. For these declarations on Laos, the change in Administrations and the widespread discontent over events in Vietnam, as well as the simple passage of

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time, have tended to dissipate their meaning and implication. The present Administration has wisely refrained from overstating the importance we attach to Laos.

Another familiar commitment-making step is the stationing of U.S. forces, especially combat units, at various points around the globe. There are, however, very few truly American installations in the embattled areas of Laos, the loss of which is likely to generate an attitude in this country like the reaction over the loss of Americans at Pleiku or aboard the *Pueblo*. There are some facilities in the Vientiane area that could conceivably belong in this category, but, given the present attitude of Americans toward Southeast Asia, it is even unlikely that an attack on one of them would lead this country to plunge in with ground troops.

There is a fundamental distinction between assaults upon Americans qua Americans and those who happen to be present when others are being attacked. It is a matter of placement, proportion and purpose. As regrettable as would be the loss of any Americans in ancillary roles, that would not be likely to lead on to greater American involvement. The loss of the navigational aid facilities at Muong Phalane and Phou Pha Tri should be mentioned in this regard. These were small, but essentially American, facilities overrun by the communists at the cost of some American lives. They were instances, however, where all concerned realized risks were being assumed, and their loss, though regrettable, was not entirely unexpected or unprovoked.

An instance of a potential moral commitment is the very close relationship we have with General Vang Pao and his Montagnard forces. We have sustained him, and he has fought on with our urging. Perhaps one event can best portray this basis of an American obligation toward him and his people. In the summer of 1969, after Vang Pao had lost the battle for Muong Soui, he was very depressed. He informed his American advisers that he was seriously thinking of moving his people from their forward positions in the hills around the Plaine des Jarres to a more remote and peaceful area in the northwestern region of the country. We would have none of that. We urged, we cajoled, we persuaded and we advised against it. Vang Pao's spirit was revived. He rejoined the fight and went on in September of that year to sweep the communists from the Plaine des Jarres and capture large stores of their supplies and equipment.

If the communists were about to overrun Laos, the Americans might feel some responsibility to assist Vang Pao in evacuating his people to Thailand. It is reported that a few years ago he held secret discussions with Thai officials on resettling Meos in the region near the Thai-Laotian border. The American sense of obligation toward Vang Pao, however, is not so great as to lead to an American invasion of Laos. Already the Meos have suffered grievously by this war, and it has not led to direct American participation in the fighting on the ground. Their traditional nomadic experience is further reason why we would feel no obligation to save Laos for them.

There is still another instance of possible moral commitment. From time to time the communists have made proposals for settling the war in Laos. They apparently did so in 1967 and 1969, and they publicly made such

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a proposal in 1970. So far none of these efforts at peace has come to fruition. To some extent it has been Souvanna Phouma that has been uncompromising. In rejecting the earlier communist overtures, he must have been assuming the continuation of American support for his position. This assumes some element of American commitment; but, again, it is not so strong as for us to believe we owe him an American sacrifice as costly as that in Vietnam. Ambassador Sullivan confirmed this point before the Symington Subcommittee in response to a question from Senator Fulbright.

The Senator asked: "Do you think . . . Souvanna Phouma believes he has a commitment from our Government to support him?"

The Ambassador responded: "No, sir; I do not think so . . . because Souvanna Phouma . . . has had a series of associations with the United States, and I think he is a man without any illusions. . . . Without any illusions in terms of what these arrangements would signify."

Perhaps the best description of the American position in Laos was contained in the following words of Ambassador Sullivan before the Symington Subcommittee: "We used to use as a rule of thumb our ability to make it [our presence in Laos] reversible and terminate it within eight hours. It would probably take twenty-four hours now, but it still could be done."

Finally, on this subject of moral commitment one should mention the possibility of such an obligation toward the Thais for what they have contributed toward the defense of Laos. It would be the height of naïveté, however, for the United States to accept such a proposition, inasmuch as the Thais are doing what they are for Laos strictly in their own self-interest. It is reasonable to assume that both Thai and American officials realize this.

As far as a commitment through a general American identification with the Laotian cause, by contrast with Vietnam, the way we have "packaged" our position in Laos has been a classic case of low profile. Until recently the operation was an official secret. This secrecy was regrettable from an American constitutional point of view, and after a time should have ceased, but from the point of view of commitments it avoided the Vietnam type of entanglement. If we had ever been faced with the unfortunate choice between a Laotian capitulation and the dispatch of large numbers of American combat troops, we could have chosen the former and walked away from the situation. Even when the U.S. government decided on March 6 of last year to make a public acknowledgment of its activities in Laos, it did so in order to portray how little, not how much, we were doing there.

The Subcommittee on Commitments found no secret agreement committing this country to sending combat forces to Laos. The public's fascination with the possibility of such secret accords is understandable but greatly exaggerated. It would be a rare step indeed for any American administration to agree privately with another country in unambiguous language to send American troops into combat at some future date. What this country does do, like other countries, is to enter into secret arrangements of a military nature that spell out some of the collateral implications of basic, publicly announced policy. The private nature of these subordinate arrangements in itself decreases their force commitments, there being no world audience to have to convince with respect to their fulfillment. That is

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not to say that private accords can never have significance as commitments. They still carry moral implications and some bureaucratic entanglement, and are always subject to being revealed by a disgruntled party. And it is true that government programs, developed publicly or privately, have self-generating dynamics that can lead to consequences never contemplated by their creators.

The American attempt to provide Laos with substantial assistance without overcommitment will not face the ultimate test, of course, unless the communists press on in an attempt to take over the entire country. Only then can we know for certain whether the United States has ordered its affairs so that even a collapse of the non-communist forces would not compel us to send American combat troops into Laos. There are precedents in which this country has resisted the pressure to become so involved, even after large amounts of American assistance have been provided; namely, at the time of the collapse of the Nationalist Chinese in 1949 and the defeat of the French in Indochina in 1954.

This raises the highly puzzling question why the communists have apparently not attempted to take over the entire country. Recall, for instance, their surrounding the royal capital of Luang Prabang in 1969 without seizing it. There are a number of possible answers, all involving a good deal of speculation. Several rest upon the premise that to the North Vietnamese, just as to us, the war in South Vietnam is by far more important than the war in Laos.

First, it may be that the communists have no specific policy as to a political settlement for Laos pending the outcome of the war in South Vietnam. Since they cannot now see the outline of the settlement for Vietnam, they cannot answer what they consider acceptable for Laos.

Second, they may have feared that if they pressed on to the banks of the Mekong and seized Vientiane, this might have removed a significant inhibiting factor which until recently had dissuaded the Americans and South Vietnamese from invading the southern end of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Laotian panhandle. With the South Vietnamese invasion of the panhandle in February, the relevance of this factor seems at an end. If it were the chief reason for the North Vietnamese to be comparatively inactive in northern Laos, we can now expect to see them become much more active there.

A third reason may be their uncertainty as to what the Americans and the Thais might do in that particular theater of the war. The communists may fear that such a marked shift in the military balance would lead to unforeseeable reprisals by Thai forces, supported by American air power, including the possibility of a broad-scale invasion from Thailand into the Mekong Valley of Laos. Such a prospect would certainly concern North Vietnam's Soviet and Chinese mentors.

A fourth possibility is simply that the North Vietnamese in Laos lack the wherewithal to achieve a complete military victory there without overburdening their limited resources needed elsewhere. Vang Pao's swift seizure of the Plaine des Jarres in September 1969 revealed surprising weakness on the part of the communists at that time. When their 1970 offensive failed to seize Vang Pao's headquarters at Long Chien they even had to relinquish his

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lesser base at Sam Thong, which they had captured and then held briefly.

Finally, it should be added that under the tripartite formula for governing Laos under the Geneva Accords, by which seats in the Laotian cabinet were distributed among the neutralists, the right-wing royalists and the communists, the Pathet Lao could obtain effective control of the government without seizing Vientiane. This could be done by the Pathet Lao's obtaining through negotiation a greater share of those seats for themselves and for neutralist factions sympathetic to them than were accorded in 1962. There is some indication from the communists' peace proposals and military operations that this may be the course they will choose.

IV

For a brief period in the spring of 1970 public attention focused once again on northern Laos because of the conflux of several events. Under President Nixon's Vietnamization program at that time the war in Vietnam seemed to be phasing down, dull news. In contrast, the war in Laos was intensifying—more communist troops, 33,000 by March; large-scale fighting on the Plaine des Jarres and around Vang Pao's headquarters at Long Chien; the fall of his other base at Sam Thong; and most symbolic, a B-52 bombing raid in northern Laos for the first time. Moreover, based upon hearings held by Senator Symington's Foreign Relations Subcommittee the previous October, the Senate was becoming increasingly restive over the situation in Laos and more insistent upon public disclosure as to American participation and intention. Under these mounting pressures, President Nixon issued a public statement on March 6 explaining the American presence in Laos; and in April 1970 the Symington Subcommittee, with Administration acquiescence, was able to release a declassified version of its hearings, which provided more detail as to the American role. Laos was again page one copy.

Although the Symington Subcommittee held its hearings on Laos in October 1969, the State Department was reluctant to approve the release of a reasonably complete transcript of those hearings until public pressure became so great five months later as to make an official declaration on Laos unavoidable. The reasons given by the State Department for refusing for so long to draw public attention to American activities in Laos provide a revealing insight into the processes of foreign policy.

First, the State Department said the American government had agreed with Souvanna Phouma to keep such activities secret.

Second, they claimed that disclosure of a large American program in support of Souvanna Phouma would jeopardize his image as a neutral and thus hamper our efforts to reëstablish the Geneva Accords under which his neutrality was guaranteed.

Third, they contended that if this country were to admit its violations of the Geneva Accords, the other side, never having admitted its violations, would have a field day of propaganda.

Fourth, an official acknowledgment on our part, they said, might require the Soviet Union to take more positive action in support of our adversaries in Laos than it had theretofore done. This concern was based upon the proposition that the Soviet Union could ignore, and generally had ignored, unoffi-

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cial press reports of American violations of the Geneva Accords, but could not do so when the admission was made by American officials. Indeed, a high Soviet official had suggested as much to one of our diplomats.

The fifth reason was the belief that so long as the operation remained clandestine, it would be relatively easy for the United States to wash its hands of the situation should our position in Laos ever become untenable.

There was a sixth reason present, although unexpressed, which stemmed from the inherent nature of operations conducted in the absence of outside review. This was a tendency, neither malicious nor particularly conscious but nevertheless real, to facilitate one's own mode of operation. Thus it was tempting and convenient to agree with Souvanna Phouma when he asked that the operation be kept secret.

One of the reasons given by the State Department for continued secrecy deserves more extended comment; namely, the contention that public acknowledgment could make subsequent disengagement more difficult. It is true that public attention can commit political leaders to courses of action which they would not take privately. Disclosure sometimes compels government officials to inflate the importance of their programs in order to justify them.

However, this did not occur in the case of the public acknowledgment of our operations in Laos. Such acknowledgment was offered in a manner calculated to deëmphasize rather than overemphasize what we were doing. Thus, the basic principle of maintaining a well-informed public with respect to major issues of foreign policy was achieved without dressing up those policies to appear more vital, and hence more binding, than they really were.

Indeed, following such publicity none of the parade of horribles which the State Department had imagined did in fact occur. To the contrary, a step toward peace followed this disclosure, for which it might have, in part, been responsible. By coincidence, on the same day that the President disclosed the American role in Laos, the Pathet Lao announced a five-point peace proposal. In contrast to his replies to earlier communist peace proposals, Souvanna Phouma responded more favorably to this one. It is not unreasonable to assume that, as a result of the President's announcement, including his reference to sending no American combat troops to Laos, the Laotian Prime Minister was now less certain of full American support and therefore more receptive to a negotiated settlement.

V

The United States' avowed goal in Laos is the reëstablishment of the Geneva Accords of 1962, which means withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from that country and continuation of the tripartite formula for governing Laos that gives the balance of political power to Souvanna Phouma's neutralists. Since the other side does not seem disposed to accept such a settlement voluntarily, the American policy has mainly been to continue our military support for Souvanna Phouma.

Our interests there are basically twofold. First, we wish to keep the communists away from the Thai border. Thailand, our SEATO ally, is consider-

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ably more important to us than is Laos. The Thais are already experiencing a communist insurgency in their northern and northeastern provinces. If communist forces were present in Laos all along the Thai border, the North Vietnamese and Chinese could greatly increase their aid to this insurgency, and even an invasion by infiltration or otherwise would not be out of the question.

As one American policy-maker has put it, if through "the nickels and dimes" effort we are making in Laos, we can put off the hard questions we would have to face in Thailand, the effort is well worth making. The only problem is that this effort is about at the level where it can no longer be counted in nickels and dimes, although perhaps it still may be worthwhile.

The second American interest in the war in northern Laos rests in the fact that the continuation of a government in Vientiane that acquiesces in what we are doing against the communist traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail makes our operations there a bit easier. But this second interest must be kept in perspective. There is really very little Souvanna can do about events in that part of his country. One would doubt seriously that the United States and its allies would stop their efforts to block the Trail merely because a government opposed to such operations had come to power in Vientiane.

In deciding upon American policy toward Laos, one should consider the plight of the Laotian people and the relatively static nature of the battle line over the years. The Laotians have suffered greatly from this war, and most of them have very little to gain whichever side may prevail. Furthermore, there is very little sense of national identity among them. They are much more oriented to their village and region. It is only slightly overstated to say that in political development they stand today where the European states stood hundreds of years ago.

In view of American interests, particularly our desire to keep the communists off the Mekong, we should welcome and encourage any settlement, de facto or otherwise, that recognizes the existing battle line as the peacetime demarcation line between communist and non-communist forces in Laos. The front is a more definite concept in the Laotian war than in the rest of Indochina. Almost any peace is better for the Laotians than the existing conflict. Furthermore, the steadfastness of the present government in Vientiane, in the byzantine circumstances of today, can never be assured. The ominous presence of thousands of Chinese troops in Laos is another important impetus for peace on any reasonable terms. A ceasefire along the present, or any recent, battle line will, therefore, probably maximize the chances that a non-communist government will continue to function in the Mekong Valley. Such a settlement can be made (if the other side is willing) without regard to the fighting along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. That conflict must await the resolution of the greater war of which it is a part.

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POLLS AND PROTESTS

By Seymour M. Lipset

THE wave of student protest which emerged in the late 1960s has often been called a "youth revolt." Actually, however, the increasing opposition of American college students to the Vietnam war and the concomitant growth in radical-left sentiments among them have not involved the total young adult age group. The idealism of much of non-college youth at that time was in fact reflected in a show of highly patriotic feeling, support for the war and even in a disproportionate backing for George Wallace's 1968 presidential candidacy. Furthermore, opinion polls dealing with the relationship of age to views on the Vietnam war have consistently shown that persons over 50 have been more numerous and more consistent in their opposition to the war than have all other groups. As a 1970 report from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan put it, "this 'generation gap' that one would have expected, wherein the young oppose the war and the old support it, simply failed to appear."

However, a "gap" does exist. But it is between persons on and off campus rather than between the younger and the older. Faculty members, for example, who are as a rule much more opposed than students to militant activism and campus politicization, are as a group fairly close to their students on substantive issues such as Vietnam, civil rights and domestic social policy. Both tend to espouse as their dominant political ideology what might be described as Kennedy-McCarthy liberalism and the program of the left-liberal antiwar wing of the Democratic Party. The non-college population, on the other hand, has over the last five years gradually moved in a conservative direction, until by 1970, 52 percent described themselves as conservative, as against 34 percent who thought of themselves as liberals.

II

Let us concentrate now on the development of student opinion on the Vietnam war. Massive demonstrations began at Berkeley, Ann Arbor and Madison in 1965. However, surveys showed that the majority of students supported the war until 1968. Not until June of that year did a Gallup Poll indicate that the proportion of students who thought America had made a mistake in becoming involved in Vietnam had reached 50 percent. At that time the same view was taken by 48 percent of the general public but by only 38 percent of the entire youth group from 21 to 30 years of age. This difference within the younger population was to continue in succeeding years.

The perception that the Vietnam war was a mistake grew greatly following the dramatic communist Tet offensive in February, the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam at the end of March 1968, and the beginning of negotiations in Paris in May 1968. In effect, once the U.S. government had given up the goal of defeating the communists on the battlefield, it became

Author's Note: This article summarizes a section by S. M. Lipset in "They Would Rather Be Left," by S. M. Lipset and Gerald Schaflander, to be published next fall by Little, Brown.

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impossible to prevent a steady erosion of support for the war, particularly, though obviously far from exclusively, on the campus.

Two Gallup samples of students taken two and a half years apart dramatically pointed up the change. While in the spring of 1967, 35 percent identified themselves as "doves" and 49 percent as "hawks," in the fall of 1969, 69 percent saw themselves as "doves," only 20 percent as "hawks."

Other survey organizations, which compared views over shorter periods after the announcement of negotiations, also found a continuing growth in "dovish" or withdrawal sentiments. In reviewing changes in attitudes which had occurred between two student surveys conducted in October 1968 and in March and April 1969, Yankelovich concluded that "on college campuses, pacifist sentiments have spread from the more liberal students to the more moderate and conservative students." In June 1969 the Harris Poll asked whether a man's refusal to be drafted because of opposition to the Vietnam war led them to respect him more or less; it found that the proportion of students who indicated "more respect" had jumped from 29 percent in the spring of 1968 to 48 percent a year later. Comparing attitudes between late September and the end of November 1969, the period of the two massive Moratorium and Mobilization protests, the Gilbert Youth Poll reported "an increase, from 28 percent in the first poll to 43 percent in the second, among those who feel the only proper action would be 'complete and prompt withdrawal of American troops.'" A similar indication of a dramatic jump in strong opposition to the war was recorded in two polls taken by the Yankelovich organization in 1969 and 1970. The proportion strongly agreeing with the statement "the war in Vietnam is pure imperialism" increased from 16 percent in the spring of 1969 to 41 percent in 1970, just before the Cambodian events. Those strongly disagreeing dropped from 44 to 21 percent.

Yet though most students opposed the war, the survey data also suggested that a majority accepted the Nixon administration's new policy of Vietnamization as a means of getting out: the administration was able to coöpt some of the campus opposition. Thus a Gallup survey of college students taken in May 1969 reported that when asked: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nixon is handling his job as President?" 57 percent approved, 27 percent disapproved and 16 percent had no opinion. A second Gallup national student poll taken in the fall of 1969 found that students were seemingly losing interest in the protest, though they remained heavily against the war. In reporting on this survey in December 1969, *Newsweek* concluded that "the mood of the American campus is apparently undergoing a striking change: militancy and violence are in good measure giving way to passivity and personal introspection, and the revolutionary impulse seems—for a while, at least—to have largely spent itself."

The reaction against the May 1970 Cambodian incursion, of course, produced the largest and most extensive student protest movement the United States has ever experienced. All the survey data document the increased extent of student participation, as well as the fact that student attitudes in general moved to the Left, not only with respect to the war, but on other issues as well. The *Playboy* student opinion survey, for example, showed that 36 percent of the 7,300 students queried in May 1970 favored "pulling out now,"

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as compared with 6 percent who had taken the same position in 1965; 29 percent favored speeding up withdrawal; 26 percent would have continued with the "administration's timetable for 'honorable withdrawal';" and only 9 percent favored fighting for "total victory," as compared with the 35 percent who had in 1965 supported continued fighting in South Vietnam and the 56 percent who had then wanted to escalate by invading North Vietnam. Naturally enough, the Cambodian events also led to a decline in favorable student opinion of the way President Nixon was handling the war, with 59 percent queried in a Harris Poll giving him a rating of "poor," 17 percent one of "fair," and only 22 percent judging him "pretty good" or "excellent."

In looking back over the five years so briefly sketched here, it is clear that in spite of some seeming shifts of interest, the number of students participating in protest activities has increased steadily. This has been documented by studies of participation in the May–June 1970 Cambodia protests by the President's Commission on Campus Unrest and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. Furthermore, not only has the number of students participating in protest activities of both a disruptive and nondisruptive nature increased, but the antiwar protests have to a very striking extent reached into relatively moderate political sectors among the students. A nationwide study of 5,000 students in 39 colleges undertaken in 1969–1970, before the Cambodian incursion, by Kenneth and Mary Gergen, psychologists at Swarthmore College, reported that "in an average group of 100 antiwar demonstrators, one might find 13 Republicans, 20 Democrats, 62 Independents, and only 5 persons who identify themselves as Radicals. The overwhelming majority of the demonstrators place a high value on traditional American ideals." Surveys after the Cambodian events confirm this finding as to the heterogeneous makeup of the protestors.

Thus, during the five years of antiwar protest, the campus has moved significantly leftward in politics. As the Gergens put it in their study, "over 40 percent of the sample indicate that the war has altered their political affiliation, and of these, only 7 percent have increased their commitment to one of the two major parties. The remaining 93 percent of this group (or 37 percent of the total sample) became more 'liberal,' 'radical,' 'disillusioned with party politics,' and otherwise alienated from party politics."

To say that the students have moved to the Left in their politics is, however, very far from saying that most of them have become alienated from society or supportive of radical activism. In fact, all available data show that at most 10 percent of the college student population could be so classified, with about one-third of this 10 percent reported to have revolutionary views. To cite only one of a number of surveys of this problem, the Yankelovich study based on spring 1969 data found that among college students 3 percent were identified as "Revolutionaries" (believing that the American system was "too rotten to repair" and justifying property destruction, etc.); 10 percent as "Radical Dissidents" (who agreed with the Revolutionaries but not on all counts); 39 percent as "Reformers" (who believed in the need for specific reforms); 37 percent as "Moderates" (who agreed with the Reformers on some points); and 11 percent as "Conservatives" (who held a coherent set of beliefs about the need for more law and order, etc.

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When examining the results of various national surveys of students from 1965 to 1970, it is difficult to come to any definitive conclusions concerning the depth and enduring quality of their discontent and its portent for continued tension with the government.

The approximately 10 percent who show up as "radicals," "alienated," or "dissidents" in the surveys completed in 1969–70 may be contrasted with those who identified "socialism" (24 percent) or "communism" (6 percent) as positive terms in a 1936 Roper-Fortune national student survey. Those who advocate fundamental changes in the American system today (75 percent in a late May 1970 Harris Poll) compare with the 68 percent who favored "a revision in our attitude about property rights" in the 1936 report. At the other end of the spectrum, Harris reported that in the spring of 1969 and 1970 the percentage of students who identified their politics as "conservative" stood at 16 and 15, respectively. Their figures are identical with the 15 percent who in a 1936 national student survey told Roper that they felt positive about the term "conservatism."

The surveys of students conducted by Harris and Gallup during the "quiet" fall semester of 1970 clearly suggested that the increase in support for radical politics which accompanied the escalation in antiwar protest in 1969 and 1970 may be reversing, and that the 1970s may witness a new, less radical, political cycle. It is also possible that the surveys reported on here have overestimated the movement to the Left which actually occurred during the sixties. Most of the surveys have generally been based on national samples running from 1,000 to 2,000 students. There is some reason to believe that some of these have oversampled the more selective or higher-quality schools, or that their respondents on given campuses were selected by quota-sample rather than probability (randomly from lists of students registered) procedures. These "biases" may have resulted in an initial overestimation of the more radical or alienated segment. Evidence of this may be seen in the fact that some of the polls overestimated the membership of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Two academic efforts to sample American student opinion, one conducted for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education by a Berkeley group, and the other for HEW by Johns Hopkins sociologists in the winter and spring of 1969–1970, reported a more conservative student body than the commercial surveys had. The Carnegie weighted national samples of 70,000 undergraduates and 30,000 graduate students and 60,000 faculty members at 300 institutions found fewer on the "Left" and more self-identified "conservatives" among the students than had the smaller surveys. When given the alternative of identifying themselves as left, liberal, middle-of-the-road or conservative, only 5 percent of the three different campus groups chose "left;" 19 percent of the undergraduates reported themselves as "conservative," a designation used by 30 percent of the graduate students and 28 percent of the faculty. The largest single category (about 40 percent) in each was, of course, "liberal." Using slightly different categories the HEW-Hopkins study found 5 percent of 8,000 undergraduates were "radical," 16 percent "conservative," 40 percent "moderate," and 32 percent "liberal."

The conclusion that only a small minority of American students has ever

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been alienated from the body politic is evident in the findings of a variety of polls conducted between 1965 and 1970 which indicated that students showed considerable support for diverse aspects of American society *other* than those linked to foreign policy, the war and racism. For example, during the spring of 1965, in the first year of large-scale protest, a national sample queried for a Harris Poll expressed confidence in the policies of dominant American domestic institutions, particularly those linked to economic and professional élites. Thus, the majority voiced a "great deal" of confidence in the medical profession, banks and financial institutions, higher education, and big corporations. As a group, students were much less favorable to the arts, the United Nations, the civil rights movement, religion and the labor movement.

Perhaps more significant in indicating how little alienation from American institutions existed among students in general are the findings of a poll conducted by Samuel Lubell in the spring of 1966, which dealt with the matter of confidence in dominant economic organizations. Only a year after the Berkeley revolt and the emergence of mass demonstrations on the war, Lubell found that 60 percent of the students interviewed praised the role of business, while only 15 percent were critical. Lubell also reported that an unspecified majority were for "a stronger Federal government but against a guaranteed annual income," and for "a more rapid extension of civil rights but against racial intermarriage." He concluded his analysis by commenting that in "their political thinking, far from being 'alienated,' the students remain basically like the rest of the country. . . ."

Two surveys of student opinion in the spring of 1969 also pointed up the limitations on any judgment that American college students had as a stratum become alienated from dominant institutions or the body politic. Thus, a Roper Poll dated May 1969 and concerned with attitudes toward four dominant institutions—business, the political system, administrative justice and higher education—found the largest proportion agreeing that they were "basically sound" but needed some assistance (these percentages ranged from a low of 37 percent when freshmen viewed business, to a high of 72 percent when seniors viewed the political system). "Basically Sound—Essentially Good" was the next most popular rubric (from 48 to 10 percent), with "Not Too Sound, Needs Many Improvements" ranking next (with from 21 to 7 percent). "Basically Unsound, Needs Fundamental Overhauling" attracted only from 3 to 4 percent of the respondents. A somewhat similar picture of the sentiments of the national student stratum appeared in a poll completed for *Psychology Today* (October 1969). This survey found that 64 percent disapproved of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, 39 percent indicated strong feelings, and 26 percent mild ones. On most of the other questions, which dealt with the universities, racial problems, etc., the students were much less critical of American institutions and policies.

The Yankelovich-CBS survey of 4,000 young people, half of them in college, taken in March and April of 1969, and the College Poll, which regularly samples students for newspapers and NBC, also reported concurrently that the college student population was generally liberal, sympathetic to civil rights demands, and antiwar, but far from being extremist in these views. To take only a very few examples, in the College Poll 63 percent of the stu-

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dents queried said they believed that "the ROTC belongs on campus" at the very time that the ROTC was under sharp attack from the SDS and antiwar groups. Only 23 percent said they disapproved of having their university or college "participating in general projects to aid the national defense," while 76 percent said they had no objection. Although 78 percent favored having "Afro-American" courses at their school, 68 percent opposed black student control over selection of faculty for these courses. A year later, in spring 1970, the HEW-Hopkins survey found that 72 percent disagreed with the statement: "to do anything rewarding one must work outside the regular institutions of our society."

The most extensive investigation of a variety of student attitudes completed in the peaceful fall of 1970 by Harris found fewer self-identified radicals and more conservatives than during the Cambodian protest in May, the "radical" percentage having decreased from 11 to 7; the "liberal" from 43 to 35; the "middle-of-the-road" having increased from 26 to 34 percent; and the "conservative" and "far Right" from 15 to 19 percent. Although the other questions used in this survey were not comparable to those used in earlier Harris Polls, nevertheless, the general picture which emerged was a relatively moderate and unalienated studenthood. Surveys taken during the 1970 fall semester by Gallup and other pollsters seem to reach more or less the same result. Similar results as to the minority status of radical student groups were also obtained in polls taken abroad—in France after events of May 1968, in Italy in 1969, and in Japan in 1966.

III

Nevertheless, even though the vast majority of the student body remains unalienated, it should also be stressed that it is becoming increasingly reform-minded and that on some points it is very critical of and even hostile to existing policies and attitudes. To cite only one of the surveys taken in the spring of 1970, the Yankelovich Poll, a profile of increased opposition to the Vietnam war plus growing support for "fundamental reforms" emerged in the following ways: proportions favoring fundamental reforms in big business and the military had risen from one-third in 1969 to close to one-half in 1970; but relatively few students proposed to do away with specific institutions, only 12 percent wishing, for example, to eliminate the FBI, with 19 percent favoring its fundamental reform and 28 percent its moderate reform, and 40 percent against any "substantial change;" as for the Constitution, 2 percent would have "done away with it," 14 percent advocated fundamental reform, 37 percent were for moderate reform, and 47 percent wanted "no substantial change." Greatest hostility was directed toward foreign policy, with 48 percent strongly agreeing that U.S. foreign policy was "based on our own narrow economic and power interests," and toward racial discrimination, with 53 percent strongly agreeing that "basically we are a racist nation." However, only 8 percent agreed that the system was "too rotten for repair."

Hardly unexpectedly, the Cambodian incursion led to some acute reactions though not to increased alienation from the society as a whole. A Harris survey in late May 1970 showed that the confidence earlier expressed in President Nixon's Vietnam policy or in his general activities had almost

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totally vanished among the students. In the same survey much larger proportions of students than earlier endorsed the need for fundamental changes (75 percent), believed that demonstrations were an effective form of protest (58 percent) and felt that social progress was more likely to result from radical pressures (44 percent); as many thought, however, that such progress would come through institutional reform (45 percent). Among the other findings was the student view (67 percent) that student protest would speed up needed changes, although close to four-fifths (79 percent) thought that radical pressures would have their greatest impact through institutional changes rather than through efforts to overthrow the system (10 percent).

IV

It is natural to overestimate support for highly visible forms of behavior. Students who participate do this; so do the mass media. The surveys and studies cited show that only a small percentage of college students are radical or alienated from the society, though the public may receive a very different impression. Numerous surveys of drug use on campus also show that the students consistently overestimate the percentage of students using drugs and that the mass media do the same. Thus the most recent national student survey, that of Gallup in November 1970, found that about two-fifths admit *ever* having used marijuana, while the proportion doing so often is only one out of seven. A similar difference between assumptions and reality seems to happen in terms of student appearance in hair and dress.

Since the results of the surveys vary so from widely held and disseminated opinion, some may question their accuracy. Yet the fact that at least 10 national survey organizations using different methods and querying different samples have corroborated each others' findings to the extent that they have should say something about the validity of their results. It may be that some extreme-left sentiment may be somewhat underrepresented. (The evidence would suggest the opposite.) It may also be that sometimes students will not respond frankly to certain questions. Yet the results of anonymous questionnaires do not differ significantly from those that are based on interviews.

The fact that the large majority of American college students do not sympathize with radical doctrines and tactics and that most of them are conventional when it comes to drug use and to dedication to academic achievement and a "straight" career, is obviously not a harbinger of a "peaceful" campus or of a stable polity. It is clear that the anti-Establishment youth culture has grown enormously during the 1960s. Increasing proportions, sometimes majorities, are discontented with the way the country is run. Continued U.S. participation in Indochina convinces these students that they can have no confidence in the nation's rulers and its élite. Many other factors point up for them the contradiction between the affluent society and social ills such as poverty and racialism. As America enters the seventies, most college students take a critical liberal-to-left posture.

This posture helps to explain why the small extreme Left can set the tone on so many campuses: most students support the overt goals of most demonstrations, though they may not approve of specific tactics. Furthermore, efforts to mobilize the moderates against the extremists usually fail because

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authority is seen as defending social evils or outmoded forms of governance. Therefore, to stress the minority status of the radicals is not to say that the majority has been opposed to them. The student vanguard has been powerful since 1965 precisely because the majority of students have been politicized to the Left, particularly through opposition to the war and to racism.

During the fall semester of 1970, manifest campus radicalism and confrontation demonstrations fell off. Furthermore, the Urban Research Institute has reported that violent tactics have become much less likely in the protests that have occurred and that the focus of campus protest has switched from antiwar demonstrations to demands for minority rights. This has reflected the apparent decline in American involvement in Vietnam. Given the strength of campus antiwar feeling, the widening of the conflict into Laos may give rise to a new wave of demonstrations against the Indochina war; protests, as in the Cambodian case, will be led by the moderates.

These recent events suggest that once the war has clearly ended, the university may begin a new, relatively less activist phase in the political cycle. The history of campus protest in this country since 1800 has witnessed far more violence in per capita terms, as well as proportionately larger radical movements, than is generally known. There have been waves of countercultural behavior in other countries previously, as well as in the United States (particularly in the 1920s). Since much of the student protest of recent years has been devoted to opposing the Vietnam war, it may also be important to note that antiwar activity during wars has also been a recurrent American trait. Sol Tax of the University of Chicago sought to estimate the extent of such opposition to different wars, and concluded that Americans had opposed a number of other wars more extensively than they had Vietnam, at least up to the time the United States agreed publicly to negotiate the end of the war in March 1968. The War of 1812 witnessed a large-scale secession movement by antiwar New Englanders. Battalions of American deserters actually fought with the Mexican Army during the Mexican War. There were massive antidraft riots during the Civil War. The antiwar Socialists obtained over 20 percent of the vote in municipal elections shortly after we entered World War I, while hundreds of thousands were involved in violations of the draft laws in that conflict. Opinion polls registered early extensive adult and student opposition to the Korean War.

Periods of protest, like those of stability, wax and wane. But the prospect of a change in the cycle does not portend a quiet university. Intellectuals and students, for reasons which have been discussed amply elsewhere, are a recurrent source of criticism, of opposition. The period from 1940 to 1960, when Western intellectuals and students were relatively acquiescent, was the unusual one. American students, like those in other countries, will continue to provide the mass base for movements of social change, both political and cultural. But the historical record would suggest that those who feared or hoped that the wave of student activism of the 1960s was the beginning of an enduring revolutionary movement, one that would fundamentally change American politics and culture, are as much in error as those of the past who reacted similarly to comparable waves of change. The campus may produce an American revolution, but this momentarily ebbing wave is not it.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Lewis C. Austin, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

AMERICA AND RUSSIA IN A CHANGING WORLD: A HALF CENTURY OF PERSONAL OBSERVATION. By W. Averell Harriman. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, 218 p. $5.95.

This book reveals the common sense and pragmatism that have made Averell Harriman such a successful diplomat. In its explorations of past, present and future, the book does not reveal much that is substantively new. What is most refreshing about it is the author's impatience with outworn ideological slogans and his determination to base policies on objective realities.

THE LOST CRUSADE: AMERICA IN VIETNAM. By Chester L. Cooper. New York: Dodd, 1970, 559 p. $12.00.

The virtues of this remarkable book are its honesty and self-analysis, considering the fact that the author was in the government for most of the period that he covers. The result is one of the best and most constructive of the many critical assessments of the Vietnam war.

STILWELL AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN CHINA, 1911–45. By Barbara W. Tuchman. New York: Macmillan, 1971, 621 p. $10.00.

The theme of this poignant historical assessment is that "China was a problem for which there was no American solution." Stilwell emerges like Camus' Sisyphus, valiantly trying, straining and laboring, but "in the end China went her own way as if the Americans had never come."

THE DEMIGODS: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP IN THE THIRD WORLD. By Jean Lacouture. New York: Knopf, 1970, 300 p. $7.95.

This is a brilliantly successful effort to apply the Weberian charisma analysis to four third-world leaders: Nasser, Nkrumah, Sihanouk and Bourguiba. The author is also indebted to the "psychohistorical" approach of Erik Erikson.

AMERICANS AND CHINESE: PURPOSE AND FULFILLMENT IN GREAT CIVILIZATIONS. By Francis L. K. Hsu. Garden City: Natural History Press (for the American Museum of Natural History), 1970, 493 p. $12.50.

The author--a leading Chinese anthropologist—engages in a multifaceted exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of the American "individual-centered"

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society by contrasting it with the "situation-centered" ethic of his native China. The result is a highly original—and disturbing—perspective on the American way of life by a friendly, sensitive and deeply concerned observer. (A revised edition of a work which appeared in 1953.)

AWAKENING FROM HISTORY. By Edmond Taylor. Boston: Gambit, 1969, 522 p. $8.95.

An American foreign correspondent of many years' standing has written an autobiography which, in his words, bears witness to "some of the transformations that have taken place in the mind of my generation since it came of age forty-odd years ago."

IDEOLOGICHESKAIA BOR'BA V SOVREMENNYKH MEZHDUNARODNYKH OTNOSHENIIAKH. By G. A. Arbatov. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1970, 351 p.

A leading Soviet scholar discusses the role of ideology in international relations. Despite continuing ideological barriers, the author is hopeful about prospects for Soviet-American rapprochement.

PATTERNS OF DOMINANCE. By Philip Mason. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1970, 377 p. $11.50.

A sophisticated analysis of various types of institutionalized inequality in different societies, both ancient and modern, by the Director of the Institute of Race Relations in London. Though somewhat marred, perhaps, by a pervasive pessimism, this is a wise and valuable work.

BEYOND MALTHUS: POPULATION AND POWER. By Neil W. Chamberlain. New York: Basic Books, 1971, 214 p. $6.95.

The population explosion per se, the author argues, is not a very reliable indicator for the future. Rather, the specific impact of population growth on the political and economic power distributions within a given society provides much better clues for neo-Malthusian analysts.

YALTA: A STUDY IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. By Diane Shaver Clemens. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 356 p. $8.50.

Of the many books written about Yalta, this one ranks at or very near the top. The thoroughness of the research, the even-handedness of the analysis, and the considerable measure of originality in interpretation make this work a joy to read even though the author's concluding reflections are far from joyful.

THE YALTA MYTHS. By Athan G. Theoharis. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970, 263 p. $10.00.

An interesting attempt to analyze the techniques used by both Democrats and Republicans in their efforts to manipulate the Yalta Conference for their respective political campaign purposes.

POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY. By Georges Balandier. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971, 214 p. $6.95.

The value of this original study lies in its emphasis on the political patterns of non-Western societies, formerly described as "primitive." In addition to suggesting some interesting methodological innovations, the author reveals that the power structures of the societies he scrutinizes are quite sophisticated. (The French edition appeared in 1967.)

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SMALL NATION SURVIVAL: POLITICAL DEFENSE IN UNEQUAL CONFLICTS. By V. V. Šveics. New York: Exposition Press, 1970, 271 p. $8.50.

The author suggests, on the basis of a number of case-studies of unequal conflicts, that small nations may use their political strength as a decisive strategic element in their military struggle against a great-power aggressor.

EUROPE AND AMERICA—THE NEXT TEN YEARS. By W. Randolph Burgess and James Robert Huntley. New York: Walker, 1970, 232 p. $8.50.

This projection of relations within the Atlantic Community during the coming decade places great emphasis on economic instruments of coöperation and better education in international affairs for the young.

SOW THE WIND, REAP THE WHIRLWIND. Edited with Introduction and Commentary by Michael H. Prosser. New York: Morrow, 1970, 2 v. $89.95.

One-hundred fifty speeches by heads of state who have addressed the United Nations during its first 25 years.

CARTA ONU—DOCUMENT AL EREI NOASTRE. By A. Bolintineanu and M. Malita. Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1970, 360 p. Lei 9.75.

Two leading Rumanian scholars discuss the achievements and disappointments of the United Nations with special emphasis on the contributions made by Rumania.

WORDS AND OCCASIONS. By The Right Honourable L. B. Pearson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 296 p. $10.00.

The author's writings and public speeches over the past half century, intelligently annotated by himself.

DESIGNS IN DIPLOMACY: PAGES FROM EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Mario Toscano. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, 433 p. $16.50.

Most of these previously published essays deal with Italy's diplomatic relations during World War II. The quality of research and analysis reveals the hand of a fine historian.

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. VOLUME II: WEALTH AND RESOURCES. Edited by Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, 343 p. $11.00.

Four scholarly monographs on various legal aspects of natural resources and economic and social development.

STALIN, HITLER, AND EUROPE. By James E. McSherry. New York: World Publishing Co., 1970, 357 p. $12.50.

This is the second volume of a two-volume history of Nazi-Soviet relations. The quality of the author's research is meticulous, but his interpretations of Stalin are somewhat one-dimensional.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION: THE CASE OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. By Ernst B. Haas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, 184 p. $6.50.

An excellent analysis of the problems involved in the development of common international criteria for the observance and implementation of fundamental human rights.

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THE NAKED EMPEROR. Compiled and edited by Barbara Fultz. New York: Pegasus, 1970, 223 p. $10.00.

A revealing selection of political satire from seven countries. It seems a pity, however, that each nation is represented by only a single publication.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

MILITARY MEN. By Ward Just. New York: Knopf, 1970, 256 p. $6.95.

In a series of sharply etched profiles of army men from generals down to privates, the author has assembled one of the most vivid portraits of the U.S. Army to appear in recent years. Written in crisp staccato style, this book leaves a powerful and lasting impression.

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: ITS IMPACTS ON AMERICAN SOCIETY. By Adam Yarmolinsky. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 434 p. $10.00.

This is a broadly conceived, measured and calm assessment of the multifaceted role of the military in the United States. Its value lies in the author's determination to ferret out the impact of the military on every nook and cranny in American society. He has done his job without undue polemics for or against.

AT WAR WITH ASIA. By Noam Chomsky. New York: Pantheon Books, 1970, 313 p. $7.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A passionate indictment of the American role in Vietnam based primarily on moral grounds. Outraged by what he saw on the occasion of recent visits to Laos and North Vietnam, the author lists a catalogue of horrors perpetrated by the United States in those two countries. The book is an emotional *cri de coeur* rather than a rational analysis.

THE SUPREME COMMANDER: THE WAR YEARS OF GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. By Stephen E. Ambrose. Garden City: Doubleday, 1970, 732 p. $10.00.

This is very much the official history of General Eisenhower from 1941 to 1945. The author has researched his subject with meticulous care and considerable erudition. But his judgments are uncritical to the point of adulation and this almost worshipful attitude may be a disservice to an otherwise outstanding piece of research.

THE ALMANAC OF WORLD MILITARY POWER. By Colonel T. N. Dupuy and others. Dunn Loring (Va.): T. N. Dupuy Associates (in association with Stackpole Books), 1971, 338 p. $19.95.

A useful geopolitical assessment of the power capabilities of the world's nations. The authors' approach to the problem of power is sophisticated even though their materials are based entirely on unclassified sources.

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies), 1970, 219 p. $7.50.

These papers prepared by nine leading theorists of modern strategy for the 1968 Conference of the Institute for Strategic Studies are distinguished by their broadly conceived nontechnical approach. (Foreword by Alastair Buchan.)

STUDIES IN WAR AND PEACE. By Michael Howard. New York: Viking, 1971, 262 p. $8.95.

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A British military historian with a pronounced philosophical bent has brought together a number of previously published essays in book form. All the essays are thoughtful, some are profound.

VERSCHWIEGENES ZEITGESCHEHEN. By Jürgen Dennert. Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1970, 399 p. DM. 25.

A West German correspondent presents a competent survey of guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia. Vietnam is dealt with only peripherally.

THE RISING SUN: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1936–1945. By John Toland. New York: Random House, 1970, 954 p. $12.95.

This is a superb history of the Japanese Empire's path to self-destruction. The author has managed to combine a keen sense for the human tragedy with a high degree of objectivity. The accounts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are shattering.

SCORCHED EARTH. By Paul Carell. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 556 p. $12.50.

This volume covers the Russo-German war from the battle of Kursk in 1943, which the author describes as the beginning of the German defeat, to the Russian advance into East Prussia in 1944. A thorough and conscientious study by a German scholar. (Originally appeared in 1966.)

STRATEGY FOR CONQUEST. Edited by Jay Mallin. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1970, 381 p. $12.00.

Well-annotated selections from seven leading communist ideologues on guerrilla warfare.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL. Edited by Bennett Boskey and Mason Willrich. New York: Dunellen Co. (for the American Society of International Law), 1970, 191 p. $7.50.

A symposium focusing on the control aspects of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA. By Juraj Andrassy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 191 p. $7.50.

A first-rate scholarly monograph.

LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT. Edited by Malcolm F. Baldwin and James K. Page, Jr. New York: Walker, 1970, 432 p. $15.00.

This symposium on environmental law breaks new ground in the field of conservation. The papers and discussions are generally of high caliber.

WHY ARE WE STILL IN VIETNAM? Edited by Sam Brown and Len Ackland. New York: Random House, 1970, 144 p. $5.95.

A dozen essays—rather uneven in quality—by opponents of the Vietnam war.

General: Economic and Social

THE REALITY OF FOREIGN AID. By Willard L. Thorp. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1971, 370 p. $12.50.

The former chairman of the Development Assistance Committee (and one-time Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) draws on his extensive governmental and academic experience for a comprehensive analysis of the process of economic development and the ways rich countries can help poor ones. Balanced judgment is the hallmark of this book.

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THE EMERGENCE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO 1914. By Mira Wilkins. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 310 p. $9.50.

A major work that does much to explain as well as describe the growth of direct foreign investment by Americans up to 1914. A prodigious amount of material is well organized, interestingly presented and made to respond to questions prompted by modern studies of international business.

EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES. By Albert O. Hirschman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 162 p. $6.95.

A fascinating comparison of the choices open to a consumer, citizen or member of an organization who does not like the product or performance he is getting. The findings are not surprising but the process of getting to them is original and enlightening. A fine cross-disciplinary exercise relevant to consumerism, the "quality of life," participation and the psychology of collaborationism.

A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Antonin Basch. New York: Vantage Press, 1970, 247 p. $4.95.

The fruit of years of experience, some as a World Bank official. No neat prescription but constant work and learning both how to give and how to use aid is the formula.

WOMAN'S ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Ester Boserup. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970, 283 p. $7.50.

The first large comparative study of what economic development does to women and how they affect it. The author is an experienced Danish economist.

AMERICAN AND SOVIET AID: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. By Robert S. Walters. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970, 299 p. $9.95.

Point-by-point comparisons of aid-giving practice lead to an emphasis on similarities rather than differences, with the United States having the advantage of wealth.

TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS COLLABORATION AMONG COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES. By Werner J. Feld. New York: Praeger, 1970, 139 p. $12.50.

Moderately interesting treatment of an important topic. The fragmentary and rather familiar economic data are not analyzed in ways that cast much new light on their "implication for political integration" as called for in the subtitle.

THE CASE AGAINST FLOATING EXCHANGES. By Paul Einzig. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970, 211 p. $8.95.

Remembering the competitive devaluations of the past, a veteran financial journalist vigorously attacks the idea of making exchange rates more flexible.

AMOUNT AND SHARING OF AID. By Jagdish N. Bhagwati. Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1970, 197 p. $1.50 (Paper).

Rich in interesting compilations and original calculations showing who is giving and receiving what.

SOUVERAINETÉ ET COOPÉRATION MONÉTAIRE INTERNATIONALE. By Dominique Carreau. Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1970, 530 p. Fr. 60.

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Some perceptive remarks are imbedded in this massive treatise aimed primarily at French jurists who are said by Professor Colliard in his preface to have neglected the impact on their subject of international monetary coöperation.

BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM. By Robert L. Heilbroner. New York: Random House, 1970, 294 p. $7.95.

Stimulating pieces by an excellent writer who uses economics "to elucidate the problem of large-scale historical and social change."

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE WORLD OIL INDUSTRY. Edited by Zuhayr M. Mikdashi and others. Beirut: Middle East Research and Publishing Center, 1970, 233 p. LL 26.

Interesting papers from a seminar at American University, Beirut.

THE FIRST U.N. DEVELOPMENT DECADE AND ITS LESSONS FOR THE 1970's. Edited by Colin Legum. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Vienna Institute for Development), 1970, 312 p. $16.50.

An Austrian institute inspired by Nehru brought together an interesting group of people from developed and less developed countries of a wide political spectrum; papers plus summaries of discussions.

The United States

NIXON AGONISTES: THE CRISIS OF THE SELF-MADE MAN. By Garry Wills. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 617 p. $10.00.

This is far and away the best book on Nixon to date. More than that, it is a profound analysis of the political forces in America that made him President.

THE END OF THE AMERICAN ERA. By Andrew Hacker. New York: Atheneum, 1970, 239 p. $6.50.

In this neo-Spenglerian essay, the author predicts middle age and inevitable decline for the United States. America, he feels, is now at "a juncture at which it becomes pointless to call for rehabilitation or renewal." While the book contains many a fine aperçu, it is permeated by a kind of resigned and cheerless historical determinism.

IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR COUNTRY. By Willard Gaylin. New York: Viking, 1970, 344 p. $6.95.

In this deeply moving book the author presents six case-studies of young war resisters whom he interviewed in prison. In laying bare the souls of these young men, he has succeeded not only in creating a shattering commentary on our times, without preaching or maudlin sentimentality, but also in building a valuable bridge between psychiatry and foreign policy.

THE CONSCIENCE OF A MAJORITY. By Barry Goldwater. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, 248 p. $7.95.

After a rather lame post-mortem on the 1964 election and some unexciting chapters on "the failure of liberalism," the author has some perceptive and refreshing things to say about the problems of tomorrow. He is particularly good on the challenges of ecology.

THE REAL MAJORITY. By Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg. New York: Coward-McCann, 1970, 347 p. $7.95.

Any candidate for political office who courts the Right or the Left will be defeated, in the authors' view. The secret of political success lies in listening to, and then leading, the center.

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REPORT FROM WASTELAND. By WILLIAM PROXMIRE. New York: Praeger, 1970, 248 p. $6.95.

This is a disturbing account of the results of the Senator's probing into the military-industrial complex in his role as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee. He concludes his somber diagnosis with some practical proposals for bringing a runaway budget under control.

THE IRRECONCILABLES: THE FIGHT AGAINST THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By RALPH STONE. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970, 208 p. $9.95.

This first-rate monograph presents the definitive analysis to date of the role of the 16 Senators who, during the fight between Wilson and the Senate over the League of Nations, were known as the "irreconcilables."

MICROSTATES AND MICRONESIA. By STANLEY A. DE SMITH. New York: New York University Press, 1970, 193 p. $7.50.

This author presents a comprehensive overview of the microstate problem in the world today and then focuses in depth on the American administration of Micronesia. He has filled a significant gap in the literature.

POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER: THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATION. By HAROLD SEIDMAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 311 p. $7.50.

This book strikes an admirable balance between intimate inside knowledge and dispassionate objectivity. The result is one of the finest analyses of the Federal administration to appear in recent years.

MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE. By HERBERT I. SCHILLER. New York: Augustus Kelley, 1969, 170 p. $9.00.

A critical examination of the economic and political functions of mass communications in the United States.

THE POLICY MAKERS. By JOHN C. DONOVAN. New York: Pegasus, 1970, 255 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.25).

A balanced primer on the policy-making process in the United States.

THE PENTAGON WATCHERS: STUDENTS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE. EDITED BY LEONARD S. RODBERG AND DEREK SHEARER. Garden City: Doubleday, 1970, 416 p. $7.95.

An uneven symposium of ten highly polemical essays, all very critical of the defense establishment.

The Western Hemisphere

PIPELINE. By WILLIAM KILBOURN. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970, 222 p. $7.95.

Lively history of the controversy about building a gas pipeline across Canada in the course of which some fundamental Canadian preoccupations are interestingly displayed.

INDÉPENDANCE ET MARCHÉ COMMUN: QUÉBEC — É.-U. By RODRIGUE TREMBLAY. Montreal: Éditions du Jour, 1970, 127 p. $2.50 (Paper).

A well-qualified economist demonstrates the cost to Quebec of Canadian tariffs and argues that the province would be better off in a customs union with the United States—whether the rest of Canada joined or not.

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THE ALLIANCE THAT LOST ITS WAY: A CRITICAL REPORT ON THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. By Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, 381 p. $7.95.

This is an important book. Expressing a liberal orientation, the authors conclude that the Alliance attempted too much, and that development efforts, properly divorced from security considerations, should concentrate on assistance to countries able and willing to pursue economic and social reforms by democratic means. Some will disagree with the downgrading of U.S. hemispheric security interests.

NATURAL RESOURCES IN LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT. By Joseph Grunwald and Philip Musgrove. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1970, 494 p. $20.00.

The authors blend a descriptive text with detailed tables, by country and commodity, to provide in-depth information concerning mineral resources and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. An historical and analytical survey of economic and political issues is presented in a useful first section.

AN INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. By James R. Jose. Metuchen (N.J.): Scarecrow Press, 1970, 334 p. $7.50.

The concept of the often-mooted Peace Force is examined from every angle. The author concludes that it is not likely to be conjured into early existence.

POLITICAL LEADERS OF LATIN AMERICA. By Richard Bourne. New York: Knopf, 1970, 310 p. $8.95; Baltimore: Penguin, 1969, 306 p. $1.65 (Paper).

An examination of the lives and careers of Guevara, Stroessner, Frei, Kubitschek, Eva Perón and Carlos Lacerda.

SOVIET IMAGE OF CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1960–1968. Compiled and translated by J. Gregory Oswald; edited by Robert G. Carlton. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Conference on Latin American History), 1971, 365 p. $15.00.

A compilation and translation of recent (1960s) Soviet writings on Latin America, including the "national-liberation movement."

COMMUNIST CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA, 1959–1967. By Cecil Johnson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 324 p. $9.95.

This careful and scholarly evaluation of China's efforts in Latin America from 1959 to 1967, and their relationship to other communist movements, includes theoretical and ideological considerations as well as the descriptive aspects of Chinese activity.

DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO. By Pablo González Casanova. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 245 p. $7.95.

The Director of the Institute of Social Research at the University of Mexico examines social and political life in his country since 1910, with particular reference to power mechanisms and the prospects for a wider democracy.

THE MEXICAN ECONOMY: TWENTIETH-CENTURY STRUCTURE AND GROWTH. By Clark W. Reynolds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970, 468 p. $13.50.

An intensive and able economic study, with unusual attention to social aspects. One important conclusion is that "although no major economic obstacles stand in the way of sustained growth, political pitfalls abound."

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REGIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By David E. Ramsett. New York: Praeger, 1969, 133 p. $15.00.

The subject of Integration Industries within the Central American Common Market is specialized but significant; this analysis and progress report is useful and well done.

PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE CARIBBEAN 1942–1969. By Herbert Corkran, Jr. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970, 285 p. $8.50.

Currently active regional integration strategies and alignments are depicted against the background of earlier Caribbean organizations.

PUERTO RICO: A PROFILE. By Kal Wagenheim. New York: Praeger, 1970, 286 p. $8.50 (Paper, $2.95).

A short but competent treatment of all phases of Puerto Rican life. The predictions concerning the island's future status, suitably hedged, indicate the complexity of the many factors involved.

Western Europe

THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE: FROM DEVASTATION TO UNITY. By Richard Mayne. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 375 p. $8.95.

THE EUROPEAN RENAISSANCE SINCE 1945. By Maurice Crouzet. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970, 216 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Two more distinguished contributions to the study of Europe since 1945. Mayne, a well-known British writer and "Europeanist," writes elegantly of the political recovery from wasteland to affluence. Impressed by the rapidity of change, he begins with the assertion: "In the world of today, we are all apprentices." From across the Channel, a French historian and veteran administrator of French education writes a spirited synthesis, with equal emphasis on politics and culture, and with a series of superb illustrations. The two works complement each other and suggest the persistence of national differences.

COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST. Edited by James A. Rahl. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970, 476 p. $32.50.

On the extraterritorial reach of American anti-trust laws as they conflict with or overlap Common Market law.

L'IMBROGLIO AGRICOLE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN. By Adrien Zeller with Jean-Louis Giraudy. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1970, 316 p. Fr. 18.

A very critical analysis of the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy. Full of interesting facts and well-argued proposals for reform.

COMMONWEALTH OR EUROPE. By G. St. J. Barclay. St. Lucia (Australia): University of Queensland Press (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1970, 210 p. $4.95 (distributed by International Scholarly Book Services).

BRITISH POLITICS AND EUROPEAN UNITY: PARTIES, ELITES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS. By Robert J. Lieber. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, 317 p. $9.00.

Barclay, an Australian with a practical and academic background, presents an acerbic picture of what he considers to have been Britain's fumbling since 1945. He contends that Britain was wrong not to go into Europe in the 1950s and wrong to try it in the 1960s when it was hopeless. Lieber, an American political

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scientist, investigates the influence of British parties and pressure groups on government policies concerning Europe. The two books, different in style and method, complement each other.

COLONIAL ISSUES IN BRITISH POLITICS, 1945–1961: FROM 'COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT' TO 'WIND OF CHANGE.' By David Goldsworthy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 425 p. $14.50.

A careful and revealing account of how domestic pressures influenced Britain's policy of liquidating the remaining Empire.

BALDWIN: A BIOGRAPHY. By Keith Middlemas and John Barnes. New York: Macmillan, 1970, 1,149 p. $14.95.

A fitting tribute in size and style to an extraordinary exemplar of flexible conservatism, British style.

IRELAND IN THE WAR YEARS AND AFTER, 1939–51. Edited by Kevin B. Nowlan and T. Desmond Williams. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970, 216 p. $8.50.

A series of essays, mostly by Irish academics, on the political and cultural changes before and after Ireland's withdrawal from the Commonwealth.

FRENCH POLITICIANS AND ELECTIONS, 1951–1961. By Philip M. Williams. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 312 p. $11.50 (Paper, $3.25).

Twenty-five essays by an English academic who catches the spirit and the substance of French politics with rare and delightful lucidity.

DETERRENCE AND PERSUASION. By Wolf Mendl. New York: Praeger, 1970, 256 p. $9.00.

An analysis of why France developed a nuclear force and has become today a "nuclear paper tiger." Mendl emphasizes the nonmilitary reasons for producing these weapons and concludes that "a military justification has followed rather than preceded their existence."

RENCONTRES AVEC . . . LÉON BLUM. By Jules Moch. Paris: Plon, 1970, 363 p. Fr. 27.50.

Evocations of 24 years of collaboration and friendship, by a leading French socialist.

DIE AUSSENPOLITIK DER BUNDESREPUBLIK: ERFAHRUNGEN UND MASSSTÄBE. By Waldemar Besson. Munich: Piper, 1970, 493 p. DM. 28.

A leading political scientist presents an account and analysis of German foreign policy from 1949 to 1969, emphasizing the maxims of political realism which evolved in that period and now constitute a kind of tradition. A book of great merit and of particular relevance at a time when Bonn seeks new directions in diplomacy.

DEMOKRATISCHE MILITÄRPOLITIK: DIE ALLIERTE MILITÄRSTRATEGIE ALS THEMA DEUTSCHER POLITIK 1949–1968. By Manfred Dormann. Freiburg: Rombach, 1970, 296 p. DM. 39.

A German political scientist analyzes the political context of Bonn's defense policies. A useful background to current debates about new departures.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HITLER'S GERMANY: DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION IN EUROPE, 1933–36. By Gerhard L. Weinberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971, 397 p. $12.75.

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An intelligent analysis of Hitler's early triumphs, on the basis of new archival sources and of an admirable mastery of existing literature. A major contribution by an American historian.

THE GERMAN DICTATORSHIP: THE ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND EFFECTS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM. By Karl Dietrich Bracher. New York: Praeger, 1970, 553 p. $13.95.

The first scholarly synthesis of all aspects of the Nazi phenomenon, by Germany's leading expert on the subject. Judicious, thorough and incisive, this study, likely to become a standard work, offers a further commentary on the precariousness of modern democracy and the ways by which it can be perverted. (German original published in 1969.)

RECHTE LEUTE VON LINKS: GEWALTKULT UND INNERLICHKEIT. By Hans Mathias Kepplinger. Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1970, 327 p. Swiss Fr. 22.

A useful analysis of the affinity between the New Left and the old and largely discredited Right. Unlikely to become popular reading among either group.

MOT D'ORDRE INTÉGRATION? LA SUISSE ET L'AELE 1967–1969. By Eric Roethlisberger. Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1970, 201 p. Swiss Fr. 21.

Continues the author's earlier study of Switzerland in EFTA (reviewed here July 1970) and discusses possible future relations with the Common Market.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND PEASANT REVOLUTION IN SPAIN: ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL WAR. By Edward E. Malefakis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970, 469 p. $15.00.

THE SPANISH REVOLUTION. By Stanley G. Payne. New York: Norton, 1970, 398 p. $7.95 (Paper, $3.25).

Malefakis's study is a rare blend of pioneering scholarship, new interpretations and sober, incisive judgments. His analysis of the political consequences of antiquated land tenure is basic to an understanding of Spain in the 1930s—and suggestive for many underdeveloped countries today. A veteran student of modern Spain, Payne presents a survey of revolutionary movements against the background of political realities. A valuable study.

SALAZAR AND MODERN PORTUGAL. By Hugh Kay. New York: Hawthorn, 1970, 478 p. $10.95.

A sober, full-length study of Portugal's controversial leader, by a British journalist.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 639 p. $10.00.

One wishes for the full story of the controversial origins, transmittal and organization of this much discussed book. There are many things the author does not say, much that is self-serving, and much that is contradictory with known facts. Nevertheless, Edward Crankshaw states flatly that here is "Khrushchev himself, quite unmistakably speaking," and many experts, though conceding that the book is a patchwork job, none the less find it a fascinating exploration of the mazes that confuse any journey through the late Stalin years.

DIE "BRESHNEW-DOKTRIN." By Boris Meissner. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1969, 189 p. DM. 18.

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Documents, with a useful introduction, relating to the background and enunciation of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, including responses from other communist régimes.

SINCE STALIN. By Brian Crozier. New York: Coward-McCann, 1970, 247 p. $6.95.

A general, knowledgeable survey of recent developments in the communist world, in various communist movements and in the New Left. In the author's view the cold war is neither over nor on its way out.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by George Schöpflin. New York: Praeger, 1970, 614 p. $25.00.

A substantial handbook, with chapters by numerous specialists.

THE SOVIET PARADIGM. By Roy D. Laird. New York: Free Press, 1970, 272 p. $7.95.

It is the author's thesis that "the Soviet political system stands out as a unique paradigm of a successful centralized monohierarchical polity."

A CENTURY OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE: FROM ALEXANDER II TO KHRUSHCHEV. By Lazar Volin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 644 p. $18.50.

A major study of Russian agriculture in both the imperial and Soviet periods, by perhaps the leading authority on the subject, who died in 1966.

SOVIET SOCIAL POLICIES: WELFARE, EQUALITY, AND COMMUNITY. By Robert J. Osborn. Homewood (Ill.): Dorsey Press, 1970, 294 p. $5.25 (Paper).

An inquiry into the way the Soviet government influences the peoples' "choices" in such matters as expenditures, education, jobs and residence.

THE LYSENKO AFFAIR. By David Joravsky. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 459 p. $13.95.

An exceptionally fine work, by a leading student of the history of Soviet science, which goes far beyond scandalmongering or muckraking to wrestle with the root causes of the disasters symbolized by Lysenkoism.

THE RUSSIAN SEARCH FOR PEACE, FEBRUARY–OCTOBER 1917. By Rex A. Wade. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, 196 p. $6.50.

A study centering on the efforts of the moderate socialists to deal with the baffling problem of war and peace in the critical months between the two revolutions.

STALINISMUS VERSUS "SOZIALFASCHISMUS" UND "NATIONALFASCHISMUS." By Peer H. Lange. Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1969, 367 p. DM. 34.

An analysis of ideology and practice during the left-swing of the late 1920s and early 1930s.

GEORGE LUKÁCS. By George Lichtheim. New York: Viking, 1970, 146 p. $5.75.

A concise but able introduction to Lukács' contribution to Marxist theory.

TALVISODAN POLIITTINEN NÄYTELMÄ. By Aaro Pakaslahti. Helsinki: Söderström, 1970, 340 p. Fmk. 16.

The posthumously published Winter War memoirs of the chief of the political division of Finland's Foreign Ministry.

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J. K. PAASIKIVI SUOMEN POLITIIKASSA. Helsinki: Otava, 1970, 210 p. Fmk. 9.

The first of what is certain to be a flood of books occasioned by the 100th anniversary of the birth of Finland's leading statesman, J. K. Paasikivi.

VAIKEA AIKA: SUOMEN PÄÄMINISTERINÄ SOTAVUOSINA 1943–1944. By Edwin Linkomies. Helsinki: Otava, 1970, 445 p. Fmk. 25.

The highly important memoirs of Finland's wartime premier Edwin Linkomies, written in prison but withheld from publication until 1970.

THE DRAMA OF THE BALTIC PEOPLES. By August Rei. Stockholm: Publishing House KVE, 1970, 384 p. (New York: Nordic Press, $10.00).

A survey of the history of the Baltic States, with emphasis on the events preceding their incorporation into the Soviet Union. The author was a prominent Estonian Social Democrat. The concluding chapter, describing developments in Estonia since 1940, was written by the historian Evald Uustalu.

ANTI-SEMITISM WITHOUT JEWS: COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE. By Paul Lendvai. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, 393 p. $7.95.

A most interesting study of the situation of the remaining Jewish population in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania. The story is remarkably different in each case, and for reasons that might not have been expected a decade ago.

POLAND. By Václav L. Beneš and Norman J. G. Pounds. New York: Praeger, 1970, 416 p. $10.00.

A convenient general survey of the country's history, economic development and resources.

SCHWARZER ADLER—WEISSER ADLER. By Volkmar Kellermann. Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1970, 196 p. DM. 24.

A very critical review of policies and attitudes in the Weimar Republic toward the Polish state.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA SINCE WORLD WAR II. By Tad Szulc. New York: Viking, 1971, 503 p. $14.00.

A substantial history by a foreign correspondent for *The New York Times* with particular emphasis on the events of 1968, to many of which Szulc was an eyewitness.

DEMOKRATISIERUNG ODER DEMONTAGE. By Jiří Hájek. Munich: Damnitz Verlag, 1969, 231 p. DM. 9.80.

An effort to "demythologize" the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and bring them into correct focus through Marxist-Leninist lenses.

DIE TSCHECHOSLOWAKISCHE LEGION IN RUSSLAND. By Gerburg Thunig-Nittner. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1970, 299 p. DM. 48.

A detailed study of the Czechoslovak legions in Russia, their "anabasis" through Siberia, and their significance for the origins of the Czech Republic. An important contribution.

TITO: A BIOGRAPHY. By Phyllis Auty. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970, 343 p. $8.50.

The author, a leading British specialist on Jugoslavia, modestly calls this an "interim historical biography—between those written in the nineteen-fifties, especially those of V. Dedijer, Sir Fitzroy Maclean and K. Zilliacus—and the many that will come later." It is in fact a very substantial, scholarly contribution.

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THE BATTLE STALIN LOST: MEMOIRS OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1948–1953. By Vladimir Dedijer. New York: Viking, 1971, 341 p. $8.50.

These are informal, personal but informative recollections of the years 1948–1953 when Stalin tried vainly to unseat the Tito régime. Dedijer was first disillusioned with the Soviet government in 1948 when he belatedly discovered the extent of Soviet attempts to exploit the Jugoslav economy. The Soviet subjugation of Czechoslovakia by force in 1968 seems to have impelled him to provide these details, some of them new, of Jugoslavia's successful resistance.

THE GREEN SHIRTS AND THE OTHERS. By Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970, 427 p. $9.95.

An exceptionally interesting comparative study of the fascist moods, movements and parties that flourished in Hungary and Rumania in the interwar years. For all their extravagances and atrocities they were a response to social ills.

The Middle East and North Africa

MÉDITERRANÉE ROUGE: UN NOUVEL EMPIRE SOVIÉTIQUE? By Michel Salomon. Paris: Laffont, 1970, 399 p. Fr. 24.

First-hand reporting of a high order combined with analysis of material from many sources. The Soviet presence is described in all its formidable strength, but without overlooking its weaknesses.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By Aaron S. Klieman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University), 1970, 107 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.45).

Less informative than the Salomon book noted above, but a good short treatment of the subject.

WESTERN WINDOW IN THE ARAB WORLD. By Leon Borden Blair. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970, 328 p. $8.50.

A misleading title for an account by an American military official of U.S.-Moroccan relations during the two decades following the World War II landings. Mohammed V and the U.S. armed forces come out with high marks, in contrast to France and American diplomacy.

VÉRITÉS SUR LA RÉVOLUTION ALGÉRIENNE. By Mohamed Lebjaoui. Paris: Gallimard, 1970, 249 p. Fr. 24.

One man's truths about the Algerian war of independence, especially the inside story of the *Front de Libération Nationale,* its leaders, its victory and its postwar feuds. Lebjaoui was closely associated with Ben Bella.

DER BURGIBISMUS UND DIE AUSSENPOLITIK DES UNABHÄNGIGEN TUNESIEN. By Werner Klaus Ruf. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1969, 279 p. DM. 27.

This first comprehensive study of Tunisian foreign relations has the merit of showing the intimate connections between Bourguiba's policies toward France, toward Egypt and the Arab League and in the Maghreb itself.

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST, 1914–1920. By Jukka Nevakivi. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 284 p. $8.75 (London: Athlone Press).

Based on private and public papers—some of them newly available—this careful monograph on the bargaining and manœuvring leading up to the division of the former Ottoman provinces into British and French mandates admirably supplements the earlier works of Kedourie, Zeine and others.

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FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH POLICY IN THE ARAB WORLD: THE CAIRO CONFERENCE OF 1921. By Aaron S. Klieman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 322 p. $10.00.

A careful account, based in part on published British documents, of a much ignored event in British-Arab affairs. The Cairo conference sharpened and gave direction to a hesitant British policy in the area, but the result, in ignoring some of the basic Arab aspirations of the day, gave rise to many later problems.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN REVOLUTION. By Humphrey Trevelyan. Boston: Gambit, 1970, 275 p. $5.95.

Three assignments—Cairo at the time of Suez, post-revolution Baghdad, and Aden—which punctuated the waning stages of Britain's moment in the Middle East, rather sketchily described by a British diplomat who nevertheless throws some new light on what happened.

THE MAKING OF ISRAEL'S ARMY. By Yigal Allon. New York: Universe Books, 1970, 273 p. $8.95.

The development of Israel's armed forces and military doctrine in the context of that country's unique strategic needs, briefly described by the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister. Especially interesting are the criticisms of some of his government's decisions taken just before and during the Six Day War. More than half the volume consists of documents and other illustrative material.

TURKISH ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL CHANGE. By Edwin J. Cohn. New York: Praeger, 1970, 196 p. $12.50.

A study whose theme—that rapid economic development and progress toward a more open society can go hand in hand in Turkey—is today the subject of open and highly political debate in that country.

LE KURDISTAN IRAKIEN ENTITÉ NATIONALE: ÉTUDE DE LA RÉVOLUTION DE 1961. By Ismet Chériff Vanly. Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1970, 418 p. Swiss Fr. 30.

A representative of Barzani's movement defends the Kurdish national cause in a book that has a wealth of information, especially on Kurdish-Iraqi relations and negotiations, in addition to the pleading.

South and Southeast Asia

AN EYE FOR THE DRAGON: SOUTHEAST ASIA OBSERVED: 1954–1970. By Dennis Bloodworth. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970, 414 p. $8.95.

Bloodworth knows Southeast Asia intimately and cares about its future. These virtues, combined with a wide range of dramatic and illustrative incidents, a brash verbal facility and a lack of any pretension to be more than good journalism make his book definitely worthwhile for the nonspecialist.

PORTRAIT OF INDIA. By Ved Mehta. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970, 544 p. $12.95.

Trying valiantly to comprehend and characterize the birthplace from which education and career estranged him, a gifted novelist and journalist covers the whole subcontinent and leaves, apparently, none of his notes unprinted. The whole, like its subject, is vivid, uneven and vaguely ominous.

SOCIETY IN INDIA. By David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, 2 v. $10.00 each.

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Mandelbaum's encyclopedic but cursory summation of the Indian social system sees caste hierarchy and "aggressive defense of personal status" as structural and psychological keys; the author denies the Weber-Myrdal thesis that the system presents insuperable obstacles to change.

SOFT STATE: A NEWSPAPERMAN'S CHRONICLE OF INDIA. By Bernard D. Nossiter. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 185 p. $5.95.

Latest in a long line of activist puritan observers of the Indian scene, *The Washington Post's* Nossiter, like his predecessors, feels horror, contempt and shame. For this economist, economics can't explain India; lack of social discipline, violence, selfishness and insensitivity are the clues to the riddle.

PAKISTAN AND THE GREAT POWERS. By Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri. Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies (in coöperation with the Department of International Relations, University of Karachi), 1970, 140 p. Rs. 10.

Professor Chaudhri analyzes his country's problematic relations with the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China on the two levels of ideal and reality. Ideally Pakistan wants good relations with all three superpowers; in this imperfect world, however, Kashmir remains unhappily the key to all Pakistani policy: "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

THE POLITICS OF NEPAL: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN AN ASIAN MONARCHY. By Leo E. Rose and Margaret W. Fisher. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 197 p. $7.95.

The authors note that in the Nepali polity political parties are banned, the bureaucracy is ineffective, the judicial system is at the mercy of the monarchy and the monarchy is "authoritarian." The "process of modernization" is seen as a "tiresome and often discouraging endeavor."

THE ECONOMICS OF INSURGENCY IN THE MEKONG DELTA OF VIETNAM. By Robert L. Sansom. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970, 283 p. $12.50.

Sansom (Rhodes scholar, D. Phil. Oxon., Capt. USAF) interviewed 90 households in two "semi-secure villages" in Vietnam in 1967. Conclusions: 1) Viet Cong successes have been due to real grievances, primarily a feudal land tenure system; 2) the Vietnamese farmer is ingenious, hard-working and adaptable, and would get on happily with rural economic development if governments (of whichever side) would give him land, allow free product and factor markets and leave him alone.

NORTH VIETNAM AND THE PATHET LAO: PARTNERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LAOS. By Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 262 p. $5.95.

Lacking both the style of journalism and the objective verifiability of social science, this must be considered an intelligence report. The authors argue that the Pathet Lao is a creature of the North Vietnamese government and possibly a front for its imperialistic designs.

THAILAND IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By Direck Jayanama. Tübingen: Horst Erdmann Verlag, 1970, 311 p. DM. 36.

Abridged from the Thai original, these memoirs describe in some detail that country's successful diplomatic tightrope act during the Pacific war. The author was Ambassador to Japan and Foreign Minister during the period he describes, although his sympathies, as he recalls, were with the Allies.

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East Asia and Pacific Ocean

COMMUNIST CHINA, 1949–1969: A TWENTY-YEAR APPRAISAL. Edited by Frank N. Trager and William Henderson. New York: New York University Press (for the American-Asian Educational Exchange), 1970, 356 p. $7.95.

Fourteen essays on various aspects of Mainland China's society and politics. The editors argue in the concluding essay that any preponderant power on the Asian mainland threatens U.S. security. None of the contributors can be said to be Maoists.

CHINA: THE REVOLUTION CONTINUED. By Jan Myrdal and Gun Kessle. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971, 201 p. $5.95.

"A Chinese Village" revisited eight years later, in 1970. The authors find higher standards of living and more democratic decision-making than before the cultural revolution. Myrdal's enthusiasm for the Chinese experiment has grown, if that is possible. Kessle's photographs are striking.

DAS POLITBÜRO DES 8. ZENTRALKOMITEES DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEI CHINAS. By Wolfgang Bartke. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1969, 165 p. DM. 40.

An extraordinarily thorough compendium of biographical information on, and the daily activities of, the members of the Chinese Politburo, 1964–67. The reader may draw his own conclusions from such items as that Mao attended the theatre in 1964 11 times, Lin Piao not once; in 1967 Lin topped Mao 4–2.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHINESE EARTH. By Keith Buchanan. New York: Praeger, 1970, 336 p. $12.50.

A confessedly partisan observer celebrates, in a book rich in both data and emotion, the process of transformation of labor into capital, of moral fervor into GNP, which constitutes, as he sees it, the Chinese model for third-world economic development.

LA RÉVOLUTION CULTURELLE CHINOISE. By Jean Esmein. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1970, 347 p. Fr. 25.

Attaché at the French Embassy in Peking from 1965 through 1968, Esmein gives one of the most convincing and thorough accounts available of the great Chinese spectacle of revolt, whose *metteurs en scène* appear to have managed adroitly their intended feat of inspiring and educating audience and actors without burning down the theatre.

THE EMERGING JAPANESE SUPERSTATE: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE. By Herman Kahn. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, 274 p. $7.95.

Super-futurist confronts super-nation in this anecdotal and casually researched set of speculations about the future of Japan. Annoying small errors of fact or omissions of evidence cannot, however, destroy the book's interest; and it will do wonders for Japanese morale.

THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE. By Robert Guillain. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970, 352 p. $8.50.

Guillain's synoptic and agile survey of the postwar transformation of Japan

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couples an excellent depiction of the economic scene with a political analysis less astute: it is extremely dubious, for example, that Japanese political leaders are generally "second rate puppets controlled by the managers." (A translation of "Japon Troisième Grand," Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969, 366 p. Fr. 24.)

LE JAPON. By Jacques Robert. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1970, 524 p. Fr. 50.40.

Like Guillain, Robert sees the Japanese re-ascent to world prominence as challenge, example and opportunity for French diplomacy. He is less dithyrambic than his compatriot as to the political future of the country. He coins the odious form "Nippo-"—as in "Nippo-American Security Treaty."

DAS POLITISCHE SYSTEM JAPANS. By Paul Kevenhörster. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969, 330 p. DM. 29.

This comprehensive survey uses the new American structural-functional orthodoxy to good advantage. Fragmentation of the opposition and an idiosyncratic electoral system are seen to make the peaceful transfer of power difficult and to endanger somewhat Japan's status as Asian model of democracy.

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1941–1968. By Trevor R. Reese. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1969, 376 p. $8.75.

Even with the advantages of a common language, culture and ideology, it is not easy to be the small ally of a big power. Dr. Reese's study sees the benefits of the ANZUS treaty as questionable and the drawbacks as considerable.

AUSTRALIA AND THE COLONIAL QUESTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS. By W. J. Hudson. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970, 214 p. $8.00.

The Australian struggle, covering the life span of the United Nations, to remain on good terms with an anti-colonial majority and simultaneously to retain control of Papua and New Guinea is described here conscientiously but in rather pedestrian form. The lack of a theoretical framework and of a future prognosis is disappointing.

Africa

AFRICA IN THE SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES: ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Frederick S. Arkhurst. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs), 1970, 405 p. $15.00.

A number of leading students of African affairs were invited in 1969 to project contemporary economic, political and legal problems into the 1980s. This volume includes the resulting papers and comments by other participants.

SPEAR AND SCEPTER: ARMY, POLICE, AND POLITICS IN TROPICAL AFRICA. By Ernest W. Lefever. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1970, 251 p. $6.50.

The roles of the armies and police forces in Ethiopia, Ghana and Congo (Kinshasa) are compared in this first-rate study by a student of African affairs, a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Program.

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POWER IN AFRICA. By Ruth First. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971, 513 p. $10.00.

A thoughtful study of military intervention in Africa, with case-studies of the Sudan, Nigeria and Ghana. Born in South Africa, the author has written extensively on African subjects.

LES ÉTATS DU GROUPE DE BRAZZAVILLE AUX NATIONS UNIES. By Mirlande Hippolyte. Paris: Colin, 1970, 333 p. Fr. 58.

A thoughtful analysis by a political scientist of the Brazzaville group at the United Nations. Votes, sponsorship of resolutions and speeches are examined, focusing on three General Assembly issues: the Algerian "problem," the Congo "problem" and the question of Chinese membership in the United Nations. The fifteenth through the twentieth sessions of the General Assembly are studied.

HISTOIRE ÉCONOMIQUE DU CONGO 1880–1968. By Samir Amin and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch. Paris: Éditions Anthropos, 1969, 204 p. Fr. 20.60.

The process of economic development in the Congo (Brazzaville) is examined with particular emphasis on the period between 1960 and 1968 and the development of a customs union among the countries of the former French Equatorial Africa.

CITY POLITICS: A STUDY OF LÉOPOLDVILLE, 1962–63. By J. S. La Fontaine. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 246 p. $13.50.

An anthropologist at the London School of Economics has written an interesting study of politics and social relations in a major African city shortly after independence.

A PATCH OF WHITE. By Arun Gandhi. Bombay: Thacker, 1969, 191 p. Rs. 25.

An Indian who lived for 25 years in South Africa writes a description of apartheid and its human costs.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF APARTHEID. By Amry Vandenbosch. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970, 303 p. $8.50.

A comprehensive survey of South African foreign policy since its beginnings in 1910. The author was formerly at the University of Kentucky.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND EUROPE. Edited by Peter Tregear and John Burley. New York: Pergamon, 1970, 170 p. $6.25.

The title of this volume of papers and short accounts of ensuing discussions is misleading, since it deals mainly with general development problems in Africa, and only one paper deals directly with relationships between Europe and Africa.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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Policy toward Africa for the seventies. Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Mar. 17–Dec. 3, 1970. Washington, 1970. 361 p.

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The Oil import question; a report on the relationship of oil imports to the national security by the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control. Washington, 1970. 399 p. $2.00.

Proposed "Trade Act of 1969" as submitted to the Congress and referred to the Committee on Ways and Means on November 18, 1969, including message of the President, draft bill, section-by-section analysis together with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, House, Mar. 12, 1970. Washington, 1970. 57 p. (Com. Print.)

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Short and medium-term prospects for exports of manufactures from selected developing countries: Lebanon. N.Y., 1970. 86 p. (70.II.D/Mim.5.) $1.00.

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